

ANGLO-MARATHA RELATIONS

DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF WARREN HASTINGS, 1772-1785

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ABBREVIATIONS

1. For. Dept. Sec. Cons. .. Foreign Department Secret Consultation.
2. B. M. Add. Mss. .. British Museum Additional Manuscripts.
3. B. S. C. .. Bengal Secret Consultation.
4. Gleig .. Memoris of the Life of Warren Hastings.
5. Khare .. Aitihasik Lekha Samgraha.
6. S. P. D. .. Selections from the Peshwa Daftar.
7. C. P. C. .. Calendar of Persian Correspondence.

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INTRODUCTION

[In the second half of the eighteenth century the East India Company desired the annexation of several islands on the western coast of India. These were Salsette, Bassein, Kenery, Hog, Elephanta and Karanja. These were then occupied by the Marathas and the East India Company hoped that it might be possible to acquire these territories by peaceful means. In March 1768 the authorities of the Company wrote to the Bombay Government, "We cannot directly point out the mode of doing it, but rather wish they could be obtained by purchase than war"¹. Next year, the Bombay Government opened negotiations with the Poona Government and the Court of Directors observed that it was 'a very proper measure'. Salsette and Bassein with their dependencies and 'the Marattas proportion of the Surat provinces' were all that the East India Company sought for in western India. The Court advised the Bombay Government that they should be 'ever watchful' to obtain these territories and they should have this in view in all their 'treaties, negotiations and military operations'². The negotiations with the Marathas did not produce the desired result and the project was temporarily abandoned.

[The possession of the islands was considered necessary by the East India Company for the defence of Bombay and the matter was revived four years later. Thomas Mostyn arrived from England in 1772 with instructions from the Court of Directors that he should immediately negotiate with Peshwa Madhav Rao "for certain advantages to the settlements on the coasts of Malabar and above all for the cession of the islands, Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay." Mostyn was no stranger to India. He had visited Poona in 1759 as a member of Price's mission. Again, in 1767, Mostyn was sent to Poona Court by the Bombay Government for preventing the Marathas from joining Haidar Ali and the Nizam.

In his third visit to Poona in 1772 Mostyn was instructed to 'penetrate into any design' of the Marathas which might affect the Company's possessions in Bengal or in the Carnatic and try to obtain the cession of Salsette, Bassein and Karanja. The English were willing to cede Fort Victoria to the Marathas, if necessary, and also promise not to oppose their annexation of the Sidi island of Rajpuri.³ He was also advised to try to secure the Marathia share of the Surat revenue and promote friendly relations between the East India Company and the Poona Government.⁴ Mostyn was to conciliate the Peshwa's ministers and become fully acquainted with the intrigues of the Peshwa's court and the Peshwa's temper. For this purpose he was authorised to spend the necessary amount.

Mostyn left Bombay for Poona on the 29th September and arrived there on the 9th October. The Peshwa, who was then seriously ill, was resting at Theur, a small village, about 13 miles from Poona. The Peshwa's brother, Narayan Rao, Sakharam Bapu and other principal ministers were with him. On October 13 the Peshwa sent compliments to Mostyn and informed him through Ramaji Chitnis that as he was too ill to see the British agent, he would be received at the Durbar by his brother Narayan Rao. The reception took place on October 16 when Mostyn presented the Company's letter to Narayan Rao. Next day, Ramaji Chitnis again saw Mostyn and discussed the affairs of Janjira.⁵ He wanted to know whether the English would help the Sidis if the Marathas attacked them. Mostyn gave an evasive answer and explained that as he was not acquainted with all the details he could not judge which party was right. He informed the Bombay Government that as the Peshwa was seriously ill, the Marathas were hardly likely to come to a decision and it would be premature to discuss the matter with them. On October 18 Mostyn was invited to a dinner with Narayan Rao. On October 19 he was informed by Sakharam Bapu that the Poona Government agreed to receive him as 'Resident for the Company'.⁶ In the afternoon of the same day Mostyn saw Nana Farnavis who confirmed what Sakharam Bapu had told him. Mostyn reported these conversations to the Bombay Government and observed, "From the best information I can

procure, the Marattahs will not this year undertake any expedition, at least not until the recovery or demise of Madah Row".⁷

The Peshwa, however, never recovered from his illness. His last days were extremely painful. His wife Ramabai performed severe austerities for his recovery. Sakharam Bapu and Nana Farnavis kept him constant company and were enjoined to place Narayan Rao on the Peshwa's *gadi* and conduct the affairs of the state. Madhav Rao died on November 18.⁸

Grant Duff

The results of Peshwa Madhav Rao's death are said to have been more fatal to the Maratha Empire than the battle of Panipat. This was largely due to the ambition of the late Peshwa's uncle Raghunath Rao. In 1768 he had taken up arms against the Peshwa. He was, however, defeated and confined at the Peshwa's palace, where for sometime a close watch was kept over him.⁹ Six months before his death, Madhav Rao desired to make it up with his uncle and begged him to forget the past and take care of young Narayan Rao after he was gone. But his appeal did not apparently soften Raghunath Rao's heart. Six weeks before the Peshwa's death, Raghunath Rao escaped from Poona. Mostyn learnt that Raghunath Rao had contacted his friends Rajaram Pant Karkun, Madhu Pant Goliah, Kesho Pant Goliah and Ramchandra Pant and asked them to raise ten thousand horse for seizing Poona.¹⁰ These men, however, were immediately captured by the Poona Government. Raghunath Rao was also seized at Tulapur and taken back to Poona.

The obsequies of the late Peshwa were performed at Theur. There was an attempt at reconciling Raghunath Rao ; Narayan Rao promised to work amicably and agreed to follow the advice of his uncle.¹¹ But soon after their arrival at Poona, troubles started again.¹² Raghunath Rao was unwilling to accompany Narayan Rao to Satara for receiving the Peshwa's robes from the Raja of Satara. He insisted on having a separate fief of 25 lakhs to which Narayan Rao did not agree. At last Raghunath Rao was persuaded by his wife Anandi Bai to give up his demand. On the 13th December Narayan Rao received the robes of investiture from the Raja of Satara. Sakharam Bapu

was invested with the office of administrator ; other officials were also confirmed in their respective posts.

Mostyn had an audience with the new Peshwa on 1 January 1773. He suggested that Nana Farnavis and Ramaji Chitnis might be appointed to transact business with him, to which Narayan Rao agreed. On 3 January Ramaji Chitnis had a talk with Mostyn about Broach. The English had occupied it in November 1772. Ramaji tried to find out if the English would part with Broach. Mostyn told him that his superiors would be advised to give up Broach if the Marathas could offer some advantages in exchange of it.¹³

The political connection of the English Company with Broach dates from their capture of Surat in 1759. There were certain claims of the Nawab of Surat upon the customs revenue of the port of Broach. These, together with a sum due to the English on account of an excessive levy of duties on cloth, the Nawab of Broach was called upon to pay. The Bombay Government soon after thought it necessary to send a body of troops towards Broach in order to persuade the Nawab to compliance. But this expedition failed and the attempt to reduce the town was given up.¹⁴ In consequence, however, of these threatening designs, the Nawab (Mazad Khan) came down to Bombay to settle terms of agreement. The terms of accommodation between him and the Bombay Government were, however, not easily settled. After the offer and refusal of several overtures,¹⁵ the Nawab was about to quit the Presidency, when, at last, on the 30th November, 1771, he was induced to sign a treaty. The Nawab acknowledged himself indebted to the Bombay Government for the sum of four lakhs, which he promised to pay at stated periods. The English were to have a factory to the exclusion of all other Europeans except the Dutch, who had already established a factory there. Stipulations of military engagements were also arranged.¹⁶

Despite these apparent gains the Broach enterprise of the Bombay Government was severely condemned by the Court of Directors, and within a few months their censure was fully justified by the Nawab's conduct. Morley, Resident at Broach, met with evasions from the Nawab when the time for the payment

of the first instalment drew near. It seemed that the Nawab had no intention of fulfilling his engagements. The majority of the members of the Bombay Select Committee then decided in favour of an expedition against the Nawab to restore the credit of their arms which had suffered by the failure of the first expedition.¹⁷ William Tayler, a member of the Bombay Select Committee, pointed out that the Bombay Government should not permit the infringement of the treaty 'without immediate chastisement' of the Nawab. He did not forget to allude to the commercial importance of Broach in the following words : "Broach is the key to the rich Kingdom of Guzerat, where most of our European investment is provided, and from whence all the best cotton is brought for the consumption of India and China".¹⁸ A force was accordingly despatched from Bombay in the beginning of November, 1772. The enterprise was successful ; Broach was stormed and captured on 18 November 1772 with the loss of an able commander, Col. Wedderburn, who was killed during the attack on the fort.¹⁹

It was against this background that Mostyn discussed the Broach affair at Poona. He was received in an audience of the 6th January, 1773. As Nana Farnavis was absent the discussion was carried on mainly by Sakharam Bapu. Haripant Phadke and Ramaji Chitnis were also present. The discussion covered a wide range of subjects, e.g., English assistance to Sidi, detention of Angria's sons by the English, Haidar Ali and Broach.²⁰ Sakharam Bapu told Mostyn that as the Marathas had claims on the entire country in the Deccan, Broach should be delivered up to them. He said that the Marathas could have easily taken Broach had they not been engaged in domestic disputes and hostilities with neighbouring states. Mostyn expressed his inability to deliver Broach and from the high tone in which Sakharam conducted the discussion, he concluded that he was not a friend of the English.

On the same day Mostyn presented to Ramaji Chitnis a memorandum²¹ requesting him to procure necessary orders from the Poona Government on the following points :

1. Losses amounting to Rs. 30,915-3-50 sustained by the English merchants were to be paid by the Government.

Peshwa Madhav Rao had issued an order to Visaji Pant to pay the above sum, but no payment had been made.

2. Madhav Rao had ordered Visaji Pant to deliver to Byramji Hormasji a boat of about 200 candies²² in lieu of his grab, burnt by the late Subadar of Salsette. That order was not complied with.

3. The boat belonging to Nasarvanji Modi was not yet given up to him, though an order to this effect had been procured from Peshwa Madhav Rao.

4. Madhav Rao had ordered the Subadar of Karanja to remove the fishing stakes fixed by the Kolis of that place to the prejudice of the English. But the Subadar refused compliance. Visaji Pant also issued an order to that purpose, but it was not carried out.

5. The Governor of Bombay had written to the late Peshwa desiring him to issue an order to his officer at Anjanvel for the delivery of the "Ruparal" and her cargoes belonging to Monakjee Modi of Surat. But Madhav Rao issued an order only for the delivery of the ship stores, saying he could not give up the cargo till he had enquired into the affair. Even this order was not carried out by the local officer.

On the 24th January Ramaji Chitnis sent an order for the delivery of the vessel (but not its cargo) belonging to Monakjee Modi, detained at Anjanvel. With regard to the Kolis of Karanja, the Marathas agreed to the Bombay Government's request. To the other three articles Visaji Pant raised objections.

The capture of Broach by the English irritated Fateh Sing Gaikwad who had some interest in it. Through his wakil, Balaji Naik Berriah, he requested assistance from the Poona Court.²³ In a letter dated 27 December 1772 Mostyn informed the Bombay Council as follows : ".....Futty Sing had made application to this court for assistance against us at Broach ; as yet no answer has been given him, nor do I believe the Durbar will venture to assist him ; the place is of importance to this Court as well as to Futty Sing ; for by what I can learn, it is the key into the Guzerat country, from whence they both draw considerable revenues."²⁴

Despite the reluctance of the Poona Court Fateh Sing did not hesitate to make a show of force for the recovery of Broach. The English troops erected a battery at Jedeseer village, about four miles from Broach. Fateh Sing with five thousand troops was quartered at a distance of about three *Kos* from the battery. The communication between Broach and Surat was suspended by Fateh Sing's order. Two English Pattamars, while going from Surat to Broach, were killed.²⁵ Fateh Sing's warlike efforts, however, made no impression upon the English ; hence he offered to them for the cession of Broach the sum of six lakhs, three of which were to be paid in ready money and the remainder in two equal payments of a lakh and a half each, together with an annual sum of 60,000 rupees out of the revenues of Surat City.²⁶ The English rejected this offer, considering it inadequate to the real value of their new acquisition. At last an agreement was concluded with Fateh Sing by Price on 12 January 1773, by which Fateh Sing was to receive the same share of the revenues of Broach as he enjoyed before the English took the place.²⁷

On the 16th January Ramaji Chitnis told Mostyn that, as the Peshwa would like to get possession of Broach, he would give 'whatever Futty Sing offered.' Mostyn wanted to know the real intention of the Poona Durbar as he felt himself annoyed by their 'shuffling behaviour'. The same proposal about Broach was repeated on behalf of the Peshwa by Ramaji Chitnis on the 26th January, but it could not be complied with as Mostyn knew that an agreement had already been reached between English and Fateh Sing.²⁸ It is alleged that the Poona Durbar wrote a letter to Fateh Sing asking him to break the treaty which he had lately concluded with the English.²⁹ Mostyn did not forget to allude to this in his talks with Ramaji. He hinted that an exchange of the place was the most likely means by which the Marathas could get Broach. On hearing this proposal through Ramaji, Sakharam Bapu became wild with fury and observed that an exchange of places was unthinkable when the English could have disposed of it to Fateh Sing and directed him to return it to the Marathas.³⁰

Mostyn was disappointed at the attitude of the Poona Government. He believed that had Peshwa Madhav Rao died

before his arrival, the ruling party would never have agreed to the embassy. Towards the close of January, 1773, Mostyn expressed his desire to withdraw to Bombay, as owing to the procrastinating spirit of the Poona Durbar he felt that nothing could be accomplished. Towards the middle of February Mostyn was instructed by the Bombay Council to communicate with the Bengal and Madras Presidencies respecting 'the Company's interests at these places'.³¹ The Bombay Council was also surprised at Mostyn's proposal to retire to Bombay. They felt that his departure would be considered as a 'virtual resignation' of the political concession made by Peshwa Madhav Rao and probably no other embassy would be admitted in near future. Moreover, his continuance at Poona was felt necessary because of the division in the Poona Durbar.³² The Bombay Council concluded, "You will remember that we have now the town and territory of Broach in our possession, which we might be induced to give up in addition to what the Hon'ble Company pointed out, provided the offers made by the Marattahs were adequate to the advantage they must reap from it."³³

A dispute between the Marathas and the Sidis had arisen out of the interpretation of an agreement made between Peshwa Madhav Rao and Sidi Yakut. Sidi Rahim on getting possession of power refused to accept these terms. In an interview with Mostyn on the 14th March Hari Pant and Ramaji Chitnis sought English help in taking possession of Janjira. Mostyn told them that the English could not break with the Sidis as they were friends for many years. The Maratha agents then placed before Mostyn three alternative proposals ; the English would take possession of Janjira or they would assist the Marathas in taking it, or the English would stand neutral and allow the Marathas a free hand. Mostyn did not give them 'a direct answer', but agreed to refer the matter to the authorities in Bombay. The Bombay Government's instructions dated the 26th September, 1772, had laid down that the English should not oppose the Marathas taking possession of Rajpuri from the Sidis if they were allowed possession of Salsette, Bassein, Karanja and other islands. This was not divulged by Mostyn, for reasons best explained in his diary : "as their (the Marathas) offers by no means coincide

with my Hon'ble Masters views, I avoided opening myself to them, or giving them the least intimation of our intentions ; for the doing it, until they bid fairer, will be giving them an opportunity of entering into a private treaty with the Sciddee, which he most likely would readily do, had he any idea of our giving him up".³⁴

Mostyn was granted another audience with the Peshwa on 22 April 1773. Hari Pant and Ramaji Chitnis told him that by the treaty made with Chimnaji Appa the English had promised to stand neutral in case the Marathas broke with the Sidis. But the English were not inclined to stand neutral unless they were assured of substantial gain by the Marathas.³⁵ In conformity with his wishes Mostyn was allowed to raise some peons in Poona, but his request for a suitable house to live in during the rainy season could not be complied with. Mostyn was to remain in Govind Shewram's garden where he had been residing since his arrival at Poona.³⁶

During Mostyn's stay at Poona Mahadji Sindhia and other Maratha Chiefs were occupied in looking after Emperor Shah Alam who had returned to Delhi and in collecting revenues from the north Indian districts, which had just passed under Maratha rule. Shah Alam was pressed for money by the Marathas. As the Emperor had no money to spare, Tukoji Holkar and Visaji Krishna advised him to confer the office of *Mir Bakshi* upon Zabita Khan. Zabita Khan also promised to pay the Marathas ten lakhs in cash if they succeeded in securing him the post. This move was not liked by Mahadji Sindhia. Shah Alam also did not like Zabita Khan's reinstatement to that office.³⁷ He had also begun to realise that the Marathas were bent upon territorial encroachments. At last he ordered his general Najaf Khan to drive the Marathas out of Delhi. Holkar and Visaji thereupon attacked Delhi (December 17, 1772) and the Emperor was defeated. Polier wrote : "The rout or defeat was great, and would have been complete had not the two English battalions (under Madec) with a 3 of the King, stood their ground firmly, and at night covered the retreat with great resolution and tolerable order."³⁸ The Marathas thus became 'perfect masters at the Court of Delhy', obtained

an imperial *sanad* for Kora and Allahabad and Zabita Khan was appointed *Mir Bakshi*.

The Marathas then turned their attention to Oudh to take possession of Kora and Allahabad, but Shuja-ud-daula refused to give up these territories. He made frantic appeals³⁹ to the English protectors at Calcutta and English forces under Colonel Champion and Sir Robert Barker joined him. The Maratha forces did not fare well in the battle of Ramghat.⁴⁰ There was now an open rupture between Visaji and Tukoji, each of them blaming the other for this irreparable failure of Maratha enterprise in Hindusthan after three years of effort (Feb. 1770-May 1773). In the month of May the Marathas themselves set out for the Deccan by way of Etawa and Kalpi.⁴¹

Janoji Bhosle of Nagpur died in May 1772.⁴² As he had no children, he had adopted his nephew Raghujī, Mudaji's son, and had appointed Mudaji the boy's guardian. After Janoji's death, the boy's claim was contested by Sabaji, and his unjust claim was supported by the Poona Durbar.⁴³ The Durbar's decision was probably inspired by the opposition of the Poona Court to Raghunath Rao. As Grant Duff writes : "Moodajee unfortunately for himself and his son, had hitherto maintained a connexion with Raghunath Rao ; and his pretensions not being supported by Narrain Rao or his ministers, he could only levy troops and assert his cause by force of arms."⁴⁴ After a trifling skirmish, this fratricidal war came to be temporarily adjusted and an agreement was arrived at by which Raghujī was to be recognised as the ruler of Nagpur and Mudaji and Sabaji were to act jointly as Dewan.⁴⁵ But the quarrel flared up again. Dariabai, the widow of Janoji, quitted Sabaji and joined Mudaji and they released Dewaji Pant from prison.⁴⁶ The Poona Durbar sent Balaji Palande with three thousand soldiers to help Sabaji⁴⁷ and took some preliminary precautions to defend Poona lest Mudaji might come this way. Mudaji obtained the aid of Ismail Khan Patan, Governor of Ellichpore, plundered several villages and proceeded to Burhanpur with his troops. Narayan Rao was frightened and sent Vamanrao Patwardhan to Miraj instructing him to raise ten thousand soldiers.⁴⁸ Sabaji Bhosle, with the help of Nizam Ali⁴⁹, and

his minister Rukn-ud-daula, attacked Ellichpore. Mudaji retaliated and captured ten guns ; Sabaji had to retreat twelve miles from Ellichpore.⁵⁰

Haider Ali took full advantage of the circumstances when the situation at Poona was too complicated to permit the Marathas to undertake an expedition against him. He sent his troops to Chitaldurg and Savanur and plundered the districts near Raolkondah.⁵¹ He also threatened to attack Sira, Mudgere and Gurrankonda. The Marathas sent some forces under Muhammad Yusuf and Trimbakrao Pethe was appointed to command in that troubled part.⁵² Narayan Rao asked Haider to pay the arrears of tribute amounting to 50 lakhs of rupees. Haider answered that the demand would be met on the restoration of places conquered by the late Peshwa Madhav Rao.⁵³

The Portuguese started disturbances in the Konkan. The Peshwa sent reinforcements to Vijaydurg.⁵⁴ Krishnaji Dhulap attacked the Portuguese and drove them back to Malwan.⁵⁵

Peshwa Narayan Rao did not possess the tact and ability of his brother. Madhav Rao had largely won over Sakharam Bapu, Sakharam Hari, Chinto Vithal, Gangadhar Yeshtant, Visaji Lele, Abaji Madhav Sohoni and other partisans of his uncle and thus prevented them from combining against him. After Narayan Rao's accession the following opinion of his capacity was reported from the Poona Court : "The Shrinant is yet a child and does not follow the guidance of Sakharam Bapu. Because of the sudden demise of Madhav Rao, everything is in confusion. The tiger is gone and the Jackals alone remain behind. God save the State".⁵⁶

The first affair that led to an open rupture between Raghunath Rao and his nephew concerned one Visajipant Lele, who was Governor of Bassein for a long time. He was charged with embezzlement of twenty lakhs of rupees, for which Madhav Rao had dismissed him from service. On Narayan Rao's accession Visajipant applied for reinstatement and was supported by Sakharam Bapu. Narayan Rao, however, appointed Trimbakrao Vinyak as Governor of Bassein.⁵⁷

Narayan Rao's relations with his uncle at first appeared to be cordial. But signs of estrangement soon began to appear.

On hearing that Raghunath Rao and his wife Anandi Bai were engaged in intrigues, Narayan Rao imprisoned them. Nana Farnavis disapproved of the Peshwa's action as there had been no proper investigation.

The differences between Narayan Rao and Sakharam Bapu assumed such a proportion that they agreed to go to Gopika Bai at Gangapur for a settlement.⁵⁸ For this purpose Narayan Rao, Sakharam Bapu and Vamanrao Patwardhan repaired to Gangapur in the middle of March 1773 and spent a few days there without coming to any definite solution.

In the meantime Raghunath Rao, sulking at Shaniwar Wada palace at Poona, took full advantage of the Peshwa's absence to promote a fresh intrigue. He began to enlist troops of his own and contacted Haidar Ali through his wakil Appaji Ram, who was stationed at Poona. The plot was discovered and Naro Appaji reinforced the guards. Raghunath Rao pitched his tents outside and declared that he was going out on an expedition. But Krishnarao Ballal intervened and Raghunath Rao was persuaded to wait till the return of the Peshwa.⁵⁹ On receiving intelligence of troubles in Poona, Narayan Rao hurried back to the city and Raghunath Rao was again placed in confinement.⁶⁰ Some correspondence relating to Raghunath Rao's intrigues with Haidar were discovered and Appaji Ram was sent a prisoner to the fort of Purandhar. Some other friends of Raghunath Rao were also seized and sent to different forts.⁶¹

The Prabhus at this time were nursing a special grievance against Narayan Rao. They claimed the rights of Kshatriyas in the performance of their religious functions and insisted upon the use of the Vedic hymns for that purpose. This practice had continued since the days of Shivaji⁶² but it received a severe check at the hands of Narayan Rao who declared that the Prabhus had no right to perform Vedic rituals. He compelled them to sign a statement renouncing the Brahmanical practice. Naturally he incurred their displeasure.

When Raghunath Rao and his followers received the news of Mudaji's success, they intensified their intrigues. In order to divert the Peshwa's attention from the Bhosle affair, Mudaji planned to release Raghunath Rao and sent his clerks Vyankat-

rao Kashi and his brother Lakshman Kashi to Poona. They were dispatched primarily to obtain the Peshwa's sanction to the succession of Raghuji, son of Mudaji, to the chiefship of Nagpur. But Narayan Rao had already given his support to Sabaji. The agents consulted Sakham Hari Gupte, a supporter of Raghunath Rao, who had been chafing under the restrictions imposed by Narayan Rao on the Prabhu Caste. These three persons, Vyankatrao, Lakshman Kashi and Sakham Hari, were the original plot-makers. Their plan was to release Raghunath Rao. This would allow Raghunath Rao to gather his soldiers near Poona and the Peshwa would be so busy controlling his uncle that he would have hardly any opportunity to interfere in Nagpur affairs. One dark night in August Raghunath Rao tried to escape with the help of Lakshman Kashi. He was, however, stopped by the guards. Lakshman Kashi managed to escape and fled from Poona.⁶³

Later on it was planned to imprison Narayan Rao, liberate Raghunath Rao and make him the Peshwa. At this stage Bhavanrao Pratinidhi, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Vitthal Vishram, Chinto Vithal and Sakham Bapu joined in the intrigues. The plot was, however, considerably altered after a few weeks ; this was largely the work of Raghunath Rao's attendant, Tulaji Pawar.⁶⁴ Raghunath Rao's wife Anandi Bai also took part in the plot. Tulaji Pawar went further than the other intriguers. He won over the Gardi Chiefs,⁶⁵ Sumersing, Muhammad Yusuf, Kharagsing and Bahadur Khan to carry the plot to its conclusion by murdering Narayan Rao.⁶⁶

The end of August appeared to be favourable time for the intriguers. The Maratha army had been dispersed on the onset of the rainy season. There were only three to four thousand soldiers in and around Poona. Narayan Rao, it seems, never apprehended any attempt on his life. The security arrangements were sufficient only for guarding Raghunath Rao.

The Peshwa, however, had a warning from Raghuji Angria. He ordered Haripant Phadke to take precautions against any possible disturbances by the Gardis. Disturbances by the Gardis were not uncommon and Haripant did not attach much importance to the Peshwa's fear. He went to the suburb of

Sakharam Bapu evidently did not like to take part in the administration.

Bhavanrao Pratinidhi, Maloji Ghorpade and Bajaba Purandare had an interview with Raghunath Rao on the night of the murder. They found Raghunath Rao virtually a prisoner of the Gardis, who demanded Purandhar, Nagar and Salsette forts and a sum of five lakhs as reward. They also threatened Raghunath Rao that if their demands were not fully met, Ali Bahadur would be made Peshwa.⁷² At last a settlement was reached with the Gardis through the intercession of Bhavanrao Pratinidhi. Besides a reward of five lakhs, the Gardis should be given three lakhs more in exchange of the forts.⁷³ The Peshwa's body was then carried away for cremation. His widow Ganga Bai insisted on being a Sati. She was prevented by Anandi Bai, who was afraid of the Sati's curse.⁷⁴

Mostyn, who was at Poona, gives a detailed account of the unfortunate incident. On 31 August 1773 he noted in his diary ; "The scheme was laid six months ago, and every opportunity for some months watched to put it in execution, but a favourable one never offered till yesterday, and even then it was hastened on by Ragobah and Sacaram Bappoo having heard Naron Row had come to a resolution of confining them both in irons".⁷⁵ Writing to Calcutta on the 9th September, Mostyn stated that most of the ministers were concerned in the plot.⁷⁶ He believed that the murder of the Peshwa was not the intention of those who had planned the scheme for Raghunath Rao's release ; they meant only to make Narayan Rao prisoner, to which "every one of the ministers, except Nana Farnavis and Haripant, were privy".⁷⁷ *Harivanshachi Bakhar*, the only *bakhar* giving a detailed and consistent account of Narayan Rao's murder, says that the original order procured from Raghunath Rao was to 'seize' Narayan Rao. But, later on, the word was scratched and replaced by 'slain'; through the intervention of Anandi Bai.⁷⁸ Grant Duff also says that "by the original paper, afterwards recovered by Ramshastree, it was found that the word *dhurawe*, to seize, was altered to *marawe*, to kill. It is universally believed that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye".⁷⁹

CHAPTER II

EVENTS LEADING TO THE TREATY OF SURAT

Raghunath Rao assumed the charge of Peshwaship on 30 August,¹ 1773, and wrote to the neighbouring powers and to the Maratha officers advising them of Narayan Rao's death.² The ministers were directed to carry on the business as usual.² Nana paid his compliments to Raghunath Rao, and was ordered to carry on the office of Farnavis as before. Haripant Phadke was allowed to continue in his post under Nana Farnavis on condition of paying two lakhs of rupees.³ On the 5th September Mostyn paid his compliments to Raghunath Rao. During this interview Mostyn tried to find out what offer Raghunath Rao might make in return for British friendship. He was, however, disappointed as Raghunath Rao replied only 'in general terms'.⁴

The sudden assumption of power by Raghunath Rao did not fail to create troubles. Mostyn entered in his diary on 5 September : "The Prince (Raghunath Rao) seems jealous of all the old ministers, and they not only of him, but of each other ; and tho' they have received orders to carry on the business of their different offices, they as yet are fearful of acting. Ragobah, from what I can learn, at present places his chief safety in the guards, who still have charge of the palace and are the principal people about his person."⁵ Mostyn was granted another audience with Raghunath Rao on 7 September and was told that Nana Farnavis and Ramaji Chitnis would transact business with him on behalf of the Poona Durbar. Mostyn took his leave 'much disappointed'. He believed that the exigencies of his situation might induce Raghunath Rao to propose something that might be advantageous for the Company. But he was disappointed in his expectations and wrote in his diary : "In my opinion it would by no means forward the views of my Hon'ble Employers for me to propose assistance, when

from Ragobah's behaviour he seems not to think he stands in need of it."⁶

On 10 September 1773 Ramaji Chitnis told Mostyn that Raghunath Rao was willing to give six lakhs of rupees in order to get possession of Broach from the English. Mostyn seemed to be much 'surprised' at this, as he had already told the Poona Durbar that his 'superiors were resolved not to part with the place in question for any pecuniary consideration whatever.'⁷

In the new regime Raghunath Rao's supporters had been specially favoured. Govindrao Gaikwad, Sadashiv Ramchandra and Baji Rao Burwe had been allowed to keep troops. Haripant Bhide was placed in charge of the state cavalry. Sakharam Hari, Malharrao Panse and Bajipant were given charge of the army. Babuji Naik had been given *Saranjams* and his son *Potdari*. On demand of Raghunath Rao, Raste surrendered his forts in order to avoid a direct quarrel. Vamanrao was asked to come to Poona as soon as possible; otherwise Raghunath Rao might doubt Patwardhan's sincerity.⁸

Sakharam Bapu did not directly participate in the administration but kept himself in contact with the Court through his agent Chinto Vithal. He feared that by associating himself directly with the administration, he might expose himself to blame for participation in the murder plot.⁹ On Raghunath Rao's insistence, however, he agreed to take charge of ministership, but only on two conditions: firstly, that all personal servants of Raghunath Rao should be sent away and secondly, only two thousand *Gardis* should be in charge of the palace. It was a proposal which could not well accord with Raghunath Rao's wish as he intended to appoint seven or eight thousand *Gardis*.¹⁰

Appaji Ram, Haidar's agent at the Poona Court,¹¹ tried to secure from Raghunath Rao the territories of Mudgere, Chenraidurg, Hoskote and Balapur by holding the bait of a permanent alliance with Haidar Ali.¹² Meanwhile, Haidar had begun his campaign by attacking Harpanhalli, Savanur and Chitaldurg.

In the middle of September Sewram Jivaji, Fateh Sing's Vakil, met Mostyn and talked of a probable alliance with the

English. The treaty to be concluded should be operative only if Raghunath Rao should try to vest Govind Rao with sole power in the Gaikwad State. Sewram Jivaji also proposed that the Peshwa's share in the Gujarat territory, except Ahmedabad and half of Petlad purgunnah,¹³ should devolve to the East India Company. He added that Broach was to be delivered up to Fatch Sing. Mostyn replied that these 'extraordinary proposals' were not likely to be accepted by the Bombay Council as it would mean a war with the Peshwa and the loss of trading facilities enjoyed by the English in the Maratha dominions.¹⁴

Meanwhile events at Poona had begun to take an unfavourable turn after Raghunath Rao's assumption of power. The intestine divisions of the Marathas and Raghunath's continued distrust of the old ministers undermined the strength of the Poona Durbar. Mostyn had previously hinted to the Bombay Council that he might be compelled to withdraw 'should an accident happen to Ragobah, or he be attacked by any foreign power'.¹⁵ But the very idea of Mostyn's departure from Poona was disliked by the Bombay authorities. They advised him to continue at Poona. "We do not doubt", they added, "but some circumstances will fall out to facilitate the accomplishment of the cession from the Marathas of the several places the Hon'ble Company are desirous of acquiring on this side India, provided you conduct yourself with that spirit and address which is requisite in the present circumstances of affairs, and not think of retiring from Poona, as you hint your intention of doing; for in this juncture your presence is more particularly necessary at the Durbar".¹⁶ On 26 September Mostyn offered to Raghunath Rao and his adopted son, Amrit Rao, a few presents in the name of the Company.¹⁷

During the two months following the murder, Raghunath Rao seemed to have been fairly settled at the head of administration. Haidar Ali's agent, Appaji Ram, maintained friendly relations with the new Peshwa while he induced his master to attack Sira, Hoskote, Mudgere and Balapur.¹⁸ The only disturbed spot was Nagpur where a fratricidal war was raging between Sabaji and Mudaji. The former was joined by the Nizam's forces, commanded by his youngest brother Rukn-ud-daula

and his general Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa. Sabaji became the head of the Nagpur State and the title of *Sena-Saheb-Subah* was conferred on him by Peshwa Narayan Rao. Mudaji appealed to Raghunath Rao through his agent at Poona, Vyankatrao Kashi. Raghunath Rao resolved in the first instance to oppose Nizam Ali and put down Sabaji.

Strengthened by the funds brought by Visaji Krishna from North India, Raghunath Rao left Poona in October, 1773, never to return. On the eve of his departure Ramshastri, the chief judge, waited upon him and pronounced the result of his investigation of Narayan Rao's murder, in which Raghunath Rao was declared to be the principal participant. In the year 1759 Ramshastri was placed at the head of the Shastris of the Court. As Grant Duff wrote, "...the weight and soundness of his opinions were universally acknowledged during his life ; ...the greatest man who did wrong stood in awe of Ram Shastri."¹⁹ His verdict gave an indirect encouragement to the various disaffected elements who could not reconcile themselves to Raghunath Rao's rule and they secretly began to rally round ~~Ganga Bai~~, now known to have advanced a few months in pregnancy.²⁰ Anandi Bai could not remain idle ; she tried to force abortion.²¹

Sakharam Bapu reproached himself as he could not keep up the promise which he had given to Peshwa Madhav Rao of his full protection to Narayan Rao. The utter disregard of many of Bapu's advices by Raghunath Rao did not fail to strain the relations between the two.²² Sakharam Bapu started his new plans silently and secretly because he had experience of the Peshwa's Durbar for the last forty years. From the middle of October Sakharam Bapu, Bhagawantrao Pratinidhi and Faltankar started scheming against Raghunath Rao. Parashuram Bhow informed Vamanrao that the Maratha sirdars were determined to save Ganga Bai by all means.²³

Sakharam Bapu accompanied Raghunath Rao in the campaign together with other nobles. When Raghunath Rao was at Pedgaon, Bapu took leave of him on ground of ill-health and came to his house at Saswad.²⁴ The unaccountable behaviour of Raghunath Rao towards the ministers could not

escape the attention of Mostyn. In an entry on 15 November it is recorded as follows : "Ragobah has undoubtedly behaved in a very unaccountable manner, not only to Nana and those that were Naron Rows friends, but to all the old Ministers and great officers indiscriminately. All the former have left him in disgust, except Moraba ; even Sacaram Bappoo, who never forsook Ragobah in all his troubles, he has slighted in such a manner as to oblige him to retire to his house on pretence of sickness..."²⁵

Raghunath Rao's first trouble arose with the Nizam who, always ready to profit by the events at Poona, prepared to attack the Marathas.¹ Mudaji Bhosle joined Raghunath Rao with his forces at Alegaum whence the two proceeded together to Naldurg.²⁶ Naldurg was captured²⁷ with little ease as the fort 'was too extensive to be defended by the small garrison that was in it'. Raghunath Rao placed a garrison at Naldurg and marched towards Hyderabad with 60,000 men including the forces of Vamanrao Patwardhan and Anandrao Raste, who had recently joined him. As Sabaji Bhosle was then believed to have planned an attack upon Poona, Raghunath Rao detached Trimbakrao Pethe and Anandrao Raste with 15,000 horse for keeping watch over Sabaji's movements.

Nizam Ali had assembled his troops at Bidar for an attack on Raghunath Rao. Raghunath attacked Bidar with his artillery.²⁸ Vamanrao was instructed to guard the neighbourhood in order to prevent all reinforcements from reaching Bidar.²⁹ The Nizam anxiously waited for some reinforcements from Basalat Jung and Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa.³⁰ "For three weeks there were daily skirmishes, in which the Mahrattas were generally successful."³¹ Mostyn, relying on rumours, believed that Raghunath Rao was worsted in the battle. People at Poona felt panicky at these rumours, and the ministers and other important persons evacuated their families from the city.³² Mostyn sensed that Raghunath Rao's reign was drawing fast to an end as he had heard that machinations were going on against him. Mostyn asked the Bombay Government to consider whether, in case of the death or deposition of Raghunath Rao, 'it would not be a good opportunity for the Hon'ble Company to accom-

plish their wishes by seizing those places', ³³ which they had so long desired.

The Nizam's army, however, was put to difficulty owing to lack of proper supplies and reinforcement. The Nizam, therefore, expressed a desire to come to terms with the Peshwa. On 9 December 1773 his agent Rukn-ud-daula visited Raghunath Rao's camp and agreed to give up Jaagir worth twenty lakhs and Aurangabad.³⁴ Patankar, Moroba, Chinto Vithal and other Maratha chiefs became very much displeased at this arrangement as nobody was consulted.³⁵ Nizam Ali afterwards had an interview with Raghunath Rao and gave him valuable presents. He pleaded his inability to comply with what his vizier had promised. Raghunath Rao agreed to waive the whole demand, on the Nizam's agreeing to assist him with a body of troops in any emergency.

Raghunath Rao has been blamed for granting such easy terms to his enemy. Grant Duff says, "Rugonath Rao to the great joy of his domestic enemies, in an effusion of misplaced generosity immediately restored the whole ; and although little can be said in excuse for his being thus openly cajoled by the well-known Nizam Ally, it is one of many proofs that he was still more weak than wicked".³⁶ Raghunath Rao's action may, however, be viewed in another light. He was anxious to retain the Peshwaship ; he knew that he was surrounded by enemies at home ; hence he was not only ready but eager to make peace with the Nizam.

After the conclusion of peace with the Nizam, Raghunath Rao advanced to Gulbaraga and endeavoured to settle his disputes with Haidar Ali. He wrote to Mahammad Ali Khan, asking him to join with a stipulated number of troops against Haidar or send him the arrears of *Chauth* and to return Tanjore³⁷ to the Maratha Raja. At the same time he also asked Haidar Ali to assist him against Muhammad Ali Khan or pay him the arrears of tribute. He knew too well that none of them would be willing to agree to his requests. He then began his march towards the Krishna. His attention was, however, diverted to another quarter.

Sakharam Bapu and Nana Farnavis had withdrawn from

Raghunath Rao's army and returned to Poona. They were soon followed by Ganpat Rao Raste, Babuji Naik and Moroba Farnavis. Sakharam Bapu, relying on the support of Nana, Patwardhan, Raste and others, took the lead in organising a plot against Raghunath Rao. The scheme of protecting Ganga Bai was thus taking shape. If a male child was born, the problem would be easy ; but in the case of a female child coming forth, the name of Ali Bahadur for the Peshwaship was thought of, as he was a direct descendant of Baji Rao. Parashuram Bhow volunteered to carry away Ganga Bai to his place Miraj.³⁸ But he was dissuaded from taking such a hasty step after consultation with Sakharam Bapu. Nana Farnavis, Moroba Farnavis, Haripant Phadke, Babuji Naik, Maloji Ghorpade, Bhavanrao Pratinidhi, Raste, Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar were all members of the party formed against Raghunath Rao. The party came to be termed as the Council of the Barbhais.

On the 30th January, 1774, Nana Farnavis, Sakharam Bapu and Haripant carried off Ganga Bai and Parvati Bai to the hill-fort of Purandhar.³⁹ The ministers formed themselves into a regency under Ganga Bai and resolved to govern the country in her name. Sakharam Bapu was to be the Dewan and carry on the business with the help of Nana Farnavis.⁴⁰ Orders were sent to different forts in the name of Ganga Bai. Sabaji Bhosle assured Nana of his full support in the measures adopted by the Barbhais.⁴¹ The Nizam and Rukn-ud-daula were also in complete agreement with the Barbhais.⁴² Chimnaji Nilkanth was deputed to the Nizam and Rukn-ud-daula with the object of securing their support.⁴³ Naro Appaji imprisoned the Kotwal of Poona and many of the followers of Raghunath Rao.⁴⁴

In the meantime Raghunath Rao received 72,000 rupees as tribute from Bellary and settled matters with Haidar Ali.⁴⁵ His pecuniary distress was so pressing, that upon Haidar's paying twenty-five lakhs of rupees, he gave up all claims to the Maratha districts of Mudgere, Hoskote and Chandragiri. Disquieting reports from Poona had already reached him and he was compelled to conclude a treaty with Haidar at Kaliandurg. By this treaty Haidar recognised Raghunath Rao as the Peshwa and agreed to pay him an annual tribute of six lakhs.

and enabled him to march towards Satara. As the Poona forces advanced, he changed his route and marched to Pandharpur.⁵³ He sent two agents to Trimbakrao requesting a settlement⁵⁴ although he had other plans. On 26 March 1774 he suddenly attacked the slender force of Trimbakrao with ten thousand horse near Kasegaum, eight miles south of Pandharpur. Trimbakrao was mortally wounded in the battle and died a week later. He was regarded as the ablest military officer of the Maratha Empire,⁵⁵ and his death was a definite loss to the Poona party.⁵⁶ The action at Kasegaum did not produce any permanent results on the fortunes of the war, but it was a definite set back for Nana Farnavis and for a while it damped the enthusiasm of his party.

Before the situation became worse Haripant hastened from Satara and was joined by the forces of Bhosle and Nizam Ali. Raghunath Rao had no funds to support his army. Suspecting the fidelity of some of his officers, he did not dare to face the ministerial forces and retreated towards Burhanpur in the hope of getting help from Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar.⁵⁷ He also thought of asking for Shuja-ud-daula's help in case Sindhia and Holkar did not join him.⁵⁸ The pursuit of Raghunath Rao was wilfully delayed by Nizam Ali who selected this moment for demanding the jaigir promised to him.⁵⁹ The Nizam's treacherous conduct in the campaign may best be described in Mostyn's own words. In a letter to the Bombay Council dated 2 October Mostyn wrote : "It is not his (Nizam Ali's) interest to embrace either side of the question, but endeavour to keep up the flame ; for it is by the intestine divisions of the Brahmins, and not by their union, the Nizam will be a gainer."⁶⁰ Sabaji Bhosle also had his own interest—the subjugation of Mudaji. Haripant was not prepared to take the risk of attacking Raghunath Rao single-handed as he had the example of Trimbakrao before him.

Haidar Ali made capital out of the troubles of the Poona ministers. He attacked Sira while his son Tipu besieged Gurramkonda.⁶¹ Both these strong forts fell as the Maratha forces could not be mobilised to save them.⁶² At the same time Basalat Jung, from Adoni, entered the Maratha country

and levied contributions as far as Hutnee and Miraj.⁶³ The Poona ministers sent Visaji Krishna and Raste with 10,000 troops to Karnatak.⁶⁴

Raghunath Rao's hope of continuing as the Peshwa was soon shattered by the news of the birth of a son to Ganga Bai in the hill fort at Purandhar on 18 April.⁶⁵ There was jubilation at Poona and the Chhatrapati granted the robes of Peshwaship to the infant when he was forty days old.

Raghunath Rao remained for a short time at Burhanpur. He was expecting promises of help from Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar. He also sent Visaji Keshav and Chinto Vithal to Purandhar for negotiating a settlement with the ministers.⁶⁶ They, however, deserted Raghunath Rao and became ready converts to the cause of the Barbhais. The ministers proposed that they would pay Raghunath Rao an annual pension of two lakhs of rupees provided he would retire from politics and reside at Anandvalli.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, Raghunath Rao had been deserted by the major part of his army. Mudaji Bhosle, one of his principal allies, also had left him. The former Peshwa had with him now only 7,000 horse. With this small force he crossed the Narbada and reached Indore in the middle of May.⁶⁸ There he met Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar. Raghunath Rao represented to them that he was willing to come to terms with the Poona ministers provided they gave him suitable Jaigirs and some forts.⁶⁹ Sindhia and Holkar tried to explain to Raghunath Rao the dangerous course he was following and urged the expediency of a settlement. It was feared that Vamanrao's army would attack Indore and imprison Raghunath Rao. Sindhia and Holkar, however, were able to prevent this,⁷⁰ and finally the draft of a settlement was ready with their help. The terms were as follows.⁷¹

- ✓(1) Raghunath Rao should be given six lakhs of rupees to pay off his contingents.
- (2) One lakh of rupees should be given to Raghunath Rao for his personal expenditure and the expenses for his servants and other personnel should be paid every month by the ministers.

- (3) After the dispersal of his army Sindhia and Holkar should conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona.
- (4) About five hundred soldiers from the armies of Sindhia and Holkar should be placed at Raghunath Rao's disposal, the expenses being borne by the Poona Government.
- (5) Members of certain Brahmin families and others who were detained need not be released.
- (6) Traitors should be punished.

Raghunath Rao agreed to return to Poona on getting seven lakhs of rupees.⁷² But on receiving the amount he attempted to escape and marched towards Bhopal.⁷³ He was pursued by Sindhia and Holkar and brought back.

In the meantime events at Poona did not wear a happy prospect. Moroba, the cousin of Nana, was dissatisfied as little regard was paid to his counsel. In a letter dated 10 February 1774, Mostyn informed Hornby, Governor of Bombay, that Moroba had 'declared off from all further connection with the Ministry' and intended to join Raghunath Rao.⁷⁴ Other ministers who did not like the tutelage of Bapu and Nana readily made a common cause with Moroba. Haripant learnt that Moroba, in conjunction with Babuji Naik and Bajaba Purandare, had formed a scheme of seizing the persons of Bapu, Nana, Ganga Bai and her son. They immediately left Saswad, where they had come to pass the rainy season, and reached Purandhar on the night of the 27th June.⁷⁵ On finding that their plot had been discovered, Bajaba and Babuji Naik fled respectively towards Jejuri and Baramati.⁷⁶ The ministers did not attempt arresting Moroba as they considered him too powerful.

Raghunath Rao, accompanied by Sindhia and Holkar, crossed the Narbada on his way to Poona at the end of July.⁷⁷ Encamping near Dhulkot, he invited the ministers to a personal conference. The prolonged negotiations between Raghunath Rao and the two chiefs—Sindhia and Holkar—had exhausted the patience of the ministers. They had already agreed to give Raghunath Rao Jaagir worth 10 lakhs and two forts under supervision of Sindhia and Holkar. They sent instructions to Sindhia and Holkar demanding final settlement with Raghunath Rao.⁷⁸

Bapu and Nana with 25,000 troops left for Burhanpur in the last week of November, 1774. Negotiations were started at Burhanpur in the course of which Raghunath Rao, suspecting that he was going to be captured, suddenly fled on the night of 10 December.

Throughout the course of his negotiations with Sindhia and Holkar the ex-Peshwa was planning his escape.⁷⁹ When it was definitely known that Sindhia and Holkar had joined the ministers, he thought of escaping to Shuja-ud-daula, Haidar Ali or to the English. The first two were far distant and, therefore, he decided to escape to Surat or Broach. Sindhia and Holkar could have prevented the flight of Raghunath Rao : but they did not like to capture and hand him over to the ministers. This would have prevented them from dictating terms to the Poona Durbar. The same motive also induced them to check Haripant from engaging in a battle with him.⁸⁰ Raghunath Rao was probably aware of this weakness of Sindhia and Holkar and found an easy chance to escape.

During his retreat towards Burhanpur Raghunath Rao had established contact with the English. A person on his behalf met Mostyn at Poona on the 9th April and attempted to find out whether the East India Company would help Raghunath Rao with ten thousand troops and fifty lakhs of rupees. Raghunath Rao was prepared to make over Gujarat as security and the country about Seringham⁸¹, and the islands near Bombay, until the Company was fully re-imbursed. He also agreed to cede for ever to the Company other territories, the exact districts to be named by the Bombay Council.⁸² The Bombay Government was informed accordingly by Mostyn on the 10th April. The Bombay Council replied that it would not be possible for them to furnish Raghunath Rao with any money ; that they might be induced to assist him with a body of forces, consisting of 500 Europeans and a battalion of sepoys, in consideration of such articles 'to be previously stipulated for the benefit and advantage of the Company' ; that Raghunath Rao must not only send a sum of money to Bombay to put the English army in motion, but should also point out the means by which they were to be paid so long as they continued in his service.⁸³

Raghunath Rao's agent informed Mostyn that it would not be possible for his master to advance any money, 'as it was money he stood most in need of, more than men'.⁸⁴

Raghunath Rao's appeal for help seemed to be very alluring to the Bombay Government. They believed that if Raghunath Rao became the Peshwa with their help, they would be able to obtain the desired places, i.e., Salsette, Bassein, Karanja and other small islands. It would also relieve them from the necessity of applying to other presidencies for money.⁸⁵

Negotiations through Mostyn at Poona could not be continued owing to the sudden retreat of Raghunath Rao. The latter renewed his overtures to the English through Robert Gambier, the acting Chief of Surat. His agent Nav Ratan, who was negotiating at Poona for English assistance, came to Surat. He was directed to conclude the negotiations. Gambier was informed that Raghunath Rao was willing to enter into a treaty with the Company for the purpose of being furnished with a sufficient force 'to carry him to Poona and establish him in the government there'. In consideration of this assistance Raghunath Rao would 'defray all the charges of the expedition and make every considerable grant to the Company and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance', which the Bombay Government might choose.⁸⁶ Nav Ratan was anxious to know how many troops the English would be able to spare and what would be their monthly expense.⁸⁷

The President and Council of Bombay on receipt of the proposals of Raghunath Rao adopted a resolution on September 6. It was agreed to assist Raghunath Rao with a body of forces, consisting of European infantry and sepoys with a proper field train of artillery, amounting to about 2500 men on these conditions : That a considerable sum of money, 16 or 20 lakhs of rupees, should be previously deposited to defray the expenses and 'to insure the Company from any loss' ; that Salsette, Bassein and the small islands adjacent to Bombay with the Maratha share of the revenues of Surat and Broach should be made over to the Company for ever ; and that Raghunath Rao would not disturb the 'tranquillity' of the Company's possessions in Bengal or make war with Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic.

The Bombay Council hoped that the English forces in conjunction with Raghunath Rao's army would be able to reinstate the ex-Peshwa in his former post,—a fond hope strongly belied by later events.⁸³

Gambier expressed his opinions on the several articles, suggested by the Bombay Council, which were to form the basis of a treaty with Raghunath Rao.⁸⁹ He was of opinion that the large sum of money to be deposited by Raghunath Rao was a very 'heavy and difficult stipulation', which would not be possible for him to comply with. In respect to the territories to be ceded, he stated that these should be particularly mentioned and also the names of the small islands near the Bombay harbour.

Nav Ratan, on being duly informed of the resolution of the Bombay Council, set out for Raghunath Rao's camp near Burhanpur. He returned afterwards to Surat with a paper from Raghunath Rao in reply to the proposals of the Bombay Council. Raghunath Rao absolutely refused to give up Salsette and Bassein as he valued these places 'more than any other'.⁹⁰ As to the islands near Bombay he did not know their names, and so he could not return any answer. The Maratha and Gaikwad share of the revenues of Broach, Amod and 'Dussem Gain' amounting to about 5 lakhs of rupees per annum could be given up to the English. Raghunath Rao also agreed to accept the stipulations in respect of Bengal and Madras, to deposit 6 lakhs of rupees and to allow one and a half-lakh for defraying the charges of the English forces.⁹¹

Gambier immediately informed Raghunath Rao that he was doubtful whether the Bombay Government would accept any places other than Salsette and Bassein. He wrote to the ex-Peshwa, "The mind of the Governor is much on Salsette and Bassein..and without you will give these places to the Hon'ble Company, I think the Hon'ble Governor will not be pleased or agree to what you want".⁹² But if he could give up the revenues of Olpad, Hasot and Ankleshvar in lieu of Salsette and Bassein, along with the revenues of Broach, Amod and 'Dussem Gain', he would try to get them accepted.⁹³ The Bombay Council, however, decided not to recede from their original demands, but the amount to be deposited by Raghunath

Rao might be lessened.⁹⁴ Finding the Bombay Government resolute in their demands, Raghunath Rao decided to give up claims of much greater value in Gujarat in lieu of Salsette and Bassein, which together with Broach revenues would amount to eleven lakhs a year. He also offered to deposit with the English six lakhs of rupees.⁹⁵

It appeared to the Bombay Council that negotiations with Raghunath Rao would not be terminated happily if they insisted on the cession of Salsette and Bassein. They agreed to waive their demand on Salsette and Bassein provided the Maratha share of the revenues of the parganas 'formerly annexed' to the city of Surat, the revenues of the Surat Castle, together with the Gaikwad share of Broach revenues, amounting in all to about eighteen and a half lakhs of rupees, were made over to the Company for ever.⁹⁶

On the 9th December Gambier settled the proposed treaty with Nav Ratan, Raghunath Rao's agent. There was, however, a slight deviation in one of the clauses. Some new parganas and districts⁹⁷ with an equal amount of revenue were entered in the place of those mentioned by the Bombay Council. These parganas, Gambier explained, lay close to Surat or Broach and their revenues would be recovered with much less difficulty and expense. The Bombay Council entertained a doubt whether Raghunath Rao would be able to make over these districts to the East India Company as most of them belonged to the Gaikwad. They, however, had no objections in accepting them provided the previous consent of the Gaikwad could be obtained.⁹⁸ Gambier yet hoped to secure Salsette and Bassein in lieu of the several places⁹⁹ ceded for twelve and a half lakhs of rupees and, therefore, sought the Bombay Government's advice whether he would include these two places in the treaty.¹⁰⁰ The Bombay Council did not like to give up a revenue of 12½ lakhs of rupees per annum for Salsette and Bassein, the revenues of which amounted only to a little more than seven lakhs. They would accept Salsette and Bassein provided some other parganas were ceded to the Company along with these two places, the total revenue of which should be a little above eighteen and a half lakhs.¹⁰¹ Before the transaction could be completed,

Raghunath Rao fled from Burhanpur in December, 1774, suspecting that some treachery was intended by Sindhia and Holkar. He went first to Dhar where he left his wife Anandi Bai under the care of Khanderao Pawar and then proceeded towards Gujarat. At this stage, the English apprehended a Portuguese attack on Salsette and Bassein and took some decisive steps.

As early as February 1774 secret offers had been made to Hornby by the Killedar of Thana for surrendering the place in exchange of two lakhs and sixty thousand rupees. Hornby was not willing to pay more than one lakh of rupees. The Maratha officer agreed to accept the proposal provided Hornby would give in addition twenty thousand rupees and added that this amount 'must be advanced to satisfy some people.'¹⁰² Considering the unsettled state of the Maratha Government and the probability of obtaining possession of Thana by some other means, the Bombay Council decided to postpone the negotiation with the Killedar. In November Hornby was informed by Henshaw, English resident at Goa, that Don Joze Pedro de Camera, 'a general officer of approved abilities', had arrived as Governor and Captain General of Goa and the Portuguese had fitted out a strong armament to recover their lost possessions including Salsette and Bassein.¹⁰³ On receipt of this intelligence, the Bombay Select Committee resolved on 28 November to obtain possession of Salsette for the Company. They wrote to Mostyn on 29 November that they were 'impelled to this step from a thorough conviction that it would otherwise fall into the hands of the Portuguese, as from the present situation of the affairs of the Marathas it must be out of their power to send such force as would be able to oppose them'.¹⁰⁴ The Bombay Government feared that if the seizure of Salsette by the Portuguese really took place, 'it would not only have prevented the English from ever acquiring Salsette for the Honourable Company but the Portuguese would then again have had in their power to obstruct their trade by being in possession of the principal passes to the inland country, and to lay whatever impositions they pleased upon it, which of course would have been of infinite prejudice to the trade, revenue and interests of the Company in these parts'.¹⁰⁵ The Bombay

Government wanted to keep both the contending Maratha parties in a state of humour lest their action on Salsette might provoke the hostility of either or both. Raghunath Rao was to be assured through Gambier that in attacking Salsette the English wanted to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Portuguese. Salsette would be given up to Raghunath Rao if he was so much keen on having it, on his granting the English an equivalent for it, and paying the charge they should incur for its occupation. Mostyn was also to try to reconcile the ministers to the occupation of Salsette, by giving them the like assurance of future cession on the same terms, in case their party should prevail in the contest.¹⁰⁶

Feeling that his stay at Poona would be risky when the hostilities would be commenced against the Marathas, Mostyn left Poona and arrived at Bombay on 9 December. The person who offered to surrender Thana on some monetary consideration now excused himself as the Marathas had sent a reinforcement of five hundred men from Poona to forestall the designs of the Portuguese. Mostyn confirmed the intelligence about the intentions of the Portuguese regarding Salsette and Bassein. He also said that it was 'publicly reported' at Poona that the Portuguese were making 'warlike preparations'.¹⁰⁷ He considered that the Marathas, distracted by internal troubles, would not be able to prevent the English 'designs taking place'.¹⁰⁸

The army and navy of the Bombay Establishment co-operated in the undertaking. Brigadier-General Gordon was appointed to command the land forces and John Watson was placed in charge of the navy. Gordon and Watson were instructed not to commence hostilities abruptly against Thana, the principal fort in the island of Salsette. The commander of the fort was to be asked to surrender the fort to the Company, and on his refusal the English were to seize the place.¹⁰⁹ On the 12th December Gordon set out from Bombay for the reduction of Thana. John Watson also embarked on the same day.¹¹⁰ On the same day the Portuguese fleet appeared off Bombay and their Commander delivered a formal protest against the English and claimed the territories situated between

Chaul and Daman.¹¹¹ The English delivered a suitable reply¹¹² and the meaningless negotiation came to a close.

The English troops got possession of the town of Thana without any impediment. The Commander of the fort was asked by Gordon to surrender the fort, but he did not return any answer.¹¹³ The authorities at Poona were informed of the arrival of more than a thousand English soldiers at Thana.¹¹⁴ Anandrao Ram complained to the ministers of the scarcity of provisions and requested them to send reinforcements and a squadron of fleet for attacking the English.¹¹⁵ The Poona ministers were repeatedly requested to send reinforcements immediately without which Thana would be lost.¹¹⁶ Bhagwantrao Khanvilkar with four hundred men arrived for help from Bassein and was met by Govindrao Hari. But they were suddenly attacked by the English and had to withdraw.¹¹⁷

The siege of the fortress was a more difficult task than was anticipated.¹¹⁸ Watson and Gordon differed as to the method of reducing it. The former wished to take two small forts, Himat and Fatte Buruj, gain command of the water, and starve Thana into submission; but Gordon did not consider his force to be sufficiently strong to be divided. He wrote: "The reduction of the fort is our grand object. To effect that our force must be united... The fort once taken the inferior posts will fall, and we may then with propriety make large detachments but not till then."¹¹⁹ In another letter he said, "I cannot make small ones to expose our arms and disgrace".

On the 20th December English batteries opened before Thana, and it was felt that it would take 'a great deal of battering' as the towers were of 'very hard stone and excellent masonry'.¹²⁰ Incessant firing succeeded in destroying the two towers of the fort. The English found a ditch of about fifteen feet deep and twenty feet wide just in front of the fort of Thana.¹²¹

Anandrao Ram reported to the Poona Government the breaches in the ramparts of the fort effected by the heavy fire of the English artillery,¹²² and pleaded his inability to hold on long, unless reinforcements were sent in speedily.¹²³ Bhavanji Ghare, who was an eye-witness of the battle of Salsette, considered that Salsette stood in danger of being lost if not imme-

diately relieved.¹²⁴ Raghuji Angria, as directed by the Poona Government, sent some force to Salsette by land, promising to send his fleet as soon as all others had joined.¹²⁵ Visaji Krishna, Shivaji Vitthal and Apaji Dhodapkar also left Poona for Salsette.¹²⁶ On being instructed by the ministers, Janoji Dhulap sent a portion of his fleet to Salsette.¹²⁷ The ministers issued orders to effect a strict blockade of Surat so that the English should receive no provisions or succour from that port.¹²⁸ Vithal Narayan, Kamavisdar of Dehejbare, was ordered by the Poona Government to render help in effecting blockade of Surat.¹²⁹ Ranoji Balkavade agreed to give effect to the Poona Government's order that no fuel or provision should be sold to the English.¹³⁰

Before making an assault on the fort the English tried to fill up the ditch. Twice they attempted but every time the lascars retreated quickly on being fired on by the Marathas. On the 25th December an attempt was made to fill up the ditch. The English troops 'persisted in the work for nearly two hours with the utmost steadiness under a most galling and incessant fire from the breach'. The English suffered so heavily that Gordon ordered his troops to retreat before the passage across the ditch could be completed.¹³¹ On the 28th December the fort was taken by assault. Visaji Krishna arrived too late to stem the tide of disaster. He could have exerted his utmost to make a counter-attack on the English, but he waited for the arrival of Angria. Anandrao Ram, the gallant defender of Salsette, said in disgust "we have been reduced to a mere condition of helpless onlookers of our own ruin".¹³² Succour did not also come in time from Dhulap and Angria.¹³³ Dhulap, who had been instructed to attack Bombay with his fleet and then to proceed towards Salsette, did not execute the order.¹³⁴ Only Yesaji Shivdev did his best in sending reinforcements both of men and money, but they were insignificant, in comparison with English troops numbering about 2500 entrenched at Salsette.¹³⁵ The Marathas thought that Salsette was lost because the cavalry could not act with effect in a country surrounded by watery marshes.¹³⁶ Anandrao Ram, the Commandant of Thana, was taken captive by the English who con-

agent was suspended temporarily when Nav Ratan was seized by the ministerial forces. On the 11th January two agents from Raghunath Rao met Gambier at Surat and explained to him Raghunath's financial difficulties. Gambier told them that nothing could be done without the previous payment of 6 lakhs of rupees and the security for monthly payment of the allowance of one lakh and a half.¹⁴⁸ But he believed that even if a few lakhs of rupees were not previously paid, the revenues of Salsette and Bassein, which Raghunath Rao would like to give up together with those of Broach, Olpad, Hasot or Amod and Jambusar, would amount to a little over nineteen lakhs. He tried to patch up a peace between the English and Raghunath Rao and appealed to the moderation of the Bombay Government : "I repeat therefore that no time is to be lost and that the most trifling delay or procrastination, is, at this juncture, highly dangerous. Something in such a game as this must be risked. Raghoba I believe means very honestly and will do all he can to satisfy you, but if you mean to insist on impossibilities 'tis better at once to declare off and honestly say that you cannot."¹⁴⁹ But the Bombay Council inflexibly adhered to their original resolution in which Raghunath Rao was required to deposit six lakhs of rupees and to give the best security for the monthly payment of one and a half lakh.¹⁵⁰

Raghunath Rao's want of money was acute and he had no resource to draw upon in order to deposit the required amount. He offered, as an alternative, to deposit jewels to the amount of six lakhs or to give his adopted son Amrit Rao as hostage for the payment of that amount. Gambier was convinced of Raghunath Rao's incapacity to procure money. He, therefore, entreated the Bombay Government to accept this alternative proposal. He apprehended that 'any further delays' might induce Raghunath Rao to conclude treaty with the Poona ministers on the best terms he could and content himself with a share of the Maratha Government 'rather than hazard the loss of the whole.'¹⁵¹ The Bombay Government thought it wise not to break off the treaty by insisting on something which Raghunath Rao was not able to perform and agreed to accept the deposit of six lakhs of rupees in jewels instead of money.¹⁵²

Two Maratha agents, Appaji Pant and Bhaji Pant, arrived at Cambay on 15 February bringing with them the jewelry to be deposited. They promised in Raghunath Rao's name to make up any deficiency which might appear on valuation, but 'esteemed the jewelry only as a pledge to be redeemed on the payment of cash'.¹⁵² Suddenly an event happened which compelled Raghunath Rao to come to the protection of the English.

Raghunath Rao along with Govind Rao left Baroda with twenty thousand troops and decided to face Haripant on the banks of the Mahi river.¹⁵³ Both sides took vantage points on the banks of the Mahi. Slight skirmishes occurred between the patrols of opposing forces as usual, especially when there was heavy concentration of forces. When Haripant was preparing to cross the Mahi in order to launch an assault on Raghunath Rao, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Abaji Mahadev, Lakshman Pant Natu appealed to him for a settlement on behalf of Raghunath Rao.¹⁵⁴ Haripant refused to listen to their importunities. On 17 February he crossed the Mahi and successfully attacked Raghunath Rao's forces and captured the guns, elephants, camels and horses. Several chiefs on Raghunath Rao's side were killed, the most famous among them were Baburao Patankar and Ganesh Vithal.¹⁵⁵ Manaji Phadke, Sadashiv Ramchandra and Sakharam Hari were wounded.¹⁵⁶ But Raghunath Rao escaped in the dark of the night with only three hundred soldiers.¹⁵⁷

Raghunath Rao and his followers reached Cambay on the 18th February, but the Nawab refused to admit him. He, therefore, applied to Charles Malet, agent of the British factory, for shelter.¹⁵⁸ Malet enabled Raghunath Rao to proceed to the harbour of Bhavnagar where Captain Field assisted him to embark in a boat for Surat.¹⁵⁹ He arrived at Surat on the 23 February and sent Kukaji Shivram for negotiations with Haripant.¹⁶⁰

Raghunath Rao had all along been negotiating with the English and after his arrival at Surat executed the treaty. This was concluded on the 6th March and came to be known as the Treaty of Surat. It was ratified by the Bombay Council on the 16th. The treaty consisted of sixteen articles; the main provisions were as follows.¹⁶¹

Former treaties concluded between the Government of Bombay and the Marathas in 1739 and 1756 and 'all other agreements' between the two Governments were 'ratified and confirmed.' Both parties engaged to abstain from assisting the enemies of the other. The English were to assist Raghunath Rao with a military contingent of 2,500 men of which at least 700 should be Europeans. These Torces were to be equipped with 'proper guns and warlike stores as a field train of artillery'. Presently, the English were to send fifteen hundred men and the rest, if wanted, would be sent afterwards. Raghunath Rao stipulated to pay to the Company annually seventy-five thousand rupees from the revenues of Ankleshvar. He also agreed to pay one and a half lakh rupees monthly for the military assistance which he was to receive, as security for which payment he made temporary assignment of the districts Amod, Hasot, Versaul and a part of Ankleshvar. He was to deposit jewels valued at six lakhs of rupees to the English, 'as a security for the promised advance, pledging himself to redeem them'.¹⁶³ 'In consideration of such effectual assistance on the part of the Hon'ble Company', he was to cede to the English in perpetuity Bassein, Salsette, Jambusar, Olpad and small islands ¹⁶⁴ adjacent to Bombay. He also engaged to procure for the Company the Gaikwad's share of the revenue in the town and parganas of Broach. Maratha raids into Bengal and the Carnatic were to cease ; any peace made with the Poona Government was to include the English. Raghunath Rao was to defray all expenses that might be incurred in taking possession of any of the places ceded to the Company; and he was to bound to assist the ships of the Company, or of persons under their protection, if wrecked, and to protect the cargoes. In Article XVI, the English expressed the hope that 'by the blessing of the Almighty', they would be able to overcome Raghunath Rao's enemies and 'establish him at Poona in the government of the Maratha Empire'. Such was the treaty which, as Grant Duff says, occasioned infinite discussions amongst the English in India and in Europe, and led to the First Maratha War.

CHAPTER III

UPTON'S MISSION AND THE TREATY OF PURANDHAR

The Bombay Government at first thought that war with the Marathas would be but a short and easy affair. But their fond hopes were strongly belied by the gallant resistance of the Marathas. Before the treaty of Surat was completed, the Bombay Government had assembled troops under Colonel Keating who arrived at Surat by sea on 27 February 1775. Col. Keating was instructed to assist Raghunath Rao 'against his enemies, the ministerial party and their adherents', and to do everything to bring the war to a speedy conclusion.¹ On his arrival at Surat Keating was introduced to Raghunath Rao who appeared to him 'a man of sound judgment and of quick and clear conceptions.' Thus ended Raghunath Rao's anxiety to secure the military alliance of the English and this seemed to offer him the only chance of recovering his lost prestige. Raghunath Rao placed much reliance on the strength of the English troops and on the ability of Keating who, to his judgment, was 'expert and diligent'.²

In the meantime the defeated army of Raghunath Rao under Govind Rao and Khanderao Galkwad, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Manaji Phadke and Sakharam Hari retired to Kapadvanj and thence to Palanpur. For the purpose of effecting a junction with those chiefs the English decided to go to Cambay. The British detachment with Raghunath Rao left Surat for Cambay on 15 March and arrived there on the 17th.³

At the beginning of the fight with the English, the prospects of the Poona ministers were rather disconcerting. Mahadji Sindhia, on being called by Sakharam Bapu to produce accounts, retired to Ujjain. Sindhia had been given Jaigirs worth 65 lakhs by the ministers for raising troops, numbering about 22,000. But during the last two years, he had raised only eight thousand soldiers and had not remitted the surplus income to the Peshawa.

Holkar also left Haripant, following the example of Mahadji, and marched to Malwa. Naro Anand after encamping at Dhawalka on the river Sabarmati, 24 miles from Cambay, deputed Appaji Ganesh and Bhagawantrao to win over Govindrao Gaikwad from Raghunath Rao's side.⁴ The negotiations with Govindrao were abruptly terminated and Govindrao joined Raghunath Rao.⁵ Haripant complained about the treachery of Govindrao in going over to the side of Raghunath Rao. At one time Haripant advised Naro Anand to seduce the English and thus weaken Raghunath's cause.⁶ Sabaji Bhosle, who favoured the ministerial cause in Berar, had been cut off by his brother, Mudaji, who befriended Raghunath Rao.⁷ The Nizam, though he received valuable concessions and promised assistance, always evaded performance.

It is interesting to note that even after the conclusion of the treaty with Raghunath Rao, the English were carrying on negotiations with the ministers through different channels to sound their motives and determination. Two English agents approached the ministers, another visited Naro Anand and a fourth contacted Haripant.⁸ As a general agreement among the Maratha Chiefs was essential, Haripant referred to the ministers three points of dispute on which the negotiation with the English should be based : dispute about Salsette, settlement of Raghunath Rao's affair and reconsideration of the Jaigir worth ten lakhs which had already been given to him. Apparently the English had no intention to carry these negotiations to a settlement ; but if they felt that by this political manoeuvre they would forestall the activities of the ministers, they were badly mistaken.

Col. Keating was reinforced by two companies of European grenadiers and one battalion of sepoy from Madras and effected a junction with Raghunath Rao's forces at a village about 10 miles distant from Cambay on 19 April.⁹ Before the junction took place, officers in Keating's army felt strong misgivings whether it could ever be accomplished. Keating wrote, "indeed so strange a prepossession had seized their minds, that few if any, believed such matter existed as a Peshwa army".¹⁰ Govindrao Gaikwad readily joined them. The whole force now pro-

ceeded towards the north ; but as the commissariat did not function properly, the army marched slowly. The objective desired by Raghunath Rao was Ahmedabad and the army proceeded as far as Mahtur. But Keating was directed by the Bombay Government to turn eastward and proceed towards Nadiad. The difficulties experienced by the English is best described in Keating's own words. He wrote to the Bombay Council on the 3rd May, "we are now fighting the enemy to a great disadvantage by being encumbered with a large bazar and baggage, whereas theirs is always at a distance ; they move lightly, we heavily ; nor can we move without this and all our stores ; if we did, all must become a prey to the enemy."¹¹ Khanderao Gaikwad had lately joined the Poona Government and Raghunath Rao's troops were leaving him daily owing to arrears of pay. Keating apprehended a general defection of Raghunath Rao's troops if he was not supplied with money.¹²

So far little opposition had been encountered beyond a few trifling attacks of Maratha horse ; but after leaving Nadiad the route of the marching army lay along a deep, narrow and sandy road, being enclosed on both sides by milk-bush hedges. The wheeled carriage being confined to this one road, the movements of the baggage were very slow ; and so timid were Raghunath Rao's troops in escorting it that Keating had been compelled to add to them two guards of two hundred men each, half sepoy, half Europeans, with two guns. One of these guards was posted in the rear, and the other on the reverse flank of the army, with orders to give each other mutual support in case of attack.

The English army advanced on 18 May near Adas, on the Mahi river. This was the scene of Raghunath Rao's defeat a few months earlier. The Maratha guns suddenly opened fire on the rear of the force. They were at once attacked by Captain Myers' Grenadiers of the Madras regiment, and silenced by the British guns. Two of the Maratha guns were not withdrawn and Keating unfortunately agreed to Captain Myers' proposal to 'have a dash at them.' Two companies of Grenadiers advanced on the guns, but were twice charged by large bodies of Maratha horse. The charges were repulsed, but with the loss of Myers and several men. The party was

now isolated by the elephants of the Marathas and their horse which got mixed up with Raghunath Rao's forces.¹³ One of the Grenadier companies mistook the order 'right face' for 'right about' and retreated rapidly, and the soldiers and sepoy followed them in confusion.¹⁴ The English loss was heavy; some three to four hundred soldiers were killed, among whom eleven were officers of high rank. On the Maratha side 150 cavalry were killed and 100 soldiers were wounded. Ranoji, brother of Maloji Ghorpade, lost his life and Panse and Anandrao Gopal were wounded.¹⁵ In this battle the English suspected Hari Bhide, one of Raghunath's trusted officers, of some foul play and he was on that account blown off from the mouth of a gun.¹⁶

Keating with his army arrived at Broach on 29th May.¹⁷ He urged the Bombay Government to supply Raghunath Rao with five lakhs of rupees. On the 8th June he marched and moved up the river Narbada towards Bawapir. The Maratha army under Haripant while crossing the river at Bawapir Ghat was suddenly attacked on 11 June, where they lost 3000 men and many horses. Nimbalkar's troops were plundered and Haripant retreated to Malwa.¹⁸ As Raghunath Rao's troops refused to cross the Narbada till they obtained satisfaction in regard to their long arrears, it was resolved to suspend the progress of the expedition. On account of the approaching rainy season, Dabhoi, a fortified city about fifty miles from Broach, convenient for receiving reinforcements and supplies, was selected for quartering the English; while Raghunath encamped with his army at Belapore, a pass on the river Dahder at a distance of ten miles. Keating wrote: "I must here add that had it not been for want of cash to support the Peshwa's army, we might have been farther on our way to Poona, but it was impossible to march it before the setting in of the rains." Shortly before this, the Marathas under Visaji Keshav attacked Salsette and killed about three hundred soldiers. The situation was saved for the English by the timely arrival of reinforcements from Bombay and Visaji retreated.¹⁹

The favourable complexion of Regiment Artillery produced among other consequences the officers of the

The engagement of Fateh Sing Gaikwad with the Poona ministers was 'merely a means to an end, a stepping-stone to the much coveted leadership in Gujarat'.²¹ Even when he joined the ministers he made indirect overtures to Raghunath Rao. When the retreat of Haripant confirmed his safety from that quarter he renewed his proposals to Raghunath and, the better to ensure success, applied for the mediation of the English. A treaty was concluded between Raghunath Rao and Fateh Sing on the 18th July, 1775.²² Fateh Sing engaged to pay Raghunath Rao the usual *chauth* and aid due to the Peshwa and to furnish three thousand horse and 'in time of necessity five thousand.' But what was of material importance was that Fateh Sing agreed to pay Raghunath Rao the sum of 26 lakhs in sixty days. The East India Company, as guaranties and negotiators between the parties, were to receive the whole Broach province, Chikhli, Variav near Surat, and Koral. Keating wrote to the Bombay Council on 18 July that Fateh Sing had given these districts to the Company for the services they had rendered him 'in accommodating matters between him and Raghunath Rao'.²³

Manaji Phadke, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Abaji Mahadev and Sakharam Hari were in favour of Govindrao and did not like this agreement between Raghunath Rao and Fateh Sing. Govindrao was naturally indignant at this treaty.²⁴ Leaving Raghunath Rao he went to Petlad and approached Gangadhar Dikshit, the Peshwa's agent. Gangadhar Dikshit persuaded Govindrao to give up Raghunath's cause and assured him of the Peshwa's protection. A document was signed in which Govindrao took an oath of allegiance to the infant Peshwa.²⁵

The Poona ministers were not idle. The blockade of Surat was maintained by Naro Anand, but suddenly he left his station and moved up to the Tapti. Haripant reprimanded him for his action as Naro Anand's presence in or around Surat would have helped in watching the movements of Raghunath Rao and the English.²⁶ Naro Anand was advised to go and capture Navapur, which could be attacked easily, as Raghunath Rao had retired.²⁷

While these transactions were going forward in India, a change made itself felt in the character of the Company's adminis-

tration. The affairs of the East India Company naturally became prominent in the British Parliament as a result of acquisition of territories in India and a Select and Secret Committee was appointed in 1772 for enquiry into the administration of India. The reports of the Committee condemned the Company's administration and in 1773 Parliament passed "an Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company as well in India as in Europe." The Regulating Act, as it was generally called, was based on the assumption that the Company's affairs, both at home and abroad, had been grossly mismanaged and in consequence the interposition of the Legislature was necessary.

Under the Regulating Act a Governor-General and four Councillors were appointed for Bengal, and the Governor of Bengal became the Governor-General. The Presidencies of Bombay and Madras were henceforth required to obey the orders of the Supreme Government in Bengal in matters relating to war and peace. Section 9 of the Act provided that the Governor-General and Council of Bengal "shall have, and they are hereby authorised to have; power of superintending and controlling the government and management of the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Beneoolen respectively, so far and in so much as that it shall not be lawful for any President and Council of Madras, Bombay or Beneoolen for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war, against any Indian Prinees or Powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace, or other treaty, with any such Indian Princes or Powers, without the consent and approbation of the said Governor-General and Council first had and obtained, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the orders from the Governor-General and Council might arrive, and except in such cases where the said Presidents and Councils respectively shall have received special orders from the said United Company".²⁸ The act also provided that "the Directors should lay before the Treasury all correspondence from India dealing with the revenues ; and before a Secretary of State every thing dealing with civil or military administr

first definite step was taken for providing Parliamentary control over the affairs of the Company.²⁹

Warren Hastings was nominated, in the Act, Governor-General, and Lieutenant General Clavering, George Monson, Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, Councillors.

Section 9 giving Calcutta control over the subordinate Presidencies did not function properly for the same statute which appeared to establish the supremacy of the Government of Bengal secured to those of Madras and Bombay their ancient privileges. A situation of great delicacy was thus created. The other Presidencies had so long been independent and it was natural that they would look with disfavour upon the interference of the Governor-General and Council in their foreign policy. Warren Hastings recorded his disappointment in a letter to his friend, Sullivan : "You long ago knew my wish to see a control given to this government over the other Presidencies, but I never meant such a control as is now exercised ; nor did the Parliament mean it. The Act gives us a mere negative power, and no more. It says the other Presidencies shall not make war nor treaties without the sanction of this government, but carefully guards against every expression which can imply a power to dictate what the other presidencies shall do ; much less does it authorise the Governor-General and Council to make cessions and exchange places for the other Presidencies. Instead of uniting all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of this Act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass"³⁰

It was perhaps natural that confusion should arise as to the meaning and instructions of the Act. Armed with vaguely defined controlling powers over the other Presidencies, the Governor-General and Council prohibited the Government of Fort St. George from sending troops to Bombay. The Court of Directors disapproved the action of the Bengal Government and observed that they had strained the meaning of the Regulating Act : "...although the said act, expressly forbids any of the other Presidencies to engage in political negotiations with the natives or foreign nations, without the participation and concurrence of the Supreme Council, yet it certainly leaves each distinct government, power to take from time to time,

such steps as the immediate exigency of their affairs may require for self-defence or protection, or for the necessary aid or assistance to be given to other settlements, and on this principle we must disapprove your interference in this case".³¹ Thomas Rumbold complained that, as a result of the Act, the Supreme Council assumed 'active and compelling power' over all political transactions of the other Presidencies.³² He wrote to the Court of Directors, "Supreme Council issue orders in the same style as the Court of Directors—neither ask nor condescend to listen to opinions from Madras or Bombay—even in matters relating to those Presidencies".³³

Apart from the relation between the Supreme Government and the subordinate Presidencies, another difficulty directly arising out of the Regulating Act concerned the relation between the Governor-General and the members of his Council. No discretionary powers were allowed to the Governor-General whose voting powers were equal with those of his council, except in case of a tie, when he could use his casting-vote. The Governor-General was not given the authority in the last resort to override his council. Warren Hastings wanted in vain 'some kind of separate and independent authority to enable him to discharge the executive duties of government', as he feared that in so small a body a majority would 'almost always be formed against him'.³⁴ Hastings in the review of his administration wrote : "If the same act of the legislature which confirmed me in my station of President over the Company's settlement in Bengal had invested me with a control as extensive as the new denomination I received by it indicated ; if it had compelled the assistance of my associates in power instead of giving me opponents....I should have had little occasion at this period, to claim the public indulgence for an avowal of duties undischarged. But the reverse took place in every instance".³⁵

The Governor-General's colleagues came to India with minds far from unbiased. They embarked from the very outset, in Barwell's words, upon "a predetermined, preconcerted system of opposition". Of the three new Councillors, Clavering and Monson were, though soldiers of repute, of little intellectual capacity and administrative ability. Monson had served in

southern India from 1758 to 1763, but was a stranger to Bengal. Clavering had never set foot in India. Hastings' first impression of Clavering was that he was 'a man of strict honour ; but brought strong prejudices with him'. But he had to change his opinion subsequently and after Clavering's death he wrote, "May God forgive him all the injuries which he has heaped upon me, and me, as I forgive him".³⁶ Monson also at first appeared to Hastings as 'a sensible man'. But his opinion changed afterwards and in March 1775 he said of him, "Colonel Monson, with a more guarded temper, and more regular conduct, now appears to be the most determined of the three".³⁷

The third and most remarkable Councillor was Philip Francis. Wietzman wrote of him that "he was a man of extraordinary ability, widely read, steeped in the political philosophy of his day, with a capacity for terse, lucid exposition. Alone of the new councillors, he was ambitious with an ambition born of conscious capacity and transcending the limits of military command".³⁸ Francis regarded himself as the depository of justice, charged to correct the great abuses of the Company's government.³⁹ Of all the Councillors, Francis appeared to have consistently opposed all the measures of Hastings. He wrote to his friend, Charles D'Oyly, "Hastings and Barwell are two abandoned villains and everything has been sold and Bengal is ruined".⁴⁰ To Welbore Ellis, Francis also observed, "If Mr. H and Mr. B are not immediately removed this country will be worse than lost to Great Britain long before the period of our Administration".⁴¹

Richard Barwell, who had been in India from 1758, was the lone Councillor who ever remained Hastings' faithful supporter. He was a man of 'quick parts and great abilities'. The solid and hearty support of Barwell proved a great boon to Hastings 'since three voices for ever combined against him, form as effectual a majority as four would'.⁴² Hastings had projected many plans of reorganisation before the arrival of the new Councillors expecting their 'hearty assistance in promoting it'. But disillusionment was not slow to come. He wrote to Lord North that his hopes were 'already blasted' and a prospect opened to him of a very different kind from that

which his 'imagination had painted'.⁴³ Events moved swiftly to afford striking illustrations of the sharp cleavage between Hastings and his colleagues in Council.

The Supreme Council in Bengal assumed the power of general administration in the affairs of British India on the 20th October, 1774. The change in the administration of Bengal was duly communicated to the Bombay authorities, who received Hastings' despatch on 7 December 1774, at a moment when preparations were being made for an attack on the Maratha fort, Thana. They deferred advising the Supreme Council of their project against Thana till 31 December when the fort had surrendered. The letter of the Bombay Council, which reached Calcutta on 8 March 1775, contained an account of the negotiations which they had been carrying on with Raghunath Rao. They justified their action on the plea that it had been started before the commencement of the new government in Bengal.⁴⁴ But even before the official communication of the Bombay Council reached Calcutta, the news of the proceedings against Thana had become known to Hastings who had received intelligence of it from Madras.⁴⁵

It appears that on receipt of these reports the Governor-General and Council in their letter, dated 3 February, to the Bombay Government expressed their surprise at not receiving information from them of their political situation.⁴⁶ They directed the Bombay Government to report in future 'constantly and regularly' all the events of their Presidency.⁴⁷

At first Warren Hastings had no intention of interfering in the Bombay Government's negotiations with Raghunath Rao. On 3 February he offered for consideration of the Council some observations upon the probable consequences of the step which the Bombay Government had taken. He appears to have thought that there should be no apprehension of any attempt at retaliation on the part of the Marathas, because of the 'present interesting distraction of the Maratha State', and the exhausted state of their strength and resources.⁴⁸ The Poona Durbar had yet too formidable an opponent in Raghunath Rao to engage in new contests against the Presidency of Bombay. On these grounds Hastings thought it "unnecessary to take any immediate

measures for obviating the consequences of the supposed injuries offered by the Presidency of Bombay to the Maratha Government".⁴⁹ But the majority of the Council did not approve of the observations of Hastings. Later, on the 8th March, the Governor-General and Council intimated to the Bombay Government their alarm at the support offered to Raghunath Rao and directed them to suspend their negotiations with him till they received further instructions.⁵⁰

On the 31st May arrived from the President and Council of Bombay a letter, dated the 31st March, reporting the conclusion of the treaty with Raghunath Rao and the departure of troops for his support.⁵¹ The Governor General on this occasion recorded a minute of considerable length.⁵² He condemned the hostilities in which the Bombay Government was engaged, as 'impolitic, unjust and unauthorised'. In his opinion, the whole burden of the war was thrown on the Company; no injury had been received from the Maratha states; and the late Act of Parliament had vested the Supreme Council with the sole authority of treating with the Indian powers. Nor did he approve of sending the Company's troops to such a distance from the Presidency. While condemning the treaty, Hastings took a statesmanlike view of the situation. He felt that to withdraw abruptly after having entered into positive engagements with one party and offended the other perhaps beyond hopes of reconciliation, might be attended with greater danger than prosecuting the original design. He consequently proposed that the President and Council of Bombay should be ordered to cancel the treaty with Raghunath Rao and withdraw the troops to their own possessions. He, however, considered it proper to modify the order for the withdrawal of the troops in certain circumstances. If the combined forces of Raghunath Rao and the English should have obtained any decisive advantages; if the situation of the English detachment was such as to make the recall dangerous; and if a negotiation was actually on foot between Raghunath Rao and his opponent, the order need not be adhered to. The Governor-General afterwards professed that he had gone beyond his real sentiments in these terms of condemnation, for he hoped to moderate by that means

the violence of the opposite party. In this expectation, if ever formed, he found himself deceived. The majority agreed to withdraw the troops without regard to any consideration but that of their safety.⁵³ In a letter to the Bombay Government, dated 31 May, the Supreme Council observed :

“Our duty imposed upon us the painful necessity of declaring that we totally condemn the measures which you have adopted ; that we hold the treaty which you have entered into with Ragoba invalid ; and the war which you have undertaken against the Maratha State impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised, and unjust. Both are expressly contrary to the late Act of Parliament. You have imposed on yourselves the charge of conquering the whole Maratha Empire, for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it. The plan which you have formed, instead of aiming at a decisive conquest, portends an indefinite scene of troubles, without an adequate force, without money or certain resources to extricate you from them ; nor have you the plea either of injury sustained from the party which you have made your enemy, or of any prior obligation to defend the man whose cause you have espoused. We solemnly protest against you for all the consequences, and peremptorily require you to withdraw all the Company's forces to your own garrisons in whatsoever state your affairs may be, unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat”.⁵⁴

The Supreme Council also announced their intention to open negotiations with the ruling party of the Maratha State at Poona. It directed the Bombay Government to receive and encourage any pacific overtures that might be made to them and to hold as the first object, an immediate cessation of arms, and a confirmation of the islands of Salsette and Bassein to the Company.⁵⁵ Hastings wrote a letter to Sakharam Bapu and expressed his intention to send a person to Poona for concluding a treaty of lasting friendship with the Marathas.⁵⁶

The choice of a person who would represent the Bengal-Government at Poona gave rise to an acrimonious discussion. Hastings proposed Colonel Dow ; General Clavering recommen-

ded Colonel Upton. The latter, being supported by the majority, was appointed.⁵⁷ Colonel Upton was instructed to apologize, in the name of the Supreme Council, for the hostile conduct of the Bombay Presidency in concurrence with Raghunath Rao ; to disavow the treaty which, without their knowledge or consent, had been entered into with Raghunath Rao ; and to express the most sincere desire, on their part, of establishing permanent peace with the Poona ministers. Upton should not relinquish the possession of Salsette and Basscin, and try to convince the ministers that even if the places should be given up to them, they would not be able to defend them against the apprehended Portuguese attack. He should also urge that the Portuguese were at peace with the English and would not attempt to conquer the two places from the English. The Supreme Council specifically instructed Upton with regard to Salsette and Bassein to the following effect : "Should the Peshwa hold out against yielding them to the Company, you are at no rate to agree to restore them, declaring to them, if necessary, that the matter having been referred to the Honourable the Court of Directors, it is impossible to relinquish these places without their express permission".⁵⁸ Upton should try to include Raghunath Rao in the treaty which he might form with the ministers. He should obtain for Raghunath Rao such terms as in his actual situation it might appear 'reasonable to expect', and which might not 'frustrate' the immediate objects of the negotiation.⁵⁹ The Supreme Council, however, wanted to leave the door open for further negotiation with Raghunath Rao in case there was a sudden turn of affairs in his favour. Col. Upton carried a letter addressed to Raghunath Rao which he was to hand over to him provided he had succeeded in winning distinct advantages over his adversaries.⁶⁰

Various powers like the Peshwa, Nawab Asaf-ud-daula and Najaf Khan were requested to afford Upton necessary passports and every possible assistance during his journey. On Upton's request for further clarification of his instructions, the Board on 17 July informed him that a confirmation of the islands of Salsette and Bassein was to be an indispensable article in any treaty he might enter into with the ministers. They also advised

Upton to negotiate with Sakharam Bapu, the ruling minister at Poona. The Supreme Council likewise gave notice to the President and Council of Bombay that any treaty negotiated with them by the ministerial party at Poona, would be deemed invalid, unless ratified by Upton.⁶¹

The letter of the Governor-General and Council, dated 8 March, was answered by the Select Committee of Bombay on 24 June. The reply reached Calcutta in the beginning of August.⁶² They argued that by forming an alliance with Raghunath Rao, whom they considered as 'the rightful supreme Governor of the Marathas', they had secured to the Company the right of possessing Salsette, Bassein and other places. The difficulty of waiting for Calcutta's order in framing or executing a particular measure was urged by the Bombay Council in the following words :

"We beg leave here to remark, that as your Honour &c. are situated so very distant from this Presidency, it would be totally impossible for us to benefit by circumstances as they fall out, provided we always wait for your directions : We need produce no other instance than the letter before us, which is dated the 8th March, not being received here till the 21st ultimo, and is an answer to our advices of the 31st December last. Had we waited for your reply to those advices, Ragoba would have been entirely lost, and the advantages the Company gain by the Treaty gone, most probably for ever. The Legislature indeed has provided against this great inconvenience in the late Act of Parliament, which we make no doubt but you will always consider ; and we assure you, that we shall take no material step in any political matters without your concurrence, unless when it may be dangerous to postpone for so long a time coming to a determination thereon".⁶³

The receipt of two letters from Bombay, dated 13 July and 6 August, occasioned much difference of opinion among the members of the Supreme Council in their meeting held on 7 September.⁶⁴ The President and Council of Bombay in these letters represented the expediency of prosecuting the war in favour of Raghunath Rao, and asked for reinforcements of

men and money 'over and above the annual one of 15 lakhs'. They also referred to the conclusion of peace between Fatch Sing and Raghunath Rao on terms very advantageous to the Company. Warren Hastings was in favour of affording assistance, on the ground that the question to be decided was not whether the Government of Bombay had acted properly or not, but by what means the Company's affairs were to be extricated from the danger in which they had been involved by a war precipitately undertaken. It seemed to Hastings that sound policy dictated the support of the Government of Bombay. He observed :

"If the detachment now employed in the support of Ragoba should be utterly defeated for want of succour, or recalled at such a crisis to Bombay, and Ragoba abandoned to ruin, I will venture to foretell that Colonel Upton's negotiations will be fruitless, and attended with disgrace. On the other hand, I will with equal confidence risk my credit with the Company, in foretelling that the issue of it will be successful and honourable if we maintain our superiority at the time in which it shall take place, and show a resolution to dictate, not receive, the terms of an accommodation. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the effectual support of the Presidency of Bombay, in the war undertaken by them, will prove the surest means of restoring the peace of India. We have those means in our power, and I therefore think it our duty to employ them".⁶⁵

Barwell, as usual, supported Hastings while he was opposed by the other members of the Council. The latter refused to send any men, but, as the pecuniary condition of the Bombay Government was appalling, they agreed to forward five lakhs more in addition to the annual remittance of fifteen lakhs. Monson pointed out that peace with the Marathas might be obtained by reinforcing the Bombay army. But he remarked, "Many actions may be honourable to the arms of a state, that are disgraceful to the conductors of it ; and I think a measure of this kind would be highly dishonourable, as we may be understood to be the aggressor's in the Maratha War."⁶⁶ Hastings was ridiculed for the alleged inconsistency of his present advice with the course which he had formerly recommended.

Hastings, however, successfully defended himself and argued that there was no inconsistency. The proposal which he had then mooted was that the orders for dissolving the connection with Raghunath Rao should not be carried into effect if any decisive advantage had been gained over the enemy. Such advantage had been obtained, and he now advised the continuance of the British force in the field. He at the same time declared that in the course which he had formerly recommended, his own views had been modified in the hope of meeting those of the other members of the Council. Hastings concluded by saying, "We should maintain our superiority for the sake of obtaining an honourable peace. War is not my object; my object is peace, which is most likely to be obtained by being prepared for war."⁶⁷ The majority in the Council were, however, determined to put an end to the war at once. Clavering believed that such a step was likely to assist the progress of the negotiations at Poona. "We have reason to hope," said he, "that the Marathas seeing the justice and moderation of this government, and that our intentions are finally to put a stop to that spirit of conquest, encroachment, and injustice, which seems hitherto to have prevailed too much in India, will listen to the proposals that we have made to conclude a firm and lasting peace with them."⁶⁸ Accordingly, the Supreme Council wrote a letter to the Bombay Government and asked them to obey the orders for withdrawing their troops, if they had not already executed them. The Bombay Government was also advised to protect the Company's possessions, including Salsette and the cessions made by Fatch Sing.⁶⁹

The Bombay Government was alarmed at the resolution of the Supreme Council to open negotiations with the Poona ministers. This step was considered prejudicial to the interest of the Company. Had the "gentlemen" of the Supreme Council known the distracted state of the Poona Confederacy, the situation of Raghunath Rao's affairs and the fair prospect of a successful issue, such orders, the Bombay Government felt, would not have been sent.⁷⁰ The Bombay Council thought that Raghunath Rao might have been easily carried to Poona had not the Supreme Council intervened.⁷¹ The 'unfortunate

interference' had injured the influence of their Government 'in a manner scarcely to be restored.'⁷²

Pending an appeal for reconsideration the Bombay Council decided to respect, at least in part, the orders received from Calcutta. Hornby, the Governor of Bombay, intimated to Raghunath Rao the resolution of the Supreme Council and asked him to stop all acts of hostility.⁷³ Raghunath Rao was assured that his interest and safety would be taken care of in the treaty to be concluded with the ministers. Orders were sent to the English commanding officer, Keating, to refrain from hostilities. Ministerial forces were also asked from Poona not to fight with the English forces as well as with Raghunath's army.⁷⁴

The Bombay Council viewed the proceedings of the Supreme Council with the utmost dislike. A letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay, dated the 23rd August, reached the Supreme Council in the beginning of October.⁷⁵ They complained of the disgrace which was thrown upon their Presidency, by compelling them to violate a solemn treaty, and depriving them of the power of negotiating with the Marathas. They denied that they had been guilty of any wilful disrespect to the Supreme Council. The nature of the circumstances required that they should act without delay; the possession of Salsette and Bassein required that they should declare in favour of one of the Maratha parties; and many considerations induced them to side with Raghunath Rao. The Bombay Council pointed out the unhappy effects which would result from the recall of the troops from Raghunath Rao. They deputed William Tayler, a member of their Board, to Calcutta. upon his representations, they still hoped, their treaty with Raghunath Rao would be ratified, and the great advantages derived from it would not be thrown away. Tayler was instructed to represent matters in their true light, to obtain a reversal of the orders, and to secure permission to carry Raghunath Rao to Poona as was first intended.⁷⁶ If this could not be obtained, he should safeguard the interests of the Bombay Presidency and Raghunath Rao in the treaty to be negotiated with the Poona Government.⁷⁷ The abrupt interven-

tion of the Supreme Council had placed the Bombay Government in a ludicrous situation. The Bombay Government were all but disappointed. Their reaction was that if the Supreme Council would have resolved a peace and committed them the charge of negotiating it, without acquainting the Poona ministers at the same time, that the Bombay Government were acting without order and authority, a peace might have been brought about to the honour and advantage of Raghunath Rao and the Company.⁷⁸

The overriding authority assumed by the Supreme Council disgusted the Bombay Government so much that they complained to the Court of Directors of the indignity which had been shown to their Presidency in making Upton the umpire of the Company on the western side of India. They sought the 'immediate interference' of the Court to prevent the like ever happening in future.⁷⁹ They further wrote to the Court of Directors, "It appears to us a matter truly to be regretted that your Governor-General and Council should have been so hasty in sending Lt. Colonel Upton on this embassy without waiting for further advices from us ; it is a step most derogatory to this Presidency and almost entirely defeating the end for which we have deputed Mr. Tayler to Bengal."⁸⁰

Tayler arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of October, 1775. On the 9th October he presented a memorial to the Calcutta Council.⁸¹ He laid stress on the importance, to the very existence of Bombay, of having control, through Salsette, of the passes by which goods travelled inland, and of Bassein and the islands for the protection of the harbour. By supporting Raghunath Rao these safeguards were being secured. The Bombay Council, Tayler said, had never intended to flout the authority of the Calcutta Council ; the Regulating Act even supported their position, in as much as it exempted them from referring to Calcutta cases in which they had received direct orders from England, and they had received repeated orders to safeguard the interests of Bombay. Tayler also gave an exact description of the situation, revenue, and other productive advantages arising from cessions of territory made by Raghunath Rao and Fateh Sing. He urged in strong terms

the dangerous and disgraceful consequences of declaring a treaty, thus beneficial, invalid and null ; especially as it might impel Raghunath Rao to throw himself into the arms of the Nizam and Haidar Ali, or of Holkar and Sindhia. Tayler insisted on revoking the order for the withdrawal of Bombay troops from Raghunath Rao as their 'national reputation' required not to abandon him.

Tayler had several meetings with the Governor-General and other members of the Council. The Governor-General was soon convinced that the step taken by the Calcutta Council was precipitate : Barwell agreed with him. Indeed, Hastings from the beginning had opposed the withdrawal of the Bombay troops.⁵² But he was overruled by other members of the Council. Consequently, the original resolution was confirmed, except that it was agreed to leave the option with the President and Council of Bombay to withdraw their forces into such of their garrisons as they might choose.⁵³

On the 18th October, Tayler again submitted a memorandum to the Supreme Council in which he expressed concern at the determination of the Board. He argued that members of the Bombay Council, being in close proximity to Maratha territories, were better qualified for treating with the Marathas than Upton, 'an entire stranger to their whole system of government'. He reminded the Supreme Council that Mostyn, one of the members of the Bombay Council, had previously been appointed by the Company as resident at Poona. Tayler requested them to entrust the Bombay Government with the task of negotiating with the Marathas by cancelling the appointment of Upton. His remonstrance had a ring of fervid eloquence. When the British Parliament vested the Supreme Council with controlling powers over the other Presidencies, it was by no means their intention that the latter should appear degraded in the eyes of the country powers. The prestige of the Bombay Government had suffered an irreparable blow by denying them the right to negotiate with the Marathas. From this aspect, Tayler said, the whole British nation might be led to suppose that the members of the Bombay Council were devoid in every degree of integrity and abilities, which

would be the most cruel and unjust of all imputations. Tayler sums up the motives that influenced the Bombay Councillors :

"I can dare to affirm, not a person who concluded that treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their employers, whose interests appeared to them to be most materially benefitted by their engagements."⁸⁴

The Governor-General and Council informed Tayler that it would not be possible for them to cancel the appointment of Upton. They advised the Bombay Government to communicate with Upton as, by their 'local knowledge and experience,' they would be able to furnish him with material information. They also directed them to retain possession of the districts made over to the Company by Fateh Sing, until a definitive treaty of peace was concluded. Raghunath Rao was to be sheltered 'in case he should ever be necessitated to apply for their protection'.⁸⁵

Raghunath Rao was naturally surprised at the recent action of the Supreme Council. When the military assistance of the English marked a favourable turn in the tide of his affairs, the Governor-General intervened and asked the Bombay Government to keep aloof. Unaware of the implications of the Regulating Act, he asserted that the engagement made by the Bombay Government to espouse his cause imposed a solemn duty on the Supreme Government to uphold it. Things, however, went ill for Raghunath Rao for the time being.⁸⁶

In consequence of Raghunath Rao's remonstrance, Tayler gave some suggestions to the Supreme Council in a memorandum dated the 18th November.⁸⁷ He pointed out that the principal basis of the accommodation with the Marathas should be an acknowledgment of the title of the infant Peshwā, the regency of Raghunath Rao during his minority, and the succession of Amrit Rao, Raghunath Rao's adopted son, in case of their death. If any objection should arise in regard to the infant being put in the hands of Raghunath Rao, a battalion of sepoy, under English command, should be stationed at Poona to safeguard his person. Tayler repeated his recommendation to delay the recall of the Bombay troops till the conclusion of

peace. He believed that such a step would prevent Raghunath Rao from throwing himself upon the protection of other powers and 'give a weight to Colonel Upton's representations and demands'.⁸⁹

On 29 November Tayler received reports from Keating, of divisions in the ministerial confederacy, some principal members of which had engaged to join Raghunath Rao.⁹⁰ This flattering prospect induced Tayler to urge with vehemence to the Supreme Council the importance of being the instrument of Raghunath Rao's restoration 'by acceding to the treaty entered into with him by the Government of Bombay.'⁹⁰ This led to a debate in the Council. Any idea of allowing the English army to remain with Raghunath Rao was distasteful to Clavering as this would defeat the present negotiation, and might eventually engage the Company in an endless war with the Marathas.⁹¹ The majority of the Board decided to wait for reports from Upton on his negotiations with the Poona ministers before sending him any new instructions.

As Tayler's brief in support of the Bombay Government had no effect in changing the attitude of the Calcutta Council, he gave vent to his feelings in letters to the Court of Directors.⁹² He elaborated upon the propriety of the measures which the Bombay Government had pursued. The deputation of Upton to Poona, he believed, tended to 'subvert every idea of respect, power and authority' of the Bombay Government in the eyes of the country powers. He wrote to the Court of Directors on 29 November 1775 :

"I cannot help here again lamenting the total inefficacy of my late representations to this Government with respect to our engagements with Ragoba ; for, in the delicate and critical situation to which their conduct has brought you, it seems to me very probable, that his reestablishment without our aid may ensue ; in which case we must probably for ever relinquish all hopes of compassing your views in the west of India".⁹³

The Supreme Council also justified their conduct to the Court of Directors. They wrote that the Bombay Government had undertaken to conquer the whole Maratha Empire for a

man who was incapable of affording any effectual assistance in it. The plan adopted by the Bombay Government was defective and seemed to aim at no decisive conquest, but to portend an indefinite scene of troubles. They had no adequate force or resources for extricating them in case of difficulty. They had no justifiable plea of making the Marathas their enemy.⁶⁴

Hostilities between the English and the Marathas had ceased from the moment the pacific intentions of the Calcutta Council became manifest, but the atmosphere was still charged with mutual distrust and suspicion. Sakharam Bapu complained about the lukewarm attitude of the Bombay Government as they had not yet recalled their troops from Raghunath Rao. He also referred to the reduction of several towns in the neighbourhood of Gujarat by the English forces. Sakharam Bapu wrote in a tone of exasperation, 'How long are they to remain idle spectators of the greatest losses?' He believed, however, that the Bombay Government would restore the conquered towns to the Marathas.⁶⁵

The Bombay Government still entertained the hope of re-establishing Raghunath Rao on the Peshwaship provided they were at liberty to prosecute the war.⁶⁶ They determined not to separate their forces from Raghunath Rao as it would 'entirely frustrate the hopes of the Governor-General and Council of establishing a general pacification by means of Colonel Upton's negotiations'.⁶⁷ They wanted to retain their hold upon Raghunath Rao which could only be attained by keeping the English forces with him.⁶⁸ This measure, the Bombay Government believed, would prevent the Marathas from starting hostilities against Raghunath Rao. Accordingly, the English forces along with Raghunath Rao and his troops encamped at Karod, on the southern banks of the river Tapti, about 30 miles from Surat. But utter dejection had seized Raghunath Rao on account of the English negotiations with the Poona ministers and Keating's assurances failed to remove his 'melancholy'.⁶⁹

The Bombay Government left no stone unturned to get rescinded the orders of the Calcutta Council for negotiating

with the Poona Durbar. They wanted to retain the territories ceded to the Company by Raghunath Rao on political and financial grounds. They had been in peaceable possession of all the ceded territories, except Bassein ; the revenues were collecting without difficulty, and the Marathas already considered them as dismembered from the Empire.¹⁰⁰ The Bombay Government still believed that a treaty with Raghunath Rao would be more advantageous to the Company than one with the ministers. But the Calcutta Council was not likely to be swerved from its professed object. On 5 December 1775, one of its members, Francis, wrote to Keating :

"The measures we have taken must be adhered until we see the success of Colonel Upton's negotiations. Our object is peace upon honourable terms. We wish to obtain this object by fair and moderate proceedings in the first instance, and by such amicable overtures, as cannot be rejected by the Maratha Ministry, without injuring their own cause and credit. If this pacific plan should fail of success, the object will then be open to other consideration".¹⁰¹

Upton reached Poona on the 30th December.¹⁰² The journey was considerably long, it being 948 miles from Kalpi. His daily progress could not be satisfactory as the countries through which he passed were found to be mostly in arms. The roads were also full of 'rocks and jungles.'¹⁰³ He got little assistance on the way. The delay was imputed by him to 'the miscarriage of orders from the Ministers and the disturbed state of the country.'¹⁰⁴

The mission encamped at Purandhar, a hill-fort, twenty miles south-east of Poona. A full durbar was held on the 1st January 1776 in which Upton, Sakharam Bapu, Nana Farnavis and others were present. Profession of friendship was made by Upton on behalf of the Company, and returned by Sakharam Bapu and Nana Farnavis. Upton desired that the treaty to be concluded with the Poona Government should not only bear the signature of the ministers but also other Maratha chiefs. The ministers replied on 3 January that this request could not be complied with as all the Maratha chiefs were

dependent on the Peshwa. The consequences, the ministers emphasised, might be fatal, as it would induce the chiefs to think themselves of consequence enough to demand a share in the Government, instead of obeying the orders of the Peshwa, and cause dissensions rather than unite them.¹⁰⁵

In the month of January 1776, the Bombay Government conveyed to Upton some 'general information' about the Maratha business and hinted at some stipulations which should be made for Raghunath Rao and the Company in any treaty he might conclude with the ministers. It appeared to the Bombay Government that Upton should insist upon some points as preliminaries previous to his entering upon any engagements with the ministers. First, the ministers should assign a revenue, amounting at least seven or eight lakhs of rupees per month, for the support of Raghunath Rao and his adherents during the adjustment of the treaty. Secondly, they should issue orders to the officers of their 'grabs and gallivats' to refrain from molesting or committing any acts of hostility against vessels with English pass and colours. Thirdly, they should open the communications between the Company's settlements and the Maratha dominions and permit of a free intercourse of trade and correspondence 'in the same manner as before the war commenced.' Fourthly, Upton should secure some arrangements in favour of Raghunath Rao ; otherwise the Bombay Government feared peace would not be 'permanent'. The Bombay Government also advised Upton not to give up the territories ceded to the Company by Raghunath Rao. They expatiated on the advantages derived by the treaty with Raghunath Rao ; the cessions stipulated in this treaty had completed the Company's views beyond their expectations and the revenue was equal to meet all the demands of the Presidency. The Bombay Government were firmly of opinion that it would reflect the highest disgrace on the Company's arms to purchase a peace from the ministers by the restitution of possessions 'lawfully' ceded to them. Upton was advised to show a little determination not to part with these territories.¹⁰⁶

On 14 January, Captain Allan Macpherson, Persian interpreter of Upton, met Madanrao Sadashiv, the agent appointed by the ministers to transact all business with the English. Madanrao disclosed that the ministers would allow Raghunath Rao a household of 1,000 horse with 200 servants to be paid by their Government; they would also give him two lakhs of rupees per annum in monthly payments for his family and private expenses, if he would settle on the bank of the Godavari.¹⁰⁷ Madanrao also observed that the ministers would pardon Raghunath Rao's followers except four, who were instrumental in the murder of Narayan Rao. Macpherson remarked that 'the sum was too small to support the Peshwa's Uncle'.¹⁰⁸

Upton hoped that the ministers would confirm all the grants made to the Company by Fateh Sing in Gujarat. In a meeting with Madanrao on 24 January, Upton asked his opinion about this. Madanrao answered in the negative. He pointed out that Fateh Sing had no right to give up the territories in question as he held them from the Peshwa and as such he was not 'the absolute proprietor of that country'.¹⁰⁹ Upton also demanded that Salsette, Bassein and other islands round Bombay should be given up to the Company. He was willing to waive the English claim on the Gaikwad possessions in Gujarat, but he could hardly be persuaded to give up the claim on Salsette, Bassein, the small islands near Bombay and Broach, with its dependencies. The reply which Madanrao gave on 26 January in answer to Upton's demands merits quotation. Says Madanrao, 'What? Salsette and Bassein? The latter has cost us 5 crores of rupees and the lives of many thousands. Is this your English Honour after the Calcutta letters declaring they want no increase of country but only peace....?'¹¹⁰ The English demand that the Marathas should never impose *Chauth* met with a flat refusal from Madanrao as the *Chauth* was their 'old and just due.' Upton, being kept long in suspense, was anxious to get a definite answer from the ministers. On 29 January Madanrao told him that the Marathas would prefer war to peace on such terms.¹¹¹

The Governor-General and Council on 12 February advised Upton that he should not insist on the signature of all the Maratha chiefs to the treaty as they did not like to "let that point be made any obstruction to the conclusion of the Treaty". Clavering proposed to add another discretionary order to Upton that he should not insist on 'the island of Bassein being granted to the Company in the future treaty of peace, unless the Ministers had already consented to acquiesce in the demand he had made for it, or that he should perceive a disposition in them to yield the possession of it to the Company'.¹¹⁷ Francis thought the cession of Salsette and Bassein should be insisted on, especially as Upton had not suggested that he should expect to meet with any difficulty from the ministers on this point. Monson was of opinion that Upton should have instructions to obtain Bassein and its dependencies, if he could, from the ministerial party, but not to make it an article on which to break off the treaty he was instructed to conclude. Hastings and Barwell agreed with Francis and resolved not to alter the instructions already given to Upton for requiring the cession of Salsette and Bassein. Clavering's protest against this resolution led to a debate in the Council. The majority decided finally that in case Upton should find 'insurmountable difficulties' in obtaining Bassein without compensation, he should be authorised to propose certain concessions to the Poona Government.¹¹⁸ Upton was empowered to cede the fortress and dependencies of Brouch in return for the cession of Bassein and its dependencies. But he was instructed to reserve this concession until he should find it absolutely impossible to succeed without it. In case Upton should find the Maratha Government 'inflexibly determined' not to yield Bassein at any rate, he should suspend his negotiations, and wait for further orders from the Board.¹¹⁹

A letter written by Upton on 2 February reached Calcutta on the 6th March and disclosed the difficulties impeding the negotiations. "The Ministers imagine," said Upton, "that I must treat with them at any rate, and that I had vastly exceeded my instructions, by asking a surrender of these islands (Salsette and Bassein). They ask me a thousand times, why

we make such professions of honour? How disapprove the war entered into by the Bombay Government, when we are so desirous of availing ourselves of the advantage of it?"¹¹⁵ The Poona ministers were not in a mood to surrender Salsette and Bassein to the Company. In an entry dated 5 February in Machperson's journal we find the following observation of Madanrao: "Salsette we cannot give up and the four small islands (Karanja, Elephanta, Kenery and Hog) are like so many bastions to it... The English have no right to claim Bassein or a country in lieu of it; but as we wish to be on good terms with them, we therefore agree to give our own share of Broach and its pergunnah with a country of three lacks adjoining it."¹¹⁶ "In short," Upton reported from Purandhar, "I find Salsette and Bassein are the only impediments to a Treaty's taking place that might otherwise be very advantageous."¹¹⁷

As prolonged negotiations had not produced any concrete result it was unanimously agreed by the Supreme Council on 6 March to direct Upton, in case he had not already concluded a treaty, to retire to Bombay within six days after the receipt of these orders.¹¹⁸ On the next day—the 7th March—the Council received the definite information that Upton's negotiations with the ministers had been broken off. "In five or six days more," Upton wrote, "I am to leave Poona Dhur, and they will then fix the time for the expiration of the cessation of arms." He added, "if the war is to be prosecuted, if three or four companies of Europeans, a small detachment from the corps of Artillery, and two or three battalions of Sepoys were embarked from Bengal to join the army from Bombay, we might soon command peace on our own terms, for the Chiefs of this country are quite at a loss which side to take, and are waiting to see what the English do."¹¹⁹

On the basis of this fresh information the Supreme Council determined to resume hostilities. Troops were prepared and the Nizam, Haidar Ali, Bhosle, Sindhia and Holkar were requested to join the English, or at least to remain neutral. The English were determined to act in all quarters at once and to bring the war to a speedy conclusion.¹²⁰ Thus war seemed to break up again between the English and the Marathas. Mill

7/10/91

rightly queried, "... all this rather than restore Salsette, the capture of which, and the alliance for its support, they had denounced as both impolitic and unjust?"¹²¹

Upton's departure from Purandhar was postponed for a few days. Dadarao, the Nawab of Arcot's Vakil, intervened to bring about a rapprochement between the English and the Marathas. Dadarao still hoped that the ministers would waive their claim upon Salsette and Bassein and leave it to be determined by the Calcutta Council.¹²² But the ministers would give no 'footing on Bassein to any man wearing a hat.'¹²³ So Upton demanded from the ministers in lieu of it a territory worth three lakhs a year in the neighbourhood of Broach.¹²⁴ This demand drew some protest from Madanrao. In the entry dated 20 February 1776, Macpherson wrote, "Madanrao said they could not account for the cause of our unjust demand of a country of three lacks in lieu of Bassein, a place we never had, nor any right to ask it".¹²⁵ The ministers, however, offered to give a country worth one lakh a year in lieu of the money demanded for payment of the army and a country worth three lakhs, which they thought was 'a great deal more' than the English had any right to expect.¹²⁶ To this proposal, Upton gave a peremptory refusal.

Thus all hopes for a settlement with the ministers were at an end and Upton prepared to leave Purandhar. Before his departure Upton met the infant Peshwa and the ministers in a full durbar on 22 February. He gave some presents to the Peshwa and Ganga Bai on behalf of the Company. The ministers in the durbar expressed their sincere intention to conclude a peace and suddenly agreed to accept Upton's demand of a country worth three lakhs and 12 lakhs for the expense of the English army, and also to refer the case of Salsette to the determination of the Supreme Council.

This unexpected *volte face* on the part of the ministers is attributed by Allan Macpherson to Ganga Bai's intervention in the affair. But the fact remains that the ministers were not prepared to resume hostilities in case no treaty was concluded as their forces were engaged in different parts of the country and suffering the ravages of famine.

within also demanded the attention of the Poona ministers. Raghunath Rao incited the Kolis to rebel and Haripant and Parashuram Bhow were engaged in putting down the trouble. The Chief of Kolhapur and the Chief of Kittur also rebelled, the latter being supported by Haidar Ali. The ministers' faithful servant, Ramchandrapant Paranjape, betrayed them and released the Pretender from the Ratnagiri fort. With the defeat of Murarrao Ghorpade in February 1776, Maratha territories beyond the Krishna passed into Haidar's hands. The league of the Barbhais, which had so long remained unshaken, received a rude shock when Vamanrao, the Patwardhan chief, died in October 1775. With his death other Patwardhan chiefs became slightly lukewarm to the cause of the ministers. The attitude of Sindhia and Holkar appeared to be anything but friendly.¹²⁹ It would have been the height of folly on the part of the ministers to enter into hostilities with the English at a time when they had so many internal troubles to deal with.

The Calcutta Council's preparations to resume hostilities with the Marathas were suspended on receipt of Upton's letter dated 24 February 1776.¹³⁰ This letter brought intelligence of the final compliance of the ministers with the English demand. Francis wrote exultingly to D'Oyly, "on the night of the 23rd instant, a letter arrived from Colonel Upton, informing us that the Maratha Ministry, after trying every art to intimidate or deceive him, had finally agreed to a peace by which we are to keep Salsette... I foretold every circumstance which has happened and we have now the benefit of a peace, which we all desire."¹³¹

The draft of the treaty was drawn four or five times, and at last, on the 1st March, a treaty was signed at Purandhar by Upton on behalf of the Company, and Sakharam Bapu and Nana Farnavis on behalf of the infant Peshwa. By the terms of the treaty¹³² it was declared that the peace between the English and the Marathas should be fully established (Art. 1.) The Marathas, being anxious to recover Salsette, would in return give the Company a country producing three lakhs of rupees, in the 'neighbourhood' of Broach; but it was to be left to the discretion of the Calcutta Council to accept it or not (Art. 3).

The city and paragana of Broach was to be ceded 'for ever' to the Company (Art. 4). The English were also to get a country of the yearly produce of three lakhs adjoining Broach (Art. 5). For the expenses of the war the English should be paid twelve lakhs, six within six months, and the remainder within two years (Art. 6). The English agreed to renounce the cessions in Gujarat, provided it appeared that Fateh Sing had no 'power or authority to make such cessions.' All treaties made by the Bombay Council with Raghunath Rao were to be annulled, as was also that with Fateh Sing (Art. 7). The English troops were to march into their 'own garrisons and districts' (Art. 8). Raghunath Rao was to disband his army, and all his adherents except four¹³³ were to have a full and free pardon (Art. 9). If Raghunath Rao refused to disband, the English were to give him no assistance, but withdraw from him (Art. 10.). On condition of Raghunath Rao's agreeing to the terms prescribed, the Peshwa and his ministers were to allow him an establishment of 1,000 horse and 200 domestics, to be paid by them. Raghunath was to receive a pension of twenty-five thousand rupees per month provided he should retire to Kopergaon on the Godavari (Art. 11). The English were not to aid or assist in any manner, either Raghunath Rao or any person disturbing the peace of the Maratha dominions (Art. 12). The treaties between the Government of Bombay and the Marathas, dated July 1739 and the 10th October 1756, were to be "held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered into unless any article or articles of either of them should in other manner be provided for by this treaty" (Art. 15). These are some of the important articles of the Treaty of Purandhar, which was ratified by the Governor Council on 1 April 1776.

The Bombay Government made severe remonstrances on the terms of the treaty of Purandhar. They stated in substance the concessions made by the Maratha Government as of an instance nugatory (the Marathas being no sign of any of the city and paragana of Broach, and the treaty was in execution. They viewed the treaty as highly injurious to the reputation of the

Company, particularly in the stipulations respecting Raghunath Rao. They were afraid that peace was far from being secured on a permanent footing, even after such mortifying concessions.¹³⁴ The Bombay Government apprehended that Raghunath Rao could hardly be persuaded to accept these terms and as an alternative he might seek protection of the Nizam or Haidar Ali, the French or the Portuguese—powers considered to be ‘an object of jealousy and danger to the Company’.¹³⁵ Even after the conclusion of the treaty the Bombay Government could not forget the interference of the Supreme Council in their administration by virtue of the Regulating Act and they wrote to the Court of Directors on 21 March :

“Altho’ the Act does give them a controlling and superintending power over the other Presidencies in case of war and peace, we hardly think it authorises them to interfere so, immediately in the executive part, and we conceive that the proper method of proceeding in the present case, should have been for them to have given their orders to us, instead of sending a substitute from themselves with plenipotentiary powers entirely independent of us to make a peace for this Presidency.”¹³⁶

Brigadier-General Gordon differed with other members of the Bombay Council in his estimation of the advantages accruing to the Company from the treaty, which he considered as ‘honourable, advantageous and expedient.’ He, however, expressed a wish that the article in regard to the establishment proposed for Raghunath Rao should be altered, as much danger might arise from the entire dependence on the ministers to which he would be reduced.¹³⁷

The Bombay Government, in their despatches to Calcutta on the 30th March, observed that Raghunath Rao should have had the option of residing at one of the Company’s settlements ; that the ministers would not have objected to it, had their intentions been good. Raghunath Rao would have proved an useful instrument in keeping the Marathas in awe, and the best security for their observing the peace. The Bombay Government lamented the loss of so many places secured by the treaty of Surat and predicted the loss of the Gaikwad dis-

tricts.¹³⁵ They concluded their plea on behalf of Raghunath Rao with these words : "We beg leave to submit to your most serious consideration, the everlasting shame and disgrace which will be entailed on the nation, if we were to surrender him (Raghunath Rao) up into the hands of his enemies, after having given him protection, and any accident was to happen to him in consequence."¹³⁷

The question whether the Calcutta Council acted wisely in concluding the treaty of Purandhar raised many controversies. Opinions may vary on this issue, but the sentiments which Allan Macpherson expressed in a letter to his friend, Colonel Champion, should not escape our attention. He wrote on 7 March 1776 :

"Altho' the peace may not, apparently, be so advantageous to the Company as supporting the usurper, Ragonot Row, yet I believe it to be much more so in reality, because placing an usurper in the masnud must be at the expense of many thousand lives, could we do it. For, give me leave to tell you, Colonel, that by the best accounts I have been able to learn, our troops now in the field with Ragonath Row do not exceed a thousand, including Europeans and Sepoys. His own army is much reduced ; those he has, ill paid, very mutinous, and running about the country for plunder. This is the army which our friends on the Island declare able to beat the ministerial army of near a lack, well furnished, and encamped within a few causs of them, besides many other troops...

On the whole, I think we are well rid of a war which too much resembled the Rohcellah business, and might, had it been continued, involve all our settlements in war with the Mahrattas, who I need not tell you, Sir, are the most formidable enemy we could have to do with in the eastern world, as well as the most destructive. I mean this entirely for your own information, to prevent your being imposed upon by any accounts sent home by the people, who, in violation of Treaty, began this war, and therefore may, like others, think it necessary to declare, be it right or wrong, we must now support it".¹⁴⁰

CHAPTER IV

DIPLOMATIC INTERLUDE

"The treaty of Purandhar", writes Hastings to a friend, "was executed on the 1st March 1776. I disapproved of it."¹ The treaty was a measure of General Clavering's majority. It was set on foot contrary to the opinion and vote of the two most experienced members of the Supreme Council; and it was generally thought to have been purchased by the sacrifice of the Company's 'nearest and dearest interests.' On these principles it was loudly protested against by the Council of Bombay, with the decisive superiority of local knowledge. Raghunath Rao was hardly expected to accept the terms stipulated for him as he felt that his person would be 'endangered by putting himself so much in the power of his enemies.'² The Bombay Council, therefore, decided to offer Raghunath Rao shelter with his family and domestics in one of the Company's settlements.³ They were sensible of the advantages to be derived by securing the person of Raghunath Rao, as the ministers would be cautious in their future conduct. The Bombay Council afterwards considered that their affording protection to the ex-Peshwa should not be construed as their entering into a new engagement with him or interfering in the Maratha dispute.⁴ Upton was 'concerned' at the decision taken by Raghunath Rao and the Bombay Council. He considered this as an infringement of the treaty; a train of unfortunate incidents would follow in consequence of Raghunath Rao's residing at Bombay. This would give the Poona Government a happy pretext of complaining against the waywardness of the Bombay Government. Its repercussions had already been felt as the ministers refused to advance 'a rupee' to Raghunath Rao unless he complied with the conditions stipulated for him in the treaty.⁵

The Governor-General and Council were not long kept uninformed of these proceedings; they were duly advised by

Upton and the Bombay Council. On 6 May an interesting debate arose in the Calcutta Council on the question whether the President and Council of Bombay were authorised to grant the protection of their government to Raghunath Rao. Warren Hastings and others approved of the decision of the Bombay Government, only Monson dissenting.⁶ On a further consideration of the question the Supreme Council sent a letter to Bombay on 9 May. It contained assurances of their concern at Raghunath Rao's intention to seek an asylum at Bombay, and of their displeasure at the permission given to him by that Presidency. The Supreme Council believed that serious danger might ensue by using Raghunath Rao as an instrument for keeping alive the fears of the ministers. They should hold the Bombay Government answerable to the Court of Directors and to the British nation, if the ministers should in consequence refuse to ratify the treaty, and renew the war.⁷

The Bombay Government's intention to provide shelter for Raghunath Rao gave great umbrage to the Peshwa's ministers. They complained, 'what is become of the Peace now, if the Governor and Council of Bombay who formerly assisted Raghunath Rao now carry him to Bombay?'⁸ Upton sought the Supreme Council's intervention and wrote to them on 10 April 1776. "Your full directions to the Presidency of Bombay are necessary, otherwise I fear the articles of the peace will with great difficulty be carried into execution."⁹

In consequence of Upton's letter, Clavering suggested that the Presidency of Bombay should be prohibited from receiving Raghunath Rao in any of the Company's possessions; and in case he should be there before orders from Calcutta could reach them, they should be commanded to send him away.¹⁰ The majority of the Board concurred in Clavering's opinion; but Francis did not approve of the removal of Raghunath Rao by force from Bombay, should he be there. He recommended, as a means of getting rid of him, the withholding of all support and encouragement from him.

The Bombay Government, in their letters to the Supreme Council, dated the 10th, 22nd and 24th April, sharply criticised the treaty of Purandhar and complained against the Poona

Government for repeated breaches of it.¹¹ They also defended their own policy of protecting Raghunath Rao. The letter of 22 April shows the Bombay Government fretting with impatience and trying to throw the treaty of Purandhar into the winds. It runs as follows :

"We flatter ourselves it will appear to you, that the present treaty is dishonourable and insecure ; that it is concluded on terms which your substitute was not authorised to agree to ; that the Ministers have not inclination or ability to perform their part ; that they have even actually infringed it by taking our vessels ; that they themselves, by taxing us with infringing it, and by their menaces, deem it void ; that their Government is far from being universally acknowledged by the Marathas, and does not promise much stability ; that there is every appearance of further considerable commotions in the Maratha Empire, by which the Company's interest must suffer ; and that there is no other method of effecting a general peace but by their interference ; we therefore request you will take these circumstances, and our present precarious and disreputable situation, into your most serious consideration, submitting to you, whether it will not be more eligible and more consistent with the honour and advantages of the Company, not to ratify the Treaty formed by Colonel Upton, but to permit us to enter into engagements with Raghoba..."¹²

The Bombay Government likewise informed the Supreme Council that Raghunath Rao had received promises of help from the Nizam on condition that the English would not assist the ministerial party.¹³ But the Supreme Council instructed them on the 20th May to adhere strictly to the terms of the treaty, to avoid any step which might give alarm to the Marathas, and to secure the immediate departure of Raghunath Rao and his army out of the Company's possessions. The Supreme Council declined to give the assurances of neutrality which Raghunath Rao had demanded of them for the satisfaction of the Nizam.¹⁴

In the month of April, 1776, Upton received some secret overtures from the Nizam through Fazal Beg Khan, regarding a plan to restore Raghunath Rao to the Maratha Government, by their joint assistance, upon terms of mutual advantage. The proposal contained the following specific engagement: "After Ragoba is settled in Poona, the Nabob Nizam does promise to make him grant to the English Company sunnuds for the Cuttack country, and relinquish all claim of the *chout*."¹⁵ Upton was requested to write to the Supreme Council and get a treaty under their seals and signatures for this purpose. But he summarily rejected the Nizam's offer.¹⁶

By the terms of the treaty of Purandhar several territories were to be restored to the Marathas. The Poona ministers complained that they had not yet got back those territories. The Bombay Government, however, refuted this charge and observed that they had endeavoured to carry the treaty into execution 'with the utmost punctuality'.¹⁷ The Bombay Government put the blame upon the Marathas as they had already instructed the Chiefs of Surat and Broach¹⁸ for the restoration of the parganas and no agents from the ministers had arrived to receive them.

Even after the treaty of Purandhar, Raghunath Rao's forces continued to remain in the vicinity of Surat. The Poona Government threatened to attack these forces if they were not withdrawn within a limited period.¹⁹ The Bombay Government determined to 'take every proper step to remove Ragoba's army from the neighbourhood of Surat and to leave the Ministers without any plea for complaint'.²⁰ They sent directions to the Chief of Surat to make the 'strongest remonstrances' to Raghunath Rao on the impropriety of his troops remaining near Surat and to insist upon their removal.²¹ This had some effect and Raghunath Rao, after disbanding his troops, came to Surat with a small number of his followers on 18 May. The ex-Peshwa was accommodated at the Nawab's garden called Mahomodybag and began to press for immediate advance of some money and also for having some allowance settled. Gambier, the Chief of Surat, expressed his delight by writing to the Bombay Government, "I cannot but think that Ragobah's

taking refuge in Surat is to be considered as a circumstance of advantage."²²

A tool had fallen into the hands of the Bombay Government and they instructed their factors at Surat to advance Raghunath Rao fifteen thousand rupees per month for his personal expenses.²³ They also requested Upton to use his influence so that the ministers might be induced to assign Raghunath Rao a suitable establishment. This would, the Bombay Government believed, relieve them from the expense they would otherwise have to incur for his maintenance.²⁴ Thus the terms of the treaty of Purandhar were honoured more in the breach than in observance. Upton wrote to the Bombay Government on 21 May 1776 :

"...the conditions of the peace advance slowly—time elapsed (the most fatal consequences to the Ministers) and schemes now in embryos may grow to maturity before they can prevent them. The Ministers are aware of this and complain heavily, they are sure there are designs concerting against them, they don't say forming by us, but they are surprised at Raghunathrao's army continuing so long near Surat and the late act of his taking refuge under the walls of the fort. They cry out against loudly, asking how is the new treaty observed, by the English?"²⁵

While affairs were in this uncertain state a dispatch, dated 5 April 1776, came from the Directors in England. They approved 'under every circumstance the keeping of all territories ceded to the Company by the treaty with Ragobah'.²⁶ The Supreme Council resolved on 3 July that as they had considered the treaty of Surat invalid, and had since concluded another treaty with the Poona Durbar, they could not carry into execution the orders of the Court. They also thought that Upton's presence at Poona was no longer necessary and his services might be better employed at Bombay for the full execution of the treaty of Purandhar. Upton was advised accordingly to repair to Bombay. The Supreme Council forwarded the Company's orders, and also their resolutions upon them, to the President and Council of Bombay, repeating their instructions to them to execute on their part every article

of the treaty of Purandhar. About the instructions of the Court of Directors, Warren Hastings made certain observations in a letter to Colonel Maclean :

" ...At Bombay the hands of the Governor and Council have been tied by the Government of Bengal and loosened by the Court of Directors, who have confirmed the treaty made with Ragobah, and ordered it to be supported by the forces of all the three presidencies, although they were early apprised of the measures taken from hence to annul it, and might have foreseen what has actually come to pass, that a treaty has since been concluded by the Governor-General and Council with the very state which their present orders enjoin us to treat as an enemy... We have repeated our commands to Bombay to adhere to our treaty, and unless I am greatly deceived in my opinion of the temper and dispositions of the gentlemen of that presidency, they will break it and renew the war as soon as they are furnished with the authority of Court of Directors for it ; and a wonderful scene of intricacies we shall have opened between us."²⁷

What Hastings feared had come to pass. Emboldened by the directions from the Court of Directors, the Bombay Government came to the resolution to retain such of the possessions ceded by the treaty of Surat as had not yet been yielded up in consequence of the treaty of Purandhar.²⁸ Upton was greatly surprised at this sudden change of attitude on the part of the Bombay Government. His efforts were unavailing in moderating the impatience of the Bombay Government. Their present resolution, Upton lamented, was in marked contrast with the profession repeatedly made to the Peshwa's Government of their strict observance of the treaty of Purandhar.²⁹ The Supreme Council wrote to the Bombay Government in terms of great disgust and demanded their assistance in executing the treaty of Purandhar.³⁰ The Select Committee of Bombay revoked their resolution before the receipt of the letter of the Supreme Council 'from an apprehension of the bad consequences which must ensue.'³¹ Dependent for their supplies upon Bengal, and being 'unable to act without assistance from

the hope of getting some allies in his favour, induced Raghunath Rao to quit Surat.

In the month of October 1776 he was at Daman, negotiating with the Portuguese and collecting forces.⁴⁰ He had 8,000 troops with him.⁴¹ From Daman he implored Hastings to direct the Government of Bombay to help him in his war against the Poona ministers.⁴² The ex-Peshwa made his way to Bombay on 11 November in a British ship sailing from Tarapore.⁴³ The Bombay Government decided to protect him from 'personal danger,' and permitted him to stay till some other residence could be obtained for him. They professed that by affording protection to Raghunath Rao they had no intention to countenance or promote any scheme to the prejudice of the ministers or to infringe the treaty.⁴⁴ 'An immediate war' with the ministers, Brigadier General Gordon believed, would be the consequence of the step taken by the Bombay Government.⁴⁵ War, of course, did not break out, but the Peshwa wrote in protest to Upton: "I have just now heard that Raghunath Rao arrived at the port of Bombay on the 28th of Ramzaun and the Governor of that place gave him an asylum in the said port... These actions are very foreign to the meaning of the Treaty."⁴⁶ The Supreme Council endeavoured to compose the differences that took place between the Poona Durbar and the Bombay Government by asking the latter to secure the departure of Raghunath Rao from Bombay and all its dependencies.⁴⁷

Upton had already received instructions to take his leave from Poona. The Bombay Government decided to appoint another man as resident at Poona to maintain the most friendly intercourse and correspondence with the Maratha Durbar and selected Mostyn for this purpose. The Poona Durbar refused to receive Mostyn as he was supposed to be the author of English attack upon Salsette. The negotiations here were not successful, and at the request of the Marathas the British Resident was obliged to remain at Poona till the end of 1776. On account of indisposition Mostyn did not leave Poona till the beginning of April 1777. He was then sent to Bombay and returned to Calcutta in May 1777.

General, which must always be attended with fatal consequence."⁵⁰

He wrote in similar terms to his cousin, James Macpherson, on 27 November 1776: "I hope you will endeavour to prevail upon Governor Johnstone and your other friends who may have the leading hand in the Hon. Company's affairs not to give any orders in consequence of the representations from Bombay till they receive letters from the Council General on the subject."⁵¹

In 1776 the internal dissensions of the Maratha State enabled an impostor to obtain some power. "In the Deccan the Perkin Warbecks and Lambert Simnels cropped up by scores. All the prominent leaders who had fallen at Panipat reappeared in various parts of the Kingdom. Jankoji Sindhia and the brother of Hari Ballal Phadke were both popular roles; but the most popular role of all was that of Sadashivrao, the son of Chimnaji Appa."⁵² An impostor who assumed his name and professed to have escaped from the field of Panipat was made a prisoner during the Peshwaship of Madhav Rao. After being confined in different forts, he was finally delivered over to Ramchandra Naik Paranjape, the guardian of the fort of Ratnagiri, and an officer of the Maratha Government. Ramehandra Naik set the prisoner at liberty in February 1776 and proclaimed him as real Sadashivrao Bhow. The rebel collected a large force and secured the alliance of several leading men who bore a grudge against the Poona ministers. About this impostor George Dick, the commercial resident of Fort Victoria, wrote to Hornby on 11 May 1776, "it seems that Sudaba's rights are very much respected, and that many officers of rank have declined going against him which may induce Nana Furnees to sue for terms; the scheme is not totally to reject him, but clip his wings..."⁵³

The pretender tried to contact Ghorpade and the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur.⁵⁴ He captured Suvarnadurg⁵⁵ and afterwards entered Tale-Ghosala. Bajaba Purandare and Bhivrao Panse were sent from Poona to attack him.⁵⁶ The ministers could not intensify their military operations against him till the end of the rainy season.⁵⁷

In the month of July Sadoba sent two agents to Bombay and requested armed help. The Bombay Government could not agree to this, such a step being 'repugnant' to the treaty of Purandhar.⁵⁹ In the month of August he sent Abdul Gunney to Bombay and expressed his wish to have a meeting with Raghunath Rao.⁶⁰ At first Raghunath Rao believed in the claim of the pretender, but on enquiry he found him to be an impostor.⁶⁰

Daulatgir and Ghatge with some forces of the pretender marched upto Kalyan, and he himself advanced upto Boreghat.⁶¹ Haider Ali kept himself in touch with him through the Chief of Kolhapur.⁶² The ministers apprehended that on their forces entering the Konkan, the pretender might go to Ratnagiri or to Panhala via Ambaghat. So they instructed Pandurang Rao Patwardhan to send forces to Ambaghat immediately. The pretender ventured to proceed as far as Sinhagad and in the battle which ensued Mahadji Sindhia inflicted upon him a defeat. Ramechandra Naik's son was killed in the action.⁶³ Shortly afterwards, the impostor concentrated his forces at Rajmachi. Parashuram Bhow was directed by the Poona Government to stop supplies to the pretender passing through Ambaghat.⁶⁴ Bhivrao Panse kept the pretender amused by promising to join him, but suddenly he, along with Sindhia, attacked him. Rajmachi and Kuradu forts surrendered to the Peshwa's forces.⁶⁵ Apprehending some danger from his own people, Sadoba fled to Belapore and his followers, 20,000 strong, took shelter under the walls of Thana.⁶⁶ At Belapore Sadoba got into some boats and left for Bombay. But he did not land at Bombay, the reason, according to him, being the absence of Hornby in the city. Promising to come back again, Sadoba went to Kolaba.⁶⁷

Raghuji Angria succeeded in capturing him at Kolaba early in November and brought him to Mahadji Sindhia at Khalapur.⁶⁸ The pretender was subsequently brought to Poona. A council of eminent men of Poona like Ramshastri, Babuji Naik, Bhaskar Pant Patwardhan, Dhondoba Appa Purandare, Gopiniath Dikshit, Haripant Phadke, Mahadji Pant Guruji, was formed to try him.⁶⁹ He admitted on oath that he was

a Desmukh Brahmin from Kanauj, his name was Sukhnidhan, father's name Ramananda, mother's name Annapurna, and he hailed from village Kanol near Chhatrapur.⁷⁰ Shivaji Pant Paranjape, the pretender's associate, admitted that Ramchandra Naik was responsible for the plot of his escape from Ratnagiri.⁷¹ Documents to that effect were produced by Shivaji Pant and Dhondopant.⁷² The pretender was found guilty and sentenced to death. On 18 December 1776 he was put to death.⁷³

Mostyn arrived at Poona in the middle of March 1777 and immediately set himself to adjust the articles of the treaty of Purandhar. The Poona Durbar delivered him a paper of complaint.⁷⁴ By the fifth article of the treaty it was settled that the ministers would give up to the English territory producing annually a revenue of three 'complete' lakhs of rupees. The ministers now employed the term 'Kamil' to express 'complete,' which is a flexible term and may be said to 'signify the highest assessment ever known to have been fixed.' To this interpretation the Poona Government adhered, although the Bombay Government agreed to accept the cession at an average of a certain number of years. The Poona ministers demanded the restoration of Fateh Sing Gaikwad's parganas as the latter had no right to alienate any part of his dominion without the Peshwa's concurrence. Mostyn refuted this by saying that Fateh Sing's wakil at Bombay had denied the right of the Peshwa to alienate any part of Gaikwad's territory and demanded the restoration of these parganas, because Raghunath Rao had failed to perform the agreement for which the cession had been made. 'From these circumstances,' Mostyn observed on the complaint of the ministers, 'your claiming the sole right of disposing of the Guicawar's territories appears very extraordinary.'⁷⁵ The Poona ministers also complained against the protection afforded to Raghunath Rao and the followers of the pretender in violation of the treaties of 1739, 1756 and 1776. Mostyn answered that 'personal protection' given to Raghunath Rao was hardly likely to infringe any article of the treaties entered into with the Maratha State. With regard to the followers of the pretender Mostyn stated that the Bombay Government were induced by 'humanity

alone to receive the people of Sudaba into Salsette, to preserve their lives and to prevent them being killed immediately before their faces.”⁷⁶ In the treaty of Purandhar it was laid down that in paying the English the sum of 12 lakhs for the expenses of the war, the revenues of Jambusar were to be taken by the English until the whole amount was paid off. The ministers demanded that the revenues should be settled and recovered by the Sircar’s man, Madaji Ramchandra, who would pay it to the English on their giving a receipt. A letter to the authorities at Jambusar from the Governor and Council of Bombay, permitting Madaji to do this, was necessary. To this Mostyn acceded.

The Poona Durbar’s demands being answered, Mostyn laid before them some complaints on behalf of the Company. He complained that notwithstanding the treaty of peace, six boats with English passes and colours in their passage from Goa to Bombay had been attacked by the Marathas. Mostyn demanded the payment of 30,915 Rupees and the delivery of two boats, one belonging to Nasarvanji Modi and the other to Byramji Homji, which had long ago been settled with the late Peshwa Madhav Rao. About the violation of the treaty by harbouring the ex-Peshwa Mostyn wrote: “You quote the 3rd Article of the Treaty of September 1761 as having been broken by the English on account of their giving mere personal protection to Dada Saheb, when at the same time, I cannot help observing, you are daily breaking it by receiving every European that deserts from Bombay.”⁷⁷

Upon Upton’s arrival at Calcutta he was asked by the Supreme Council to deliver his opinion about the difficulties which still retarded the execution of the treaty of Purandhar. He remarked that by securing peace with the Company, the ministers had expected that the English were to give no assistance to Raghunath Rao or any of the rebellious subjects of the Peshwa and they accordingly acceded to many of the stipulations so beneficial to the Company. But the English forces were not immediately withdrawn from Raghunath Rao and he himself took shelter first in Surat and then in Bombay. The dispersed troops of the pretender were also received in

Salsette. The Bombay Government, Upton stated, had been giving assistance to Raghunath Rao and other rebels against the Peshwa ever since the treaty of Purandhar. He gave it as his opinion in the following words :

“If the Council of Bombay will oblige the disaffected subjects of the Peshwa, who to his great loss, have taken refuge in Bombay and Salsette, to quit these settlements, they will then soon find that harmony and confidence restored ; And then the trifling differences in dispute, regarding the country of three lacks, would be easily adjusted ; for I conceive, whilst we are keeping back so many and such material articles to them, they may have determined in turn, to be tardy in making over this cession : Besides, it should appear that the ministers may be somewhat alarmed about Jambooseer. Whilst Raghunath Rao resides at Bombay, in expectation of being supported, the ministers can place no confidence in the Council there ; which must now be productive of the greatest inconveniences, and perhaps, in the end, of fatal consequences. The Poona Government seemed ever disposed to comply with the wishes of the Superior Council.”⁷⁸

After considering these matters the Calcutta Council observed to the Bombay Government in their letter of 18 August that the presence of Raghunath Rao at Bombay would be an “insuperable bar” to the completion of the treaty concluded with the Maratha Government, nor could any good understanding be established with them as long as he should derive support from the English.⁷⁹ The Bombay Council was exhorted to effect Raghunath Rao’s departure from the Company’s dependencies. Regarding the differences which arose in receiving the possession of the country of three lakhs of rupees by the Company, the Calcutta Council gave no positive instructions except implying that the term ‘Kamil’ meant gross amount of the actual collection. The collection of Jambusar should be left under the management of an *Amildar* appointed by the Marathas, and a receipt should be given to him for the amount until the whole debt of twelve lakhs be liquidated. The

Calcutta Council discarded the Bombay Government's idea of maintaining a civil or military establishment in Jambusar where they had no other concern except of receiving the rents. They also instructed the Bombay Government to retain possession of the districts in Gujarat ceded by Fateh Sing, until positive proofs should be afforded by him or by the ministers that he had no right to make those cessions. "The detention of the country for a few months longer," the Calcutta Council added, "supposing it should be at last restored to Futty Sing, will be no breach of the Treaty on our part, as long as any material articles of it remain unexecuted, on theirs."⁸⁰

The mutual recriminations of the English and the Marathas which followed the treaty of Purandhar were dragging on when an entirely fresh turn was given to events by the unexpected appearance of a French adventurer, called St. Lubin, at the Maratha Court. M. Le Chevalier de Saint-Lubin was no stranger to India⁸¹ He had served as third Surgeon on the vessels of the French East India Company. In 1766 he came to Bombay *via* Basra and then proceeded to Mangalore, where he entered into Haidar Ali's service. Haidar suspected him of treachery and St. Lubin would have been probably put to death but for his timely escape.⁸² He next came to Madras where he became a friend of John Call, an engineer in the service of the East India Company. On his return to France, he ingratiated himself to the confidence of Monsieur de Sartine, Minister for the Navy, by presenting several memoirs on the political situation of India. On 10 January 1775 St. Lubin submitted to the Ministers a plan for a treaty of alliance to be concluded with the Marathas.

In March 1776 he was appointed as an envoy of the French King for negotiating a commercial treaty with the Maratha Government. In April he received his detailed instructions :⁸³

(1) The French Government wanted the establishment of permanent friendship with the Marathas. The French would render all possible services to their ally, and the Marathas in their turn were to guarantee protection to the French possessions in India against any enemy whatsoever. (2) The Marathas, in preference to all other Asiatic nations, were to-

enjoy the privilege of free trade in all states, present and future, under French rule. Similar concessions were to be granted to the French by the Marathas. (3) Maratha vessels were to have free access to all French ports, and *vice versa*. (4) Maratha vessels were to enjoy French protection in French ports. Similar protection was to be granted to the French vessels. St. Lubin was further instructed to negotiate with the Marathas a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance against any nation which would break off with France.

In September 1776 Lubin sailed from France in 'Le Sartine', a ship of 800 tons, mounting 30 guns, a ship which was 'more elegant, and had more accommodations than any ship belonging to France.'⁸⁴ He reached the French port Malé on 12 February, 1777; after a week's halt there, he proceeded up the Konkan Coast and arrived at Chaul on 16 March.⁸⁵ His confidential secretary, Monsieur de Santy, went to the shore and insisted on the observance of certain formalities for the reception of the envoy. He demanded that the Subedar should send the officer next in rank to him with a letter of congratulation of his safe arrival, that the troops of Chaul should be under arms, that there would be a salute of 21 guns from the fort, and an elephant and palanquins should be sent for carrying him. The palanquins could not be sent for Lubin's party, but all other points were complied with. Lubin sent his secretary to Nana Farnavis wishing to see him immediately and deliver the letters he had brought from the King and Prime Minister of France. St. Lubin arrived at Poona on 26 April and proceeded to Purandhar where the infant Peshwa and Nana Farnavis were spending the hot season. On his way to Purandhar Lubin was formally received by Bhivrao Panse, the commandant of the artillery.⁸⁶ Mostyn, the English Resident, remonstrated against the French envoy's reception. He was assured that no political importance was to be attached to this visit and the French envoy's mission would not injure the interests of the English East India Company.⁸⁷

On 5 May the French envoy was introduced to Sakharam Bapu and Nana Farnavis. After the ceremony of introduction was over, he retired with Sakharam Bapu, Nana Farnavis,

Madhu Rao Sadashiv, Kishen Rao Ballal, Bhosle's Vakil, and produced a letter from the Prime Minister of France, addressed to the Peshwa. The substance was that 'from time immemorial friendship and harmony had existed between the two states, which it was expedient to preserve in time to come, and that Mr. Chevalier would personally explain all further particulars'. The ministers enquired if the French and English were friends or otherwise. Lubin answered that they were at present friends, and that the French were not at variance with any power whatever. This was all that passed in the first meeting.⁸⁸

On 8 May Lubin had his audience of the Peshwa at which the principal ministers were present.⁸⁹ After a few minutes spent in profession of friendship he presented a letter from the French King to the Peshwa. Lubin apprised Sakharām Bapu that he had a 'variety of matter to treat of,' which he would explain at a convenient time. Madhu Rao Sadashiv was appointed by the Poona Darbar to transact business with Lubin.⁹⁰ Mostyn complained, "the Chevalier in every respect meets with the greatest attention from this Darbar."⁹¹ Meanwhile, the ship in which Lubin came was permitted to winter at Chaul for the rainy season.⁹²

In the month of June 1777 Lubin issued a circular letter to every Frenchman then residing in Poona. In it he requested them to meet at the house of Nana Farnavis to bear witness to the oaths to be taken by the ministers of the respective nations (meaning himself and Nana), relative to a perpetual alliance to be formed between the King of France and the Marathā State. The alliance with France was accepted unanimously by the Poona Government and liberty of trade was granted to all Frenchmen on the terms of the articles proposed in the treaty. The treaty in four articles was signed on 13 June at Poona. The Peshwa announced his friendship for the French King and also gave the assurance of full protection to all French possessions in India. The Marathās also promised to place at the disposal of the French 25,000 of their cavalry in case of an attack on the French establishments in India.⁹³ It was alleged that the basis of the agreement was to send out a body of troops from France to assist against the enemies of the Poona

Government. Anquatil de Briancourt in a letter dated 4 September 1777 to St. Lubin congratulated him on the success of his mission to Poona. Briancourt further wrote : "The treaty of alliance and commerce concluded with the Court of Poona will do you much honour at Court, and will afford infinite satisfaction to M. de Sartines, and will procure considerable advantage to France, if she will make the most of the circumstance and will afford you support in time."⁹⁴ Mostyn wrote to Hastings, "this diabolical scheme had opened a door the most destructive to our interests that could have been thought of."⁹⁵

Lubin sent to France the most flattering accounts of his negotiations at Poona. He wrote with much skill to his superior about the flourishing state of this country, the power of Nana, the certain destruction of the English, and his having obtained the port of Chaul.⁹⁶

The spectre of a French invasion in India always haunted the English in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. The prospect of the French obtaining an establishment at Chaul meant to the Bombay Government 'great injury to the commerce of Great Britain and inevitable ruin to the trade of this settlement.'⁹⁷ The situation of the port of Chaul might be looked on as 'the key to the trade of the Balaghat country,' on which the most essential part of Bombay's trade depended, both as to woollens as well as staples.⁹⁸ In the Franco-Maratha alliance the Bombay Council saw 'an endless scene of troubles and dangers.'⁹⁹ On the 17th December the Bombay Council recorded a minute, "if time is given for the French Ministry to take their measures, and to supply Nana with a body of forces, we can expect nothing but a repetition of the scene of wars and troubles formerly acted on the coast of Coromandel, which will certainly be fatal to the influence of the English on this coast, and may end in our total subversion."¹⁰⁰

In the meantime the parties at Poona were seething with discontent. Affairs of the Poona Government appeared also to be 'in a very ticklish situation.'¹⁰¹ Their treasury was low, the army under Haripant was suffering privations and there

was the jealousy between the leading men in the city. Farmer writes from Poona : "In six words the state of the government is this—the two chiefs in nominal possession of it aiming at the supremacy through different means—jealous and fearful of each other to such a degree, as not to speak but on matters of business ... the other chiefs seeking their own security, watching events—and ready to join in wherever they think the power may be effectually lodged."¹⁰² Moroba Farnavis developed a bitter hatred towards Nana. Sakharam Bapu. Moroba Farnavis and Chinto Vithal formed a trio against Nana. In a private letter to Warren Hastings, dated 3 November 1777. William Hornby, Governor of Bombay, conveyed his opinion that the present Maratha Government could never stand, as the leaders were disputing amongst themselves and making overtures to Raghunath Rao separately.¹⁰³ Hornby received an application from Moroba's party in which he was requested to bring Raghunath Rao to Poona. Reinstatement of Raghunath Rao by any other power would have deprived the English of any advantages to be derived from the Marathas. Hornby's appeal to Warren Hastings in the following words clearly shows the secret intention which he cherished in his heart :

"I must say I should have been very happy to have effected this service for the Company, before I left India. but if it is not to be, I can only lament the losing so fine an opportunity of doing them a most essential piece of service, and quit India under the disappointment ... The Marathas have been a bugbear to many, for they are nothing else."¹⁰⁴

The Bombay Government wanted power to regulate their own affairs independently of the Calcutta Council as the exigencies of the situation demanded. Carnac wrote to Hastings on 27 November 1777 :

"Much injury may really arise to the public service if your controlling power be exercised so vigorously that you will leave absolutely nothing to our discretion, for the intercourse between Bengal and us by land being slow and precarious, and the communication by sea for

half the year quite out off ; such a length of time will frequently intervene between the issuing and the receipt of orders, that the state of things, especially in a country where they are perpetually fluctuating, may be so entirely changed as to render obedience fatal ; and happy occasions do sometimes of sudden present themselves, which if not embraced at the moment, are for ever irrecoverably lost.”¹⁰⁵

Strange things were in store for the Bombay Government. They received a letter, dated 16 April 1777, from the Court of Directors which contained their observations on the treaty of Purandhar.¹⁰⁶ The Directors, though they gave their sanction to the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, were not entirely satisfied with the terms of it, as it had not produced the surrender of Bassein to the Company. They also did not approve of the mode of interference by the Supreme Council in sending an ambassador to Poona. They observed that an alliance originally with Raghunath Rao would have been more for the honour and advantage of the Company than that concluded by Upton. It appeared to the Directors that Raghunath Rao's ‘pretensions’ to the Poona Government were better founded than those of his competitors. They, therefore, authorised the Bombay Government to form an alliance with Raghunath Rao on the basis of the treaty of Surat provided the conditions of the treaty of Purandhar were not fulfilled on the part of the Marathas.¹⁰⁷

Overtures had been made to Lewis, Deputy Resident at Poona, on the part of Sakharam Bapu, Moroba Farnavis, Bajaba Purandare and Tukoji Holkar for the Company's assistance to bring the ex-Peshwa to Poona. The President and Council of Bombay had unanimously agreed to encourage the plan, in case Sakharam Bapu and other chiefs would make the application under their own *siccas* and handwriting.¹⁰⁸ Dadoo Pant, an agent from Moroba, arrived at Bombay on 5 January 1778, to negotiate with Hornby for this purpose.¹⁰⁹ In a letter to the Court of Directors, the Bombay Council wrote on 25 January : “It is our fixed and deliberate opinion that nothing but a change in the present administration at Poona

can secure the Company from the dangers and ruinous consequences which must ensue from an alliance between the French and the Marathas, and that there is no other method to avert them but by the Company immediately taking a decisive part."¹¹⁰

The Bombay Government's resolution was approved by the Calcutta Council. In a private letter to Hornby, Hastings gave his 'fullest approbation' and 'fullest sanction' for carrying their plan into execution.¹¹¹ Hornby was 'assured of all the support' from the Fort William Government.¹¹² On 2 February 1778 the Calcutta Council resolved that the President and Council of Bombay were warranted by the treaty of Purandhar to join in a plan for conducting Raghunath Rao to Poona on the application of the Poona Durbar.¹¹³ They informed the Bombay Government that the object of their own policy was to prevent 'the growth of an influence dangerous to the Company's interests, to defeat the intentions of a party adverse to the Company, and to promote the security of the Company's possessions'.¹¹⁴ On 23 February after an unusually warm debate the Supreme Council issued orders for forming a detachment consisting of six battalions of sepoys, one company of native artillery, with the regular proportion of field artillery to which were afterwards added a regiment of cavalry and a body of 500 Kandahar horse supplied by the Nabab of Oudh for the occasion. This force was to assemble near Kalpi under the command of Colonel Leslie. In vain Francis raised his voice in protest and there was no lack of grievance when he wrote to North that 'these people, both here and at Bombay', were determined to have a war at all events.¹¹⁵ Francis objected to this plan of sending detachments to Bombay 'into the heart of Hindostan through an immense tract of country' in which the English had no alliance or connection whatever. His minute runs as follows: "I will not be answerable for the consequences of hazarding a detachment of our troops, which we can very ill spare, upon an expedition in which they will probably be cut off, and for no purpose but to support an offensive war, which I do not doubt will soon become general."¹¹⁶ Thus the

English were on the eve of a war with the Marathas, from which Francis implored 'Good Lord' to deliver them.¹¹⁷

"The expulsion of the French influence from the Maratha State," Hastings wrote to a friend, "and the establishment of our own in its stead, were our objects in our first adoption of the Bombay plan."¹¹⁸ This measure appeared to Hastings as 'a desperate one', but he was sure that it would be 'productive of the most solid advantages, besides the prevention of infinite troubles.'¹¹⁹ Hastings wrote to Leslie, "the success of this undertaking may prove the crisis of all my future fortunes, and I have no doubt of its success."¹²⁰

The fear of a French invasion in alliance with a country power had taken a deep root in Hastings' mind. He was certain that if the French forces were permitted to obtain a footing in the Maratha territory, as allies of the Maratha State, all the country Powers of India would lie at their mercy and 'even the provinces of Bengal be exposed to their depredations'. The French, by allying themselves with the Marathas, had seized on the only means by which they could hope to regain their former consequence in India.¹²¹

The Bombay Council received a despatch from the Court of Directors, dated 4 July 1777, in which they were instructed to prevent Raghunath Rao from forming any plan against the ministerial party at Poona. They were further instructed not to engage with him in any scheme whatever in retrieving his affairs without the consent of the Governor-General and Council or the Court of Directors. The Directors were not in a mood to complicate their affairs in India by engaging in hostilities with the Marathas. Their determination to adhere to the terms of the treaty of Purandhar was expressed in unequivocal language : "... for though that Treaty is not upon the whole agreeable to us as we could wish, still we are resolved strictly to adhere to it on our parts."¹²²

The Calcutta Council got intelligence of this despatch and Francis and Wheler addressed a letter to Hastings requesting him to countermand the order for the march of the detachment to Bombay. But they could not carry their point against the majority. In consequence of the Court of Directors'

letter to the Bombay Government, the Calcutta Council sent them fresh instructions. The Bombay Government was instructed to defeat the machinations of the French, to insist upon the execution of the treaty of Purandhar and to take advantage of every change of circumstances for obtaining beneficial concessions to the Company. The Bombay Government was permitted to form a new alliance with Raghunath Rao if they observed any violation of the treaty.¹²³ At the same time, Colonel Leslie received instructions to proceed to Bombay preferably through the province of Berar, of which the rulers were friendly. He should be careful in preventing injury to the country or its inhabitants, and he should not suffer himself to be diverted from his march by any new object. He was to consider himself to be under the Presidency of Bombay from the commencement of his march.¹²⁴

CHAPTER V

POLITICS AT POONA AND THE CONVENTION OF WADGAON

Nana Farnavis and Sakharam Bapu were the two ministers who conducted the administration of Poona with great ability. Nana's cousin, Moroba, who had so long acted as the confidential Secretary of the late Peshwa Madhav Rao, was not consulted on account of his well-known leanings towards Raghunath Rao. But to disarm him from creating any trouble, Moroba was allowed to share the responsibility of the state along with the two ministers. He was also granted *saranjams*.¹ Immediately on assuming power, Moroba began his intrigues and courted English help through Lewis, Mostyn's assistant at Poona. He contrived a plot together with Sakharam Bapu, Bajaba Purandare and Tukoji Holkar, the object of which was to bring Raghunath Rao to Poona with the help of the English.² It had also been settled that Savai Madhav Rao should be acknowledged as the Peshwa, and Raghunath Rao should act as regent during the minority of the Peshwa.³ ~ ~

The English welcomed this idea as it would have enabled them to substitute a government at Poona under their patronage by expelling the French. Moroba professed a great attachment to the English to whom he looked for security and aid when the administration at Poona would devolve upon him.⁴ Moroba's cautious and determined character pleased Farmer, an English resident at Poona, so much that he would be glad to recommend him to the Peshwa's government. Sakharam Bapu was "too old, too cunning, and too false to be trusted ;" Farmer fancied that he would be contented to remain in Purandhar under English patronage. Let him have the guardianship of the boy Peshwa if he desired so. Nana Farnavis was not a factor to be reckoned with as such an unexpected blow would quite confound him.⁵

During the year 1777 the Raja of Kolhapur in conjunction with Haidar Ali had started troubles against the Poona Durbar.

In the beginning of 1778, Poona was denuded of fighting forces. Haripant and the Patwardhan chiefs with their troops were deployed in Karnatak. Baji Pant and Appa Balvant who had been around Poona also started for Karnatak. Despite his artfulness, Nana alone was not equal to meet these foreign troubles and the deep-laid schemings of Moroba. He attempted to seduce Holkar from Moroba's alliance, but without any success. Holkar even refused to have any communication with Vaji Pant Benewalshi, whom Nana had sent to contact him. Sakharam Bapu kept himself cautiously away from any share in the administration. He became jealous of Nana's overgrowing power. Farmer writes of him: "He is afraid of his person and don't venture out of Pronder, and is justly jealous of his colleague Nana. . . if the intelligence we get is true, this must certainly be his game, he leaves the direction of the troops and of all affairs to Nana and secretly foment the discontents of the officers against him."

Although the friendship of Holkar with Moroba was very well-known, Nana entirely overlooked the possibility of the two joining hands with each other. Moreover, he could not dream of Bapu's taking part in the plot. In February 1778, Nana had been absent at Purandhar having gone to Menavali for Shivratri celebration. On pretence of pilgrimage, Moroba with his family went to Pandurang Rao Naik at Baramati on 12 March, where he expected to be joined by Holkar.⁸ Sakharam Bapu feigned to start for the Karnatak expedition, but remained at Poona on some pretext. On 18 March Nana returned to Poona and heard that some gardis were coming from Aurangabad without necessary permits. He immediately despatched troops to put down the gardis. The skirmish ended in Nana's favour, but to his utter consternation, he found that the gardis were the partisans of Moroba sent to attack Poona.⁹ The plot had thus leaked out. Indeed for some days past Nana had found that prominent persons like Chinto Vithal and Balaji Pant Damlia were leaving Poona. Mostyn reported, "indeed every Bramin in the place is removing his effects as fast as he can."¹⁰ Nana suspected that something was in the air and sent two agents to Dhonsa and Haripant requesting

them to come to his assistance.¹¹ In politics, quick action is one of the high roads of success and Sakharam Bapu warned Moroba to hasten up the plot lest it should be rendered abortive.¹² Moroba, accompanied by Bajaba, rushed to Wadgaon where Tukoji Holkar was encamping with his forces. These joint forces proceeded to Poona and became masters of the city on 26 March. On the same day, Parvati Bai invested Moroba with the *sirpaw* and other insignia of Diwan.¹³ Nana Farnavis, who had retired to Purandhar with five thousand troops, at first thought of opposing Moroba and his party. Sakharam Bapu visited Nana at Purandhar and advised him to make peace with Moroba. Realising the futility of armed opposition, Nana agreed and asked Bapu to mediate. An agreement was reached in which it was settled that Moroba should work as head of the government on the advice of Nana and Bapu and Raghunath Rao at present should not be invited to come to Poona.¹⁴

Mostyn had several meetings with the newly constituted Poona Durbar. He remonstrated against Lubin's stay at Poona and learnt that the Durbar intended to dispatch him shortly.¹⁵ Mostyn was informed that Gopal Naik Tambucker was to be sent by the Durbar to Bombay with full powers to treat with the English and Raghunath Rao.¹⁶ Moroba and other Maratha chiefs also assured Mostyn that they all confirmed the agreement formerly made with Raghunath Rao ; that their arrangements with the Company would be best settled after Raghunath Rao's arrival at Poona.¹⁷

Raghunath Rao received the news of the revolution at Poona with mingled joy and expectation. He wished to proceed to Poona immediately lest delay should weaken the attachment of the party in his favour. He also expressed his desire of putting the Company in possession of the places stipulated in the treaty of Surat. Ramsay and Carnac were sent from the Bombay Council to expostulate with him on the precipitancy of his conduct and to moderate his impatience. They assured him of the friendship of the Company and asked him to wait till the arrival of some fresh overtures in consequence of Mostyn's interview with Moroba.¹⁸

the Bengal troops to march through the Maratha dominions.²³ The Poona Durbar wrote to Calcutta, "Colonel Upton concluded a Treaty between our two Governments; where then is the necessity of your sending troops into my country?"²⁴ Moroba assured Mostyn that the French agent, Lubin, would be sent back, and after his departure there was no occasion for the coming of the Bengal troops or his granting a passport.²⁵ A few days afterwards it seemed clear to the English that Moroba would not grant any passport for the Bengal troops.²⁶ The Bombay Government complained to the Calcutta Council of the 'evasive conduct' of the new ministers, of their coquetting with the French, and of Moroba's treading in the 'footsteps of his predecessors.' They added that the treaty of Purandhar still remained on the same footing on which it had stood these two years past, nor had the new Government at Poona taken any measures whatever for fulfilling the unexecuted articles.²⁷ The Bombay Government wrote on 3 June, "Any offers the Durbar may now make to Ragoba, can only be intended to gain more time, and the more important object we have in view cannot be put to the hazard upon the mere hopes of advantage to him."²⁸

On the 4th June, 1778 Mostyn presented to the ministers a formal paper of demands in obedience to the directions of the President and Council of Bombay, and demanded an explicit answer within fourteen days.²⁹ He wanted to know whether the Marathas would pledge their faith to the due observance of the treaty of Purandhar. He also demanded immediate possession of a country of three lakhs of rupees near or adjoining to Broach. The cessions made by Fatch Sing Gaikwad were to be retained by the English as the Marathas had failed to produce any proof that Fatch Sing did not possess power or authority to make such cessions. Mostyn demanded 'clear and satisfactory explanation' of the intention of the Marathas respecting the French.

In the meantime, Nana Farnavis worked silently in organising a plot against Moroba and his party. He repeatedly urged Haripant, Mahadji and the Patwardhans to repair to Poona. By the beginning of June Sindhia reached the environs

of Poona, having been joined by Haripant and Parashuram Bhow at Morasvar. Nana Farnavis, who had retired to Purandhar, now left the place and took the protection of Mahadji Sindhia on 10 June.³⁰ Soon after his arrival at Sindhia's camp, Nana asked Moroba to deliver over the *Sicca*, *Cutary* and *Jari Pataka*. Moroba refused to do so.³¹ Mostyn apprehended that the executive part of the Poona Government might again revert to Nana Farnavis, but he imagined that it would not be 'decided without bloodshed.'³²

Before the junction of Nana and other prominent leaders took place, Moroba warned Sakharam Bapu in a secret note that if the Patwardhans, Nana and Mahadji were not defeated, their downfall seemed imminent. That note was intercepted by Nana and sent to Mahadji.³³ At Morasvar, Bapu arrived at Mahadji's camp and repeated for his association with Moroba. Discussions took place between Mahadji, Nana, Sakharam and Haripant, and it was decided that Sindhia and Holkar should reconcile themselves. Nana should be the ruling authority at Poona and Moroba's fate was to be decided in future.³⁴ Parashuram Bhow, however, expressed his displeasure at the prolonged discussion, especially when combined Maratha forces, numbering about 40,000, would have easily defeated Moroba. Probably Holkar's indecision in joining Sindhia and Nana prevented them from taking any immediate step. But Mahadji took great pains to dissuade Tukoji Holkar from ruining the Maratha State by supporting Moroba. He reminded Tukoji that Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia fought side by side and earned fame. Mahadji's effort was crowned with success.³⁵ Holkar's accession reinforced the party that had already gathered strength by the union of several chiefs. They all took oaths of allegiance to support the boy Peshwa at the instance of Mahadji.³⁶ All these arrangements were completed by the middle of June.

Moroba's fate thus hung on the balance unless he was assisted by any foreign power. In this unfortunate dilemma, he again courted English help. He promised Mostyn his compliance with all the demands which the latter had submitted to the Durbar on 4 June and desired that Raghunath Rao should

be brought to Poona with the help of the English troops.³⁷ Mostyn requested the Bombay Government's instructions on this head as it appeared to him that Moroba's party was now 'really in earnest, and in a hurry about it'.³⁸ He also gave his opinion in the following words :

"I hope no objections on our part will now be started. The rains may be an obstacle but if we can but bring him over, they will find means to convey our stores, etc., up, and until an interval of fair weather our troops may find shelter at Bellapore, and Panwell or Callian, if you take that road, which is the best in the rains."³⁹

In fact Moroba made a desperate bid to win the attachment of the English. He and Mahipat Rao Trimbak delivered to Mostyn the draft of a treaty, the important terms of which were that the English army would accompany Raghunath Rao to Poona assisting him with 'troops and warlike stores' ; they confirmed the treaty concluded by Upton and agreed to the further demands made by Mostyn. The English army accompanying Raghunath Rao to Poona should be dismissed whenever they might think it proper and the English were to bring Raghunath Rao 'through their interposition alone and not thro' any other.'⁴⁰ The *sicca* should be continued in the name of Savai Madhav Rao and Raghunath Rao should conduct the administration during the Peshwa's minority. Mostyn sent a memorandum to Moroba's party and wanted to know how the business might be expedited. To this they answered 'under the *sicca*', "The principal officer and their armies are now here . . . You may now go to Bombay and when you have settled every thing let us know and send the Articles according our agreement. We have given you full powers but the matter must be kept as secret."⁴¹

Moroba's ascendancy was, however, shortlived. From the end of June, Nana recovered his influence at Poona and Mostyn feared that 'greater obstruction' would be thrown in communicating with Moroba's party and in securing 'future intelligence.'⁴² Moroba at first thought of making a stand but when Maratha forces were pouring in, he expressed his willingness to surrender if he was allowed to stay at Shivner.⁴³

Nana refused. Finally Moroba was seized on 11 July by Sindhia's forces along with Bajaba Purandare and Naro Ganesh.⁴⁴ Moroba was sent as a prisoner to Ahmadnagar escorted by three hundred horse and two hundred foot.⁴⁵ Bajaba was imprisoned in Wandan fort, close to Satara.⁴⁶ Thus, the concord of the Maratha chiefs once more proved superior to the narrow and shifty policy of Moroba, whose intrigue might have endangered the State had he not been checked in time.

The Poona Durbar had evinced a pacific disposition by giving St. Lubin final leave on 25 June 1778. A paper was alleged to have been delivered by Nana to Lubin on his taking leave. "When the disturbances raised by Morojee is over, which will be ended shortly and without difficulty, I will call your troops from Europe, and join them with the Peshwa's army, when by your assistance, the business will be properly concluded."⁴⁷ Shortly before Moroba's overthrow the Poona Durbar, through the instrumentality of Nana, sent an answer to Mostyn's representations, asserting that they had in every sense complied with the treaty of Purandhar. They observed, "the English ought to keep it faithfully and the Sircar will also do the same." They also denied having entered into any engagement with the French.⁴⁸ This answer was regarded by the Bombay Council as 'in the highest degree vague, evasive and unsatisfactory.'⁴⁹

Mostyn had already received the flattering proposal of Moroba and henceforth he was eager to leave Poona. He sought every 'opportunity of leaving Poona without giving the least cause to suspect the real motive' of his journey. He took recourse to a diplomatic ruse and wrote to the Peshwa that it was by order of the Bombay Government that he wanted to leave Poona.⁵⁰ On 6 July he left Poona and shortly afterwards reached Bombay.⁵¹ On his arrival he was asked by the members of the Bombay Council about the state of affairs at Poona.⁵² Considering the 'critical situation' of affairs with France, he declared it to be his unalterable opinion that there was no other alternative to choose but that of taking part with Moroba. On being asked what services could

be rendered by Moroba, Bajaba and Holkar. Mostyn asserted that they would be able to assist with thirty thousand horse. He further gave it as his opinion that if the English were to act in concert with those chiefs, Mahadji Sindhia would not oppose Raghunath Rao, or separate himself from Holkar. The inimical attitude of Nana Farnavis to the English was also explained by Mostyn, who said that if he remained in the chief management of the Maratha State, it would mean 'every injury to the Company'. Mostyn concluded by saying that the French would receive every encouragement from Nana Farnavis while the English should be confined within their narrow limits and deprived of every supply from the continent.⁵³

The President and Council of Bombay, after deliberating upon the proposals from Moroba's party, resolved on 21 July to effect the subversion of Nana's power because he was connected with the French and to establish an administration at Poona with which a 'secure and permanent alliance' could be maintained.⁵⁴ Raghunath Rao should be placed in the regency, with a proviso that the Government and *sicca* be continued in the name of the Peshwa during his minority, and should be surrendered to him on his attaining the legal age. The Bombay Council considered that the letter of the Governor-General and Council, dated 23 March, and the Poona Durbar's unsatisfactory answer to Mostyn's demands, authorised them to pursue such measures. They also resolved that the restoration of Nana Farnavis to the executive power of the Poona Government made it 'a case of indispensable necessity' that measures should be taken with all expedition. Moroba and his party should be acquainted of the 'good disposition' of the English, who would 'heartily' join in the proposed plan. Preparations for effecting these points were to be made secretly without communicating the resolutions to Raghunath Rao till matters were more ripe. Thus the intestine division of the Marathas and the overture of a disgruntled Poona party opened up a fair prospect to the English for effecting their object without any difficulty. Though the news began to filter through that Moroba and his associates had been kept under strict

surveillance by the Poona Government, yet this did not deter the Bombay Government from postponing their views to any favourable opportunity. In their anxiety to hasten up their object they expected the defection of many principal Maratha officers. They entirely overlooked the possibility of any resistance from the Marathas to Raghunath Rao as they believed that his claim was in general favoured by them, and 'Nana's oppressive government detested'. A fresh agreement was to be concluded with the ex-Peshwa in which the English were to look for nothing further than the performance of the treaty of Surat, the exclusion of the French, and the payment of military expenses.⁵⁵

The Committee of Correspondence, appointed by the Court of Directors to examine into the affairs of Bombay, submitted its opinion to the following effect :

"And the Committee having duly attended to the whole of the proceedings previous to the expedition under consideration, are of opinion, that the resolutions of the Select Committee of Bombay, of the 21st of July, for placing Ragoba in the Regency at Poona, was not improper, under the favourable circumstances set forth in their proceedings at that period."⁵⁶

The troops destined for the assistance of the Bombay Government assembled at Kora on the 25 April when Colonel Leslie joined. When he arrived at the bank of the Jumna he wrote to Balaji and Gangadhar Pant, the chiefs of those parts of Bundelkhand which were under the Peshwa's authority, for a free passage through their territory. Leslie received assurances of friendship and prepared to march with his army.⁵⁷ But before the first division was fairly embarked, a party of horse came down and fired on them. On their arrival at the opposite bank they were opposed by a body of 1,200 horse with the Kiledar of Kalpi at their head.⁵⁸ The English soldiers behaved with great spirit, in particular the grenadiers of the 4th battalion.⁵⁹ The Marathas retreated and the English occupied the fort of Kalpi as a pledge for their future good behaviour. "The fort of Culpee is an excellent hostage," wrote Leslie on 20 May to Calcutta.⁶⁰ Francis and

Wheler used these circumstances as a lever to call back the detachment or at least to suspend their march till the end of the rainy season. Francis observed in a minute, "I think that we hazard the safety of that army, on which perhaps the safety of Bengal, and of the whole British Empire in India may depend, by attempting to force a passage from one side of India to the other at this unfavourable season of the year, and in the face of an enemy determined to oppose it."⁶¹

The skirmish was followed by an agreement which Leslie entered into with the Maratha chiefs for the safe passage of his detachment through their country.⁶² The terms of the agreement were, that the English troops should have a 'free and unmolested passage' and that they should be supplied with provisions and other necessities at a fair price. The fort of Kalpi should be kept by the English guard, as a security for the performance of the agreement. The fort was to be restored provided the English detachment reached Chhatarpur and received 'friendly' assistance from the Marathas.⁶³

At this juncture a letter was received by Leslie from Bombay with directions to halt until further orders.⁶⁴ As the ground around Kalpi would not admit of an encampment, Leslie decided to move about twenty miles further to the banks of the Betwa river, where he would wait for their further instructions.⁶⁵

Hastings summoned an extraordinary Council on 11 June to consider the Bombay letter to Leslie. Francis supposed that Hastings would countermand Leslie's march. The motion which Hastings made, however, did in no way answer Francis' 'expectations.' He proposed that the army should halt wherever the orders were received, but the commanding officer should complete his preparations, and hold himself in readiness to march on immediate warning. Francis, on the contrary, insisted that the expedition should be countermanded, and the army ordered to recross the Jumna; but to no purpose. Francis wrote to North:

"I suspect the Governor's (Hastings') intention to be, to quarter the army in the rich, defenceless country of Bundelcund, which is the principal market for diamonds,

and where new sources of private fortune will soon be discovered."⁶⁶

But his qualms were soon satisfied when he got the news that the Bombay Government had already sent orders to Colonel Leslie to stop the march of his army. To Francis it was a fortunate event for the Company, but he felt that the rebuff to the Government of Bengal was 'a little ludicrous and not a little disgraceful.'⁶⁷ Soon afterwards, however, the Bombay Council revoked their order and asked Leslie to proceed.

News of Burgoyne's surrender in America reached Calcutta in the middle of June. Francis again pressed for the recall of the detachment as the Bombay Government had acted 'capriciously and without reason' in sending contradictory orders in quick succession. He could place no reliance in 'the wisdom of men, whose Councils, in the determination of the most important questions, appeared to fluctuate without plan, principle or object.'⁶⁸ He also pleaded that events in America ought to have influence in shaping the policy in India and urged the necessity of standing on the defensive, without weakening or dividing the forces on which the safety of Bengal depended. But Hastings refused to be intimidated by the gloomy forebodings in the west. He argued that it would be injudicious to stop abruptly a measure of such importance when the eyes of all India were turned upon it. If it were really true that the British arms had suffered disgrace in the western world, all the more was it incumbent on those who were charged with the nation's interest in the east to exert themselves for the retrieval of the national loss.⁶⁹

Despite the Governor-General's arguments Francis did not understand how the march of the forces, established for the defence of Bengal from its own frontier to the other side of India, could be a measure of importance to the 'national interest and the national safety.' He wrote to North on 24 June :

"I need not attempt to combat principles so manifestly subversive of the fundamental policy of the East India Company, as well as of every dictate of justice and

prudence. The Company have thought fit to leave their affairs under the same guidance, which planned and executed the Rohilla War, and will have no right to complain, however they may have reason to lament the fatal consequences of their own conduct, in suffering those acts to pass with impunity, which they thought deserved the severest condemnation".⁷⁰

With deep chagrin Francis admitted to North that 'continuing a verbal-debate at the Board' led to nothing but 'unavailing altercation and asperity on both sides.'⁷¹

Hastings' enemies in the Council took every pains to stop the march of Leslie's forces by pointing out the slowness of the progress as well as the danger which they had to meet on the way. Francis elaborated upon the extraordinary length of the march, the difficulty of procuring subsistence in the Maratha territories, and the immoderate labour in conveying artillery through a country intersected by some great rivers and numerous *nullahs*. The melancholy account of their situation and particularly of the distresses which had attended their journey filled Francis with the most serious apprehension of the fate of the army. "If unfortunately it should be cut off", Francis wrote, "no man can say, how far the mischievous consequences of such a disaster may extend, or where they will stop."

Francis, no doubt, magnified the difficulties, but the army did suffer to some extent. The following account from the Journal⁷² exhibited the privations which the English army suffered on their march from Kalpi :

"The scorching hot winds, with the intense heat of the sun, on a dry extensive plain, from eight o'clock to a quarter past eleven, exposed us to sufferings of the superlative degree ; about twenty sepoy's dropped down quite exhausted for want of water ; several dogs and other animals gasped their last ; not less than fifteen or twenty of our followers shared the like fate, and twenty officers were taken sick merely from the bad effects of this ridiculous march."⁷³

Captain James Crawford, 'one of the best sepoy officers in this army', died and the news was received by Hastings with much annoyance. He wrote to Leslie, "do not expose me to the mortification of hearing reports of the most unpleasant kind which I can neither contradict nor even refuse my credit to them."⁷⁴

On the 7th July came news *via* Suez that war had been declared between England and France.⁷⁵ In view of this information received, the Calcutta Council directed Leslie to proceed with the detachment under his command to Berar, and 'not to pass beyond that Province.'⁷⁶ This would be convenient for the return of the troops, if it should appear expedient to recall them for the defence of Bengal. This changed situation in the relation between Britain and France influenced Hastings' policy so much that he drew far-reaching plans of overthrowing the power of the French and the Marathas in one round. He showed his diplomatic tact in a lengthy minute which he subscribed on that occasion.⁷⁷ Bombay was equal to meet the French alone, but unequal to face them if they were supported by the Marathas. Bombay, being weak in itself and entangled rather than strengthened by its divided possessions, required every assistance. Hastings, therefore, pointed out the immediate necessity of forming an alliance with some country Powers to counterbalance the supposed confederacy between the French and the Marathas. To this end he recommended a deputation to the Court of Berar as the most powerful ally with whom they should enter into the closest bonds of amity. It had long been a favourite project of Hastings to secure an alliance with Berar. Some half-hearted attempts were made before 'to the attainment of it in the administration of Lord Clive'.⁷⁸ By adoption and blood, Mudaji Bhosle, the Raja of Berar, had some pretensions to the leadership of the Maratha Confederacy. Although he had relinquished these in consideration of certain valuable concessions, Hastings conceived the design, on the death, in December 1777, of Ram Raja, the *roi faineant* of the Maratha Empire, of encouraging Mudaji to press his claims with the support of the English. By drawing the two states of Berar

and Bengal into 'a decided lasting union,' Hastings projected the overthrow of the power of the Poona Government which would give the English a 'lasting ascendant in its operations', and 'for ever dissipate all the designs' of the French.⁷⁹ Mudaji had wealth, power, a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poona; Raghunath Rao neither wealth, power nor territory, nor an influence remaining which could supply the want of these requisites, except what might eventually arise from an active part taken by the Presidency of Bombay in his favour. Hastings, therefore, judged Mudaji 'a fit instrument' to supply the place of Raghunath Rao.⁸⁰

Francis delivered his opinion on this subject on 11 July.⁸¹ He strongly declared his unalterable opinion that the safety of Bengal 'the first and most essential of all objects to the Government,' required the recall of Leslie's detachment. It might, however, be advisable to send a reinforcement of two or three battalions of sepoys to Bombay, which should proceed from Madras, and be replaced, if necessary, from Bengal. He also advised that the Bombay Government should be directed to make some concessions to the ministerial party at Poona and try to come to an accommodation with them 'as soon as possible.' He did not think that friendship of Mudaji or that of any Maratha Chief was 'worth purchasing.' He was afraid of the proposed engagements with him, because he did not know 'whither such engagements might lead the Company's arms, or how long they might implicate them in the political contests of the country Powers.' Francis summed up in the following words :

"Our general line of action is and must be purely defensive . . . to avoid becoming parties in any disputes between the powers of India."⁸²

Hastings moved for an offensive and defensive alliance with Mudaji on 18 July.⁸³ It passed with the usual division, and Elliot was appointed to conduct the negotiations. In concerting with Mudaji his whole attention was to be directed to the defeat of the combination of the French and the Marathas; the latter were to be prevented from assisting the French in their designs on Bombay. He was further authorised

to make an offer to Mudaji Bhosle to unite with him in 'a direct and open war with the ministerial party at Poona.'⁸⁴ The terms of the alliance proposed that a stipulated number of battalions should be maintained for the service of the Government of Berar and paid by a monthly subsidy; and this force should be stationed on the English frontier, 'ready always for immediate service.' This would prove a vast augmentation of English military strength without an addition of expense.⁸⁵ Hastings exhorted Elliot to accomplish this great object without diverting his attention from it by any other, however, tempting. It was a delicate task with which Elliot was entrusted and called forth all his diplomatic ingenuity.⁸⁶ In another letter Hastings instructed him :

"Do not attempt to conceal our strength from Moodajee. It may be his, if he chooses to apply it to his own protection, or for his own aggrandizement. It cannot operate by any possible means to his prejudice, or to the hazard of his safety. A large space of wild and unprofitable lands lie between his frontier, and the proper boundaries of Bengal, and forbid every attempt to extend our territory on that side. Cuttack we will not accept, if he were to make an offer of it. It is our interest to improve the territory which we possess."⁸⁷

As to the claims of *chauth*, Hastings asked Elliot to insist on a formal renunciation of it.

The Bombay Government. Mostyn,⁸⁸ and Leslie⁸⁹ were informed of Elliot's deputation to the Court of Berar and requested to assist him by supplying necessary informations. The Bombay Government was particularly directed to refrain from forming 'any engagements of a nature hostile to the actual administration at Poona,' excepting such as might appear absolutely necessary for the defence of their possessions.⁹⁰

"Francis and Wheeler," wrote Hastings on the 19th July to Impey, "have protested against Elliot's instructions."⁹¹ To Francis the plan of an offensive union with Mudaji Bhosle seemed to be founded on a supposition that Raghunath Rao had no party left, and the Presidency of Bombay had

abandoned him. He felt strong misgivings whether the Presidency of Bombay would easily relinquish their connections with Raghunath Rao ; if they should not it was worth considering what their situation might be and what appearances their conduct would have in the eyes of the world. "In the first instance," Francis said, "we have a Treaty with the Peshwa, which we break or renounce in favour of Ragoba. We authorise the Presidency of Bombay to execute a plan for restoring him to the administration and we send a detachment of troops across India to support that plan. The present measure supposes a third distribution of power and a third competitor for it, to be supported by our alliance."⁹² The projected alliance with Mudaji led Francis to think that Raghunath Rao's cause was given up by Hastings who now viewed the former 'as a person too insignificant to be of any further service' to the English.⁹³ Francis was frankly suspicious of this scheme of alliance with Berar. "We agree in suspecting Hastings of the worst designs," he recorded in his Journal, when Auriol brought him a copy of Elliot's instructions.⁹⁴ In a strictly confidential letter to Rumbold, Francis wrote that an alliance with Mudaji Bhosle was to be undertaken and executed on the eve of a French war, and with every probability of an invasion of Bengal. "With this apprehension hanging over us, he wrote to him, "Bengal is stript of a considerable part of its defence, and the flower of our army sent to ramble thro' the heart of Indostan, not even for the purpose at first pretended of securing Bombay, but now to support a new competitor, hitherto unthought of, in his pretensions, if he has any, to the succession to the Ram and-Son Raja..."⁹⁵ Francis deprecated the interference of the English in the internal politics of the Maratha chiefs. By doing this the English were embroiling themselves in 'hazardous, airy projects.' It had also the dangerous possibilities of withdrawing their attention from objects more immediately interesting to them and infallibly throwing one of the contending parties into the hands of the French.⁹⁶

Elliot left Calcutta on the 20th July for Nagpur. Orders were issued to Madras to prepare for an attack on Pondicherry.⁹⁷

A force was sent to demand the surrender of Chandernagore which was effected on the 10th July.⁹⁸ The Madras Presidency was asked to enter into a treaty of alliance with Haidar Ali, while measures were taken for the defence of Bengal.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, Leslie marched from Kalpi towards Chhatarpur in the middle of June. The principal Raja of Bundelkhand was Anrodh Singh who had usurped the dominion from the hands of his elder brother Sarnet Singh. Sarnet Singh made several unsuccessful attempts to depose his younger brother. Raja Guman and Kaman Singh, near relations of the former brothers, came to offer their service to Sarnet Singh. They had an army of about five thousand, consisting of matchlock-men and cavalry.¹⁰⁰

On 22 June the English troops advanced to Rheat. They moved from Rheat on the 24th and after three days reached Srinagar, a well-built fort of stone, situated on a commanding height.¹⁰¹ They made a halt there till the 1st July, when they moved to Mulheera, six miles from Chhatarpur. Here a messenger came from Anrodh Singh with offers to supply provisions, if the detachment would take the route he should direct. The messenger also observed that the English army 'must not pass by Chatterpore'.¹⁰² The army halted for one day; an answer to this message was sent which, while emphasising peaceful intentions, made it clear that the troops could march by no other road than Chhatarpur. Leslie asked Anrodh Singh to give the English troops 'unmolested passage' through his country and supply provisions.¹⁰³

On the 3rd July the army marched to Chhatarpur and encamped south of the town. The place was found abandoned. Leslie received information that the Bundela chiefs were preparing to obstruct his progress. A party of 700 cavalry and 2000 infantry with nine pieces of artillery was posted at Mau, situated six miles to the west of Chhatarpur, under the command of Hamet Khan, who was joined by Gudd Singh with his force. On the road to Rajgarh they had an advance guard. These were supported by a party of a thousand horse and as many foot, posted near the fort of Rajgarh, 14 miles to the

east of Chhatarpur. Between Rajgarh and the river Kaine, Balaji was posted with another body of cavalry and infantry. On the other side of the river, Raja Anrodh Singh had taken post with 500 cavalry, 4000 infantry and twenty pieces of cannon.¹⁰⁴ In this situation Leslie received letters on 4 July from Anrodh Singh and Balaji, meant only to gain time and amuse the English till everything was ready for opposition. At this juncture the Rajas of Bundelkhand, Guman and Kaman Singh, who had some cause of resentment towards Balaji and Gudd Singh, sent their agents to Leslie.¹⁰⁵ They now solicited an English alliance, offering to supply them with plenty of grain. Raja Sarnet Singh, brother of Anrodh Singh, made similar offers of supplying provision. Leslie asked Sarnet Singh to join him ; as a result of this alliance he 'hoped to secure Gomaun and Comaun Singh' who were much attached to him.

Provisions coming to the English camp were intercepted by the troops from Mau. Some parties also had placed themselves in Leslie's rear with an intention of cutting off his communication with Kalpi. This was soon verified, for Captain Munro, coming up with a small party by way of Kalpi to join the English detachment, had been attacked, and most of his men killed. Munro afterwards lost his life at the hand of assassins.¹⁰⁶ Leslie demanded immediate satisfaction for this attack from Anrodh Singh. Shortly afterwards, a party from Mau carried off the cattle for carriage belonging to the English army. Leslie determined to 'extricate' himself out of these difficulties by an attack on Mau, 'a fort of much strength.'¹⁰⁷ It was occupied by the troops of Raja Anrodh Singh under the command of Hamet Khan and Gudd Singh. Colonel Goddard was entrusted with the task and despatched with three battalions and a body of horse.¹⁰⁸ After having forced his way through some breaches in the wall of circumvallation, he engaged and drove the enemy out of the fort. On the English side the loss was inconsiderable, being eight sepoys killed and 27 wounded.¹⁰⁹ One British Officer, Lieutenant Grant, was killed in the action. The Bundela chiefs lost 160. This blow had the desired effect. It induced the inhabitants

and *banjarrahs* to come to the English camp with grain. Balaji, Anrodh Singh and other chiefs crossed the river Kaine and encamped with their forces almost opposite to Rajgarh.

The capture of Mau was effected on 10 July. On the 12th Sarnet Singh came to Leslie at Chhatarpur ostensibly to 'implore his assistance against his brother Anrood Sing.'¹¹⁰ He pledged himself to give every requisite aid and escort to the English troops. He was also convinced that Guman and Kaman Singh would join Leslie and in alliance with them everything would be settled peacefully. Leslie decided to wait at Chhatarpur till the end of the rainy season. He was expecting the arrival of Guman and Kaman Singh in order to determine when he could proceed without further molestation.¹¹¹ Guman Singh and Kaman Singh came towards the end of July and encamped near the English camp. Leslie embroiled himself with those Rajas as well as with Sarnet Singh.¹¹² On 12 August Guman Singh and Kaman Singh with their army decamped hastily and moved towards their country. This sudden defection was found to be due to the intrigues of Anrodh Singh.

Leslie's long halt at Chhatarpur and his negotiations with the Bundela chiefs raised some alarm in the Calcutta Council. Francis wrote : "On the 25th of July Colonel Leslie was still at Chatterpore. At the rate he proceeds he may not probably reach Bombay in the course of the present century".¹¹³ Hastings defended Leslie by saying that after the unprovoked enmity which had been shown him by Raja Anrodh Singh and the attempt made by him to distress the army in the most important article of provisions, it was an obvious policy to embrace the friendship of any competitor, who might at the same time serve to intimidate the Raja to peace. If this was his motive, it was so far laudable ; if he had any other, or if it was his intention to dispossess the Raja in being, and to raise his brother to the sovereignty of Bundelkhand in his stead, he had disobeyed the positive orders of the Board, and proved himself unworthy of the confidence which they had reposed in him.¹¹⁴

On 15 August the English army began their march from Chhatarpur and arrived at Rajgarh on the 17th.¹¹⁵ Anrodh

Singh's army disputed the passage of the river Kaine. An English artillery attack compelled them to retreat.

On 24 August Leslie entered into agreement with Guman Singh and Kaman Singh in recognition of their 'friendship and attachment' towards the English. Both the Rajas declared that they would 'consider the friends and foes of the English as those of their own' and that they would 'assist them with an army' whenever they might ask for it.¹¹⁶ Leslie sought Hastings' approval to the treaty by pointing out that these Rajas had 'the greatest power of supply' and an alliance with them would disarm these chiefs from creating any mischief to the English.¹¹⁷

While Leslie was making preparations for crossing the river Kaine, offers of accommodation came from Anrodh Singh. Leslie thought it necessary to provide for Sarnet Singh's independence in any agreement which he might enter into with Anrodh Singh, in view of the services rendered by him 'in the article of supplies.'¹¹⁸ Leslie was tired of the wily Bundela chief, Anrodh Singh, on account of his persistent opposition towards the English army. How anxious he was to reconcile him to this march can be gauged from his private letter to Hastings, dated 24 August 1778 :

"Anrodh Sing is my only difficulty, and if I could reconcile him to my march, in conjunction with his brother and Goman and Coman Sing, all difficulties at this side, would be at an end, as I should get my supplies without any molestation, and would be able to defeat any measure formed against me, by Ballajee or Sindhia."¹¹⁹

But Anrodh Singh and his ministers evaded coming to any definite agreement with Leslie, for they were expecting a considerable reinforcement of troops from Balaji and Bisa Pundit.¹²⁰

On 31 August a detachment of about 2,000 infantry and cavalry under the command of a chief called Pudham Singh marched into Leslie's rear with the intention of cutting off his communications with Chhatarpur. Captain Popham was detached against him with his battalion, two six-pounders, and 500 Kandahar horse.¹²¹ "As he (Popham) advanced, they fired on him, but he reserved his fire until he came very near ;

he then gave them a volley, which being well supported by a brisk attack of the Condaharians on their horse, routed them effectually ; the Condaharians pursued, and did great execution amongst them ; 26 of the enemy were found dead on the spot. they received the volley."¹²²

On the 4th September Leslie wrote from Rajgarh to the Calcutta Council and assured them that he had avoided interfering with the Bundela chiefs, either in their 'private or public dispute,' except in the instance of Sarnet Singh.¹²³ In another letter he complained of the heavy fall of rain which retarded the march of his troops. He wrote on 13 September :

"The incessant rains for many days past and now falling, in torrent and storm, forbid all possibility of my marching, until they are over, and the rivers and nullahs (so much swelled) subside, as well as the water which lies on the roads."¹²⁴

Francis expressed dissatisfaction in regard to the conduct of Colonel Leslie. He doubted his sincerity and feared that the objects of the expedition might be defeated, while he delayed his march to make treaties with the Bundela chiefs. He urged that Leslie's conduct should be enquired into. Hastings was also disposed to condemn his conduct, remarking on the slow advance of 120 miles in the space of four months at an expense of 12,00,000 rupees. At the request of Hastings, the proposed enquiry into the conduct of Leslie was postponed till the arrival of necessary papers from him.¹²⁵

Elliot, charged with negotiating with the Berar Raja, died on 12 September on his route towards Nagpur.¹²⁶ Hastings considered his death as a 'private and public calamity.'¹²⁷ He also painfully acknowledged that the project of forming an alliance with Berar was 'suddenly blasted and annihilated by the death of that excellent man.'¹²⁸ But he proposed that another person should be appointed and furnished with the same instructions as were delivered to Elliot, for concluding a treaty with the Berar Raja. The march of Leslie's detachment could not be put off *sine die* on account of the death of Elliot. Hastings argued that the restoration of Raghunath Rao had never been his object and that he entirely looked up-

to Mudaji Bhosle. He firmly insisted on the march of the detachment. The continuance of its march, he argued, was 'proper,' even though it might be found necessary or expedient to recall it at a future period. It would be a measure of defence and security to canton this detachment at Berar. The strategic position of Berar was not unduly emphasized by Hastings when he observed in this connection: "Its (the detachment) situation in Berar will be central to all our settlements in India." It would be a check on the Poona Government if it meditated designs against the English. It would be at hand to oppose them, if hostilities should actually break out.¹²⁹

Francis and Wheler objected to the further march of the detachment. Wheler foresaw 'dangers, difficulties, disappointments and enormous expenses' from their further attempt to proceed.¹³⁰

The reproachable conduct of Leslie in meddling with the country chiefs was a serious offence to the members of the Calcutta Council. On one occasion Francis made a statement in the Council, "he (Leslie) has assumed a power, with which the Legislature has not thought fit to entrust the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay and from the exercise of which he was particularly restricted, by our instruction."¹³¹ Leslie's conduct towards his subordinates also appeared to be not cordial. Goddard, the second in command, at one time demanded a court-martial in consequence of some aspersions thrown upon him by Leslie, in the course of a dispute about command.¹³² Goddard was not even consulted in the negotiations which Leslie had entered into with the Bundela chiefs.¹³³ Leslie was, therefore, removed from the command, and directed to return to the Presidency after giving up the command to Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, who was the next senior officer.¹³⁴ It was a 'hard and humiliating necessity,' to which Hastings found himself compelled, of removing from command a general upon whom he had placed unbounded confidence.¹³⁵ On 26 October 1778, Hastings wrote to Goddard:

"I gave him (Leslie) all my confidence, an authority limited only by the ends for which it was granted,

and I extended to him my personal support, even when I began to lose trust in him. . . . Had he proved an insubordinate he never would have forfeited the confidence of government."¹⁸

But Lesle did not live to receive the star of racial. He died of a violent fever on 3 October.¹⁹

Long after Lesle's death, Francis gave it as his opinion in a private letter to North that Hastings' original view in sending the expedition under Lesle was neither to oppose the French nor to support Raghunath Rao but to force an alliance with Mincaji Bhosle. Francis admitted that "some delicate purposes" were answered by Lesle's march into Burmehland and his long delay there. Though Lesle had already waited for four months in Burmehland "without any visible result" Hastings never talked of removing him from his command, until he knew he was dying or dead. It appeared, however, to Francis from Lesle's private letters that he was ready to answer the charges and probably would have done so if he had lived. Francis concluded by observing in his characteristic way:

"From this detail your Lordship may form some conception of the endless intricacy of this man's intrigues.—It is a myriam of plots and expedients, into which he himself cannot always find his way."²⁰

The Bombay Government had already decided on 22 July to release Mr Raghunath Rao to the agency of the Prince Durrat in view of their strained relations with the Marathas and the prospect of an approaching rupture with France.²¹ The Calcutta Council approved their resolution on condition that it should not interfere with any engagements formed with Mincaji Bhosle, that the engagement to be formed with Raghunath Rao should not be of any 'hostile tendency' to the Government of Bengal and that their forces should be sufficient to undertake the expedition without endangering the safety of Bombay, in the event of a French invasion.²² With unwavering zeal Francis opposed the policy of the Bombay Government, as he apprehended that their plan might be attended with 'endless difficulties.' The policy of support-

ing simultaneously Raghunath Rao and Mudaji Bhosle for the government of the Maratha dominion did not find favour with Francis. He said, "We should once for all declare what party we shall adopt and what single object we shall have in view."¹⁴¹

Upto the middle of October no preparations had been made at Bombay. Carnac, one of the members of the Bombay Council, submitted a minute on 12 October in which he urged the necessity of taking immediate action against the Marathas, criticising at the same time 'all the evils of procrastination.'¹⁴² This was supported by the information and opinion of Mostyn, who added that the supporters of Moroba must conclude, if this opportunity was suffered to slip away, that Raghunath Rao was given up by the English. Mostyn also said that any further delay would give the French an opportunity of gaining influence at the Maratha Court. The sooner measures for placing Raghunath Rao in the regency of the Poona Government were taken, the better. Of success he was quite confident. It was this bold optimism of Mostyn which refused to believe to meet with any serious opposition from the Marathas that led the Bombay Government to undertake an expedition to Poona.¹⁴³

It was resolved by the majority, Draper dissenting,¹⁴⁴ that the resolution of the 21st July for conducting Raghunath Rao to Poona be carried into execution.¹⁴⁵ Lewis was informed of these proceedings and directed to hold himself in readiness to quit Poona at a moment's warning.¹⁴⁶ Upon this resolution, the Court of Directors afterwards conveyed their opinion to the Bombay Select Committee in the following words :

"Your resolution of the 21st of July was not improper, under the favourable circumstances stated by you at that period ; but the change which happened soon afterwards in the situation of Ragoba's friends, and the lapse of time from the 21st of July to the 22nd of November, rendered it extremely imprudent to undertake the expedition at that time."¹⁴⁷

On the 4th November, a Committee consisting of Carnac, Egerton and Mostyn was appointed to make every arrangement

for conducting Raghunath Rao to Poona and to settle with him the conditions on which the assistance was to be given.¹⁴⁸ Colonel Egerton, who at the time of appointment did not suppose that the two civilians were to accompany him in that capacity on the intended expedition and therefore had approved the measure, now vainly protested against it, as being contrary to the orders of the Directors and derogatory to his position as commanding officer.¹⁴⁹ Thus the commander-in-chief was circumscribed in his designs and operations by the appointment of field-deputies. Debate and execution are in their nature incompatible. The success of military operations depends very much upon unity of command, without which there can neither be prompt decision nor timely execution. Eyre Coote, who was supposed to be expert on military affairs, observed :

“The measure of appointing Field Deputies, for every other name to that Committee must be a fictitious one, was in the most immediate opposition to the Company’s repeated orders... an office immediately exploded and reprobated by all Governments as the most frustrating clog, that can be thrown upon any military operation ; a restraint under which no man that has any jealousy for his own military reputations, or any regard for the interests of his employers, should or could act.”¹⁵⁰

On the 24th November 1778, a fresh agreement was concluded between the Bombay Government and Raghunath Rao.¹⁵¹ Article 1 declared that the treaty of Purandhar having been violated by the Poona ministers “the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, with the sanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council, do hereby engage and agree, in behalf of the said Hon’ble Company, to assist Raghunathrav Pradhan to the utmost of their power to put him in possession of Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratha Empire during the minority of Madhavrav Narayan, the infant Peshwa, hereby declaring, that the true intent and meaning of this Treaty is not to alter the form of Government, or to interrupt the peace between the Hon’ble Company and the Maratha State, but only to remove the

administration out of the present improper hands, and to place in the Regency the person who has justest title to that office." Raghunath Rao agreed to accept the office of Regent during the minority of Savai Madhav Rao. But if it should prove that the child was suppositious, the English were to place him in the Peshwaship. If the child should prove to be really the son of Narayan Rao, the English would guarantee Raghunath Rao equal division of the government on the Peshwa's attaining majority (Art. 2). The care of the child should be committed to Parvati Bai, and if she should refuse to undertake the charge, he should be 'disposed of in such manner as may be deemed most advisable for his security.' (Art. 3) In consideration of the assistance to be afforded to Raghunath Rao, the English were to get Bassein fort and town, Jambusar, Olpad, the island of Kenery, an assignment upon the pargana of Ankleshvar, all the small places belonging to the district of Salsette and the parganas of Amod and Hasot (Arts. 6 and 7). Raghunath Rao engaged to pay for the force consisting of four thousand men with which he was to be assisted, two lakhs and a half rupees per month (Art. 10). All the former treaties and engagements subsisting between the Government of Bombay and the Maratha Government were ratified and confirmed (Art. 13). No European settlement was to be allowed in the Maratha dominions without the consent of the Company (Art. 15). It was stipulated that if any article of this treaty interfered with any engagements which might have been formed by the Supreme Council, it was liable to be altered or amended (Art. 17).

An advance party under Captain Stewart consisting of six companies of grenadiers from different corps embarked from Bombay on 22 November.¹⁵² They took possession of the Bhore Ghat without opposition and encamped at the village of Khandala. Colonel Egerton, Commander-in-chief of the army, with his suite left Bombay on the 24th¹⁵³ and Carnac and Mostyn on the 7th December. The whole force consisted of 591 Europeans of the Regiment and Artillery, 2,278 Sepoys and 500 gun lascars. Raghunath Rao accompanied the force with his small body of horse and infantry. With this fo ~

and relying upon a general disposition amongst the Marathas in favour of Raghunath Rao, the Bombay Government had 'sanguine hopes' to bring the business to a happy conclusion.¹⁵⁴

The Poona Committee accompanying Raghunath Rao did not work harmoniously. The Bombay Council drew the distinct line between the Committee and the Commander-in-chief in their respective jurisdictions. All 'political intercourse' with Raghunath Rao and the execution of the general plan of the expedition were entrusted to the Committee. But the Committee was prohibited from meddling in the detail of the duty of the army, the mode of march or encampment or the method of carrying any military measures into execution, all of which were the 'distinct province' of the Commanding officer.¹⁵⁵ Egerton evidently disliked the power of the Committee to concert and conduct all political and military operations in the course of the expedition. When Mostyn fell ill on the way, Egerton held that any meeting was 'incomplete and informal without the presence of every member,' and claimed that the power of the Committee was suspended.¹⁵⁶ Carnac was of opinion that the sickness of one of the members of the Committee did not render the proceedings of the others invalid.¹⁵⁷ Egerton's objections were overruled by the Bombay Council's order in which they laid it down that the power of the Committee should be vested and continued in the remaining two.¹⁵⁸ It also armed Carnac with a casting voice in case of a difference of opinion. Unfortunately, Mostyn, the only person experienced in Maratha politics, had to return to Bombay where he died on 1 January.

On the 15th December the whole army reached Khopoli. Intelligence was received that the ministerial forces under the command of Bhivrao Panse, Baji Pant Joshi and Ganesh Pant, consisting of 10,000 horse and 15 pieces of cannon, were encamped at Wadgaon to harass the English troops and to obstruct their march when they should make their appearance above the Ghats. Nana Farnavis, Sakharam Bapu, Mahadji Sindhia and Hari Pant were encamped near Poona with about 5,000 horse.¹⁵⁹

On the 20th December Carnac remonstrated upon the slow progress of the army and represented, in strong terms, the necessity of hastening their march.¹⁶⁰ The delay was occasioned by the making of roads for the passage of cannon. Carnac proposed that they should be carried up by hand, which he argued was possible. The Commander-in-chief treated this suggestion as chimerical.

The army ascended the Ghats by 23 December.¹⁶¹ Uptil now no Maratha had joined the English army. W.J. Farmer, the Secretary of the Poona Committee, wrote an interesting letter to Popham in this connection from the camp at Khandala, the place at the top of the Ghats.

"The intention of this expedition is to place the government in the hands of Ragonath Row which we are in treaty to do,—it was held out to the Government of Bombay as an encouragement to this measure that immediately on Ragonath Row's ascending to the top of the Ghaut, a large party formed in his favour was to join him, and all the powerful officers from one motive or other would quit the ministerial junto and quietly accede to his government. If this had proved true there would have been no difficulty in compassing our object by conducting him to Poonah; as yet not an officer has joined him and I much doubt on the plan we have settled with him, whether any will or not, in that case I foresee great distress and a moral impossibility of effecting the Capital object."¹⁶²

Farmer struck a note of warning that on the English advance the Marathas, instead of facing them in the open field, would adopt harassing tactics and scorched earth policy. In the same letter he wrote :

"Our opponents will not fight in, but they will harass us, lay waste the country and cut off our provisions. for all which circumstances the Government of Bombay have not provided, depending upon the quiet acknowledgment of Ragobah immediately that we openly and vigorously embraced his cause; we may march on to Poonah but I am afraid it will only be to march back."

On reaching the summit of the Ghats, Egerton divided his troops into two brigades and an advance guard. These three divisions moved forward in succession at the rate of about six furlongs daily, each taking up the post quitted by its predecessors. This method of warfare encouraged the Marathas to harass the English columns with an incessant fire of rockets, musketry and cannon. During the march from Khandala, Lieutenant Colonel Cay received a mortal wound from a rocket on the 1st January; he died at Bombay the 14th January. On the 4th January Captain Stewart was also killed by a cannon shot.¹⁶¹ Egerton found his state of health so bad that he resigned the command of the army and Colonel Cockburn succeeded him.¹⁶⁵ Egerton could not effect his return to Bombay because of the presence of roving Maratha armies. He continued with the camp and acted throughout as a member of the Committee.

Nana Farnavis and other Maratha chiefs were not idle in organising opposition against the invading English. They strengthened their alliance with Sindhia and won over Holkar by liberating his Dewan, Naro Ganesh, from prison. The ministers and chiefs then assembled together to discuss the question of commencing hostilities against Raghunath Rao. They unanimously declared that they would not have taken arms against Raghunath Rao if he had not made alliance with the English. They would prefer death to bearing the burden of a foreign yoke.¹⁶⁶ Accordingly, Bhivrao Panse, Baji Pandit Appa, Appa Balvant Rao, Sindhia, Holkar and Haripant marched with a contingent of 40,000 cavalry and 16,000 infantry to Talegaon.¹⁶⁷ Pratinidhi, Raste, and others who were on their way to join Parashuram Bhau in his Karnatak expedition, were recalled and ordered to join the forces.¹⁶⁸ Balaji Pant Patak from Konkan with four thousand troops attacked the Kalyan area and encamped at Khopoli, blocking the rear of the English.¹⁶⁹ Poona was completely evacuated under Nana's instructions.¹⁷⁰

On the 9th January the English army reached Talegaon, a place sixteen miles from Poona. Talegaon was in flames when the English entered it.¹⁷¹ It was reported that a similar

fate was to attend Chinchvad, another considerable town, and even Poona, if the English attempted to advance.¹⁷² The Marathas began to cannonade and with the help of the cavalry harassed the English by engaging their attention on every side. The Poona Committee found that they were 'engaged in an indefinite scene of military operations' without any hope of being joined by the Maratha chiefs. The Committee, therefore, came to the conclusion that the plan of establishing Raghunath Rao in the regency of the Maratha Empire would be impracticable without the active co-operation of 'a respectable party in that State'.¹⁷³ For full two days on 10th and 11th January, at Talegaon, the Committee discussed expedients for saving themselves from the critical situation. Holmes, the Commissary-General, intimated that the stock of provisions would last 18 days more. The Marathas were ravaging the country. Provisions were scarce. The English could not advance against a numerous cavalry of the enemies without any of their own. There were no hopes of benefit by remaining at Talegaon. At last it was resolved to retreat to gain as fast as possible the Ghat which the English had quitted in order to secure the communication with Bombay.¹⁷⁴ In vain Cockburn protested that he could carry the army to Poona, though he would not undertake to protect the baggage. The Committee gave Cockburn a definite order to retreat.¹⁷⁵

On the 11th January, at 11 o'clock at night, Cockburn gave the order for retreat in the hope of stealing a march on the Marathas.¹⁷⁶ Captain Gordon, with Raghunath Rao and the baggage, led the retreat; then followed the main body. Captain Hartley, with the select body of Grenadiers, brought up the rear. But within three hours the advance guard was fired upon by the Marathas and a large portion of the baggage was captured. Then followed attacks on the rear. By day-break on the 12th, the small English army was surrounded by the Marathas, and thrice did they endeavour to charge Hartley's division, situated at a distance of about half a mile from the main body.¹⁷⁷ Cockburn ordered Hartley to join the main body. But Hartley was in such a delicate situation that if once he turned his back to the Marathas, ~~he would~~

be destruction to the whole. He repelled the attacks of the Marathas from daylight to near noon, at which hour Major Frederick with 200 Europeans and 600 sepoys reached him. At about past one, after a most severe attack in which 124 men out of Hartley's corps fell, he found means to retreat so as to unite with the main body.¹⁷⁸

In spite of the attacks along the whole length of the column, the English army maintained its order in the retreat until three o'clock in the afternoon, when, on its approaching the village of Wadgaon, the followers made a rush for the shelter of the houses. The whole line of march was thus thrown into confusion, and the Marathas took advantage of the disorder to charge, inflicting heavy losses. Nevertheless order was restored and the village was placed in a state of defence. On the 13th morning the attack of the Marathas was renewed and again repulsed ; but the losses of the previous day amounted to three hundred and fifty killed, wounded and missing. Many of the missing were found to be deserters. Further retreat was then deemed impracticable. Thus peace became essential to the English, because to wage war with such a slender resource and in the face of the determined resistance of the Marathas was impossible.

In this dilemma the Committee sat to deliberate 'relative to overtures (to the Marathas) for the peaceable return of the army to Bombay.'¹⁷⁹ No minutes were taken, 'being in a severe cannonade, and a number of persons standing around.'¹⁸⁰ On the 14th January Farmer was sent to the Maratha camp to propose an accommodation.¹⁸¹ Farmer explained that the English were merchants and did not desire bloodshed. At the request of Raghunath Rao they had come to his assistance thinking that his claims were genuine. The English, he said, were already bound by a treaty with the Marathas and it was wrong on their part to have waged war against them. So he offered an apology on their behalf and assured them that henceforth the treaty would be faithfully observed.¹⁸² At first the Marathas demanded only that the person of Raghunath Rao should be delivered up.¹⁸³ This point was solved when Raghunath Rao expressed his desire

to deliver himself up to Mahadji Sindhia. But Nana Farnavis said, as Farmer reported, that 'as we had broken the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, before our army moved we must agree to remain as we were by our treaty with the late Peshwa Nana.'¹⁸⁴ Mahadji Sindhia insisted upon the conclusion of a new agreement while the army remained on that very spot. This demand being transmitted to the Committee, they consulted Colonel Cockburn upon the practicability of making a successful retreat. Cockburn opined that the 'harassed and dispirited' troops would not be able to stand another Maratha attack. Panvel being 45 miles away, it seemed 'chimerical' to him that the small English army could support themselves from the daily attack of the Marathas.¹⁸⁵ An attempt to retire in the face of the whole strength of the Maratha Empire with such a handful of men was considered suicidal rather than wise. Cockburn felt that humanity must prompt some other method. He, therefore, refused to conduct the army to Bombay.¹⁸⁶

Egerton concurred with Cockburn's opinion. Carnac declared his real sentiments to be in favour of an attempt to retreat : but as the military officers had given their opinions that it was impossible to effect it, he would not take upon himself 'singly' the responsibility of reaching a decision.¹⁸⁷ Hartley, when consulted, urged every argument in favour of a retreat and presented to Cockburn a plan by which it could be effected.

The Committee directed Farmer to inform the Maratha Durbar that having no power to negotiate or agree to any treaty without the sanction of the Calcutta Council they should only deceive the Maratha Government in pretending to submit to their demands. "The only power left to us," the Committee wrote to Farmer, "is the giving up the cause and person of Raghunathrav, which done, must certainly put an end to all disputes between the English and the Maratha State".¹⁸⁸

The Committee tried another source to bring about a rapprochement with the Marathas. On 15 January they sent Thomas Holmes to Mahadji Sindhia with full powers to settle with the Durbar an agreement for the return of the army to Bombay.¹⁸⁹ Holmes returned from the Maratha camp on the

same night after having settled matters with Mahadji Sindhia and the rest of the Durbar on the only terms they would hear of, which in short were the surrender of all the possessions acquired since the reign of Madhav Rao Peshwa and the retrogression of the Bengal army. The Committee, however, remarked in their diary that Mahadji Sindhia and the whole Durbar could not plead ignorance of their want of powers to conclude such a treaty.¹⁹⁰

On the 16th the treaty was executed on the part of the Company and the Marathas.¹⁹¹ All the Company's acquisitions in Western India, made since the treaty with the late Peshwa Madhav Rao, were to be given up. The Bengal detachment was to be ordered back. No protection was to be afforded to Raghunath Rao or to any enemies of the Poona Durbar. The English forces were permitted to proceed to Bombay under a Maratha escort. As the mediation of Mahadji Sindhia brought about the peace, a separate agreement was made with him by which Broach was conferred upon him by the English in gratitude.¹⁹² Farmer and Stewart were left as hostages with Sindhia for the due observance of this agreement. After the conclusion of the above treaties, presents were made by the Poona Committee to officers of the Durbar to the amount of 41,000 rupees.

These transactions were completed before the Bombay Select Committee could be informed thereof. Carnac and Egerton on the 16th January directed Goddard to march back with the army under his command to Bengal. Two days afterwards they countermanded the order.¹⁹³ On the 17th January the troops began their march back to Bombay. They were escorted by a party of Maratha horse to Panvel, which they reached in seven days, and from whence they were transported to Bombay.

This terrible catastrophe was a great blow to the British power, the fabric of which stood on the foundation of clay in the second half of the eighteenth century. Farmer painfully acknowledged that the signing of the capitulation hurt him more than the substance of it, but there was no remedy.¹⁹⁴ He lamented the 'quixotic manner' by which the Bombay Govern-

ment engaged to establish Raghunath Rao, as it brought every Maratha chief in arms against him. Farmer later observed :

"The Government of Bombay should have waited the arrival of Goddard's detachment and have acted in conjunction with it against the then Mharatta Government on our own footing, disconnected with the pretensions of Ragoonath Row. Instead of this, the Government of Bombay misled by the assurances of poor Mostyn, resumed the romantick projects of blindly asserting the rights of Ragoonath Row and declaring to all the world that the English meant to re-establish him in the possession of those rights ; such an attempt and such a line of policy naturally united against us all the leading chiefs of the Mharatta Empire and all the powers who had cause to be alarmed at our ambition ; as they (the Bombay Government) wanted also to engross the whole honour of this project and would not wait for the aid of Goddard, their attempt was attended with the ill-success that might be expected."¹⁹⁵

Draper, a member of the Bombay Select Committee, also considered Mostyn as 'excessively credulous' as he held 'too despicable an idea of the Maratha power.'¹⁹⁶

Goddard heard the news of the 'ill-timed and injudicious' retreat of the Bombay army with great mortification. He did not doubt that had they attacked, they would have been led to 'signal success' and 'one vigorous and successful effort' might have been the means of changing the whole face of affairs. Goddard wrote, "to fly secretly and ignominiously before an enemy could not but be of the most dangerous consequence."¹⁹⁷ He urged Hastings to 'repair the evils' and 'wipe off the stain' brought about by this disaster upon the reputation of the English arms. His solemn appeal to Hastings had a flair of sincerity :

"The whole attention of the powers of the East is turned towards you, and from your counsels and resolves they expect a speedy decision."¹⁹⁸

The opinion of Goddard was also shared by Hornby. It appeared to him that, had the Bombay army pushed on for Poona, they might have reached there with great ease in two

days, as the Marathas would never come to an engagement.¹⁹⁹ Francis held the civil authority responsible for the debacle as it had been placed over the commanding officer.²⁰⁰ Gloomy forebodings began to influence Francis' mind when he reflected upon the dangers that might befall Goddard's army. He wrote to North on 27 February, 1779, "we are at the mercy of fortune, or something worse." He further added :

"As long as it is thought advisable at home to continue such men in power, there is no remedy. If Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell be continued in this Council, I shall quit Bengal in November next."²⁰¹

"The terms of the treaty made me sink with shame while I read them", declared Hastings.²⁰² The 'precipitate and miserable enterprise' of the Bombay Presidency 'blasted' all his political plans.

On the 29th January, Hornby brought in a formal charge against Egerton and Cockburn for refusing to conduct the army from Wadgaon to Bombay.²⁰³ This charge was grounded on the written opinion of Cockburn, concurred in by Egerton. Cockburn acknowledged that he gave the written opinion already stated. But he denied having absolutely refused to conduct the troops to Bombay. He declared that all he meant was, that as he did not think it possible to effect a retreat, he could not be answerable for all the bad consequences which he foresaw would follow. If Carnac had ordered it to be attempted, he should not have disobeyed him, whatever consequences might have ensued. Carnac was 'all powerful,' Cockburn opined, and the only responsibility, remaining with the commanding officer was the mode of executing any military measure, not the measure itself, which in fact reduced him to 'a mere adjutant of the troops' he was said to command.²⁰⁴ Egerton also argued that Carnac's authority extended to giving an order obliging the army to march at all events. It was extremely unfortunate that in a matter of such importance Carnac should entertain 'any doubts of the plenitude of his powers.'²⁰⁵

Whatever might have been the merit of their argument, the Bombay Government suspended Egerton and Cockburn from

the service and rewarded all those who showed remarkable bravery in the campaign. No censure was, however, passed against Carnac, though his conduct was no less exceptionable than Egerton and Cockburn. Captain Hartley was, for his 'conduct and intrepidity,' promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.²⁰⁶ This occasioned complaints and remonstrances from the other senior officers.

The Court of Directors appear to have felt much indignation at the retreat of the Bombay army. They wrote :

"The army was only 18 miles, or about two days march from the summit of the Ghauts, and about 16 miles, or two days march from Poonah, on the 11th of January, when orders were given to march back towards Candolah. That advice had just been received of Morobah's horse being in the Concon, to act in favour of Ragobah. That the Commissary had 18 days provisions in store and that Ragobah had promised further supply... that the troops were in spirits and intrepids."²⁰⁷

They complained that no 'Council of War' was called at Talegaon to take the opinion of the officers of the army on the necessity of an immediate retreat. Though the order for the retreat of the army on the 11th January, was the joint action of Cockburn and Egerton, it appeared to them that Carnac was responsible for the measure as he had 'a casting voice in the Poona Committee and possessed in fact supreme authority in the camp at the time.' They commended the charge brought by Hornby against Egerton and Cockburn and upon an impartial review of their conduct dismissed them from the service. They also dismissed Carnac from his office as one of the Council and the Select Committee of Bombay. As the promotion of Hartley to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel had given umbrage to many senior officers the Court of Directors, without degrading him, ordered that he should receive only Captain's pay, till the officers who had been his seniors should rise regularly to the same advanced rank.²⁰⁸

CHAPTER VI

FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS

Leslie's death enabled Colonel Goddard to assume command of the troops. By the middle of October, 1778, Goddard was able to leave Bundelkhand. In a private letter to Warren Hastings, dated 11 October, 1778, he wrote :

"I have the satisfaction to think that I have fairly bid adieu to the regions of Bundelcund at least for the present, and to the tempting prize the divisions and family contests of its possessors offer to an invader. I have left them professing amity towards each other, and respect and friendship to the English nation, whose power and prowess they have at last learnt to dread. The whole country now wears a face of tranquil peace, and the army is plentifully supplied with every necessary for its support and convenience."¹

But Goddard had yet to encounter some difficulties. Despite the presence of Balaji's *vakil*, who accompanied Goddard, the Pindaris intercepted some provisions coming to the English camp.² Even Balaji made an attempt to carry off the baggage of the English army and attacked their rear as well as the right and left flanks in three different bodies. Goddard, by his timely exertion, dispersed them.³ In spite of this check, Balaji's troops hovered in Goddard's rear, harassed his forces, and occasionally picked up any baggage that straggled too far from protection.⁴ Meanwhile, Goddard received a letter from Raghunath Rao in which he was requested to arrive with the English troops at Bombay by taking under protection his son Baji Rao and his wife Anandi Bai who were then at Mandalesvar.⁵

The desultory opposition of Balaji and others did in way check Goddard's progress. He reached duly the Bhamburda territory where he was supplied with rations and other supplies.

by its Nawab, Hyat Khan. From Bhopal to the Narbada, a distance of 46 miles, Goddard marched in four days. This was possible due to the friendly disposition of the Nawab of Bhopal and 'the spirited exertions of the officers and the cheerfulness and alacrity of the troops in general.'⁶ Goddard commended Hyat Khan's 'behaviour' towards the English especially at a time when he was threatened by Balaji and the Marathas.⁷

On 16 November, 1778, Hastings proposed to renew the negotiations with Mudaji Bhosle, on the principles of Elliot's instructions, and to entrust this delicate task to Goddard. Francis and Wheeler objected to this proposal. An alliance with Mudaji, Francis thought, would amount to a declaration of war with the Nizam, with whom they were instructed by the Company to 'preserve a good friendship.'⁸ But the Governor-General's resolution was carried and Goddard was asked to negotiate and conclude a treaty of alliance with Mudaji Bhosle.⁹ Goddard was also privately asked by Hastings to include Raghunath Rao in any treaty which he might enter into with Mudaji ; but this was to be regarded as only 'a secondary consideration' and should be made subordinate to the greater object of his commission.¹⁰

Goddard crossed the Narbada on 3 December, and encamped on the southern banks of that river, within the territory of Berar. He deputed Lieutenant Watherstone to Nagpur in order to induce Mudaji to conclude the proposed treaty. Goddard fondly believed that the enmity of the Peshwa and the Nizam might influence Mudaji to swallow the bait offered by the English which, besides securing his own safety, would offer him the 'highest reward of power and ambition.'¹¹ Goddard was not aware of the secret report which Lieutenant James Anderson had transmitted to Hastings from Nagpur on 2 December, 1778. The report runs as follows :

"I am indeed sorry to say that since my last, I have had the greater reason to be confirmed in my opinion of their (Bhosles) having given the most positive assurances to the Paishwa that they will on no account whatever assist the English. They are unwilling I believe to

enter into any hostile measures against them... an apprehension of immediate ruin to themselves from the threat of the Ministerial party operates at present more strongly on their minds."¹²

Watherstone arrived at Nagpur on the 19th December.¹³ His despatches showed that Hastings' proposal to support the Nagpur Raja's pretensions to the sovereignty of the Maratha Empire had not the slightest chance of proving acceptable to the Raja. Watherstone 'neglected nothing' to convince the Raja and the Dewan of the propriety of concluding an alliance with the English. "It was however to no effect," Watherstone wrote in regret, as "they are determined not to take any active part whatever with our armies." They excused themselves by observing that they could not violate their engagement with the Peshwa. They added that any assertion of their pretensions to the sovereignty of the Maratha State would meet with 'numberless opposition.' No lure of any kind could win the adherence of the Raja and the Dewan, Devakar Pant, wished to postpone the scheme for two or three years. With disappointment Watherstone wrote, "every effort to persuade the Raja into a concurrence with the proposed plan would be absolutely ineffectual."¹⁴

Meanwhile, Mudaji had assured Hastings of the sincerity of the Poona ministers and requested him to defer the execution of his scheme to a more favourable opportunity in the future. He added, "This will not only redound to his fame but will also produce mutual advantages. People would believe that the English had sent an army to Bombay with a view to counteracting the French activities and not to help Raghunath Rao."¹⁵ But these pious platitudes did not assuage Hastings' disappointment. On 9 February, 1779, he wrote a letter to Mudaji in terms of regret bordering upon complaint. Hastings wrote, "the cause of this change is the fact that the Government of Bombay lately concluded a treaty with Raghunath Rao and took measures to reinstall him in the administration of Poona."¹⁶ He further declared that had Mudaji accepted the terms offered to him and concluded a treaty, the obligation of implementing it would have been held

superior to that of any engagement formed by the Government of Bombay.¹⁷

Hastings' expectations in courting an alliance with the Berar Raja thus went unfortunately awry. The explanation of the deadlock was simple. In the month of August, 1778, Hastings intimated to the Government of Bombay his intention of forming an alliance with Mudaji and asked them not to form any engagement hostile to the Poona Durbar. But the Bombay Government clung tenaciously to the drooping cause; they wanted to prop up Raghunath Rao to the Poona Government and started on an expedition against the Marathas. News of this event had reached the Bhosles and stiffened their attitude towards the English. The Dewan, Devakar Pant, did not forget to allude to the despatch of the Bombay troops in his talks with Watherstone. "This circumstance," Watherstone wrote, "seems an effectual bar to the Raja's concurrence with the plan projected for his advancement by the Supreme Government at Calcutta."¹⁸ Thus the schemes of the Bombay Councillors and the active part they had taken in support of Raghunath Rao destroyed all hopes of concluding the proposed alliance with the Court of Nagpur.¹⁹ Goddard believed that the proposed treaty with Mudaji would have met with no obstruction had not the measures taken by the Bombay Council intervened to counteract it. In the meantime, Goddard was anxious to move forward with all possible expedition, it being necessary to bring the ministers to 'a proper sense of their improper conduct.'²⁰ The presence of his forces, it was felt by Goddard, was necessary not so much to support the measures taken in favour of Raghunath Rao, but to prevent any ill consequences to English arms.²¹

Dubious information from Bombay²² and Mudaji's letter intimating the defeat of the British forces at Talegaon determined Goddard to proceed with all haste to Bombay by way of Surat. He thought that his arrival might not only be the means of restoring the affairs of the Bombay Presidency, but of saving it from utter ruin.²³ The news of the misfortune of the Bombay army reached Goddard on 8 February.²⁴ Raghunath Rao's cause was believed to have been

and as Hastings' plan of supporting Mudaji appeared to be the most eligible policy for obtaining an influence in the Maratha State, Goddard entertained the idea of securing his alliance.²⁵ A faint hope made its appearance in an atmosphere otherwise gloomy. Goddard wrote to Hastings, "the principal hope is, the Ministers may attack and force him (Mudaji) to fly to us for protection."²⁶

Francis had continually circulated the wild tale to his friends that Goddard would meet with 'insurmountable difficulties' and would never reach Bombay.²⁷ News had arrived in England of the death of Leslie; Hastings' enemies had termed the expedition 'an act of insanity' and believed that the detachment would be sacrificed.²⁸ But despite Francis' wishful thinking and the apprehensions of Hastings' enemies, Goddard reached Surat on the 25th February, 1779.²⁹ From the Narbada to Burhanpur and thence to Surat was a long march which Goddard performed with surprising rapidity. He acknowledged that his progress would have been a good deal retarded, had not the inhabitants on the road voluntarily supplied him with provisions.³⁰ Hastings warmly testified to Goddard's activity and prudence.³¹

The arrival of Goddard's army at Surat afforded a most seasonable aid to the Presidency of Bombay when it stood in need of support. He received a letter from the Bombay Select Committee in which he was requested to come to Bombay at the earliest convenience.³² He proceeded and arrived there on the 15 March.³³ He reported to Calcutta on the 21st that the Poona Government would be satisfied with the advantage they had gained and would not like to provoke a war the consequence of which might be fatal to their party.³⁴ It was alleged by Francis and probably with some truth that Goddard's resolution to march to Surat was taken by himself and Hastings had no share in the credit of that measure. When Hastings heard that Goddard, by the most extraordinary forced marches, had arrived safe at Surat, "he applauded a measure which he would not have failed to condemn, if it had miscarried."³⁵

The news of Mudaji's positive refusal to join with the English reached Calcutta in the beginning of January, 1779,

and gave an occasion for a prolonged debate in the Council. Francis deprecated the step taken by Hastings in sending Goddard with his forces a thousand miles away to Berar 'in the presumption of receiving assistance on the spot, without any treaty previously concluded, without a single condition agreed on.'³⁶ "I do not wonder," said Francis, "that Moodajee Boosla should feel no inclination to unite his fortune with such a government, but let us now at least profit by his advice, as far as the circumstances we are reduced to will admit. In the natural order of things, deliberation should go before measures ; with us it must follow them."³⁷ The safety of the English forces weighed heavily upon Francis' mind, and he urged that Goddard should return to Bengal. He also recommended that letters should be written to the Peshwa requesting him to permit the English army to retire without 'molestation'. He ended by expressing his oft-repeated desire that the English should make peace with the Marathas according to the terms of the treaty of Purandhar. It would be a mistake to suppose that Francis was oblivious to the advantages that might have been secured by forming an alliance with Mudaji. He was sorry to learn that Mudaji, 'once the favourite of Mr. Hastings, and the perpetual subject of his panegyric,' refused to make an alliance with the English. In this critical posture of the Company's affairs in India, this circumstance was indeed unfortunate. Even Francis who always viewed things in India with his myopic vision paid Mudaji a warm tribute. His conduct towards the English, observed Francis to North, was fair and explicit, and his advice friendly, judicious and uniform.³⁸

Hardly had Hastings recovered from this shock, than he was faced with a crisis more portentous than the former. Barwell announced his desire to return to England.³⁹ Barwell's steady support and zeal had always strengthened Hastings' hands in the face of the bluff and blusterings of two members in the Council. So his retirement at this critical moment would be disastrous. Hastings exhorted Barwell to remain for the sake of 'national honour'⁴⁰ and succeeded in prevailing upon him to postpone his departure until the arrival of Coote. "My

friend Barwell," Hastings wrote to Baber. "has promised to remain in the service...She possesses much experience, a solid judgment, much greater fertility of official resources than I have, and his manners are easy and pleasant".⁴¹

The enterprise of the Bombay Government to conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona blasted all the fine hopes which Hastings had built upon the proposed treaty with Mudaji Bhosle. Hastings lamented that the policy of the Bombay Government, besides defeating his measures, exposed him to "the suspicion of duplicity."⁴² But he showed a statesmanlike grasp of the situation and resolved to give every possible aid in the execution of their policy. Goddard was ordered to co-operate with the Bombay Government in their expedition in support of Raghunath Rao. The Supreme Council furthermore appointed Goddard as their envoy plenipotentiary to the Court of Poona with distinct powers to treat with Raghunath Rao or any other persons who might be at the head of the Maratha State.⁴³ They also authorised Goddard to resume the negotiations with Mudaji Bhosle provided Raghunath Rao departed from the terms of his engagement with the Government of Bombay or in case of the failure of the plan undertaken on his behalf. The Supreme Council did not forget to pass strictures on the conduct of the Bombay Government in the following words :

"It was formerly a matter of great concern to us, that you had suffered so many opportunities to escape after the conclusion of the plan which you had formed in December 1777, for restoring the power of Ragoba, without taking any effective means to carry it into execution. It now affords us equal concern and mortification that you have precipitately undertaken it, after having given us every reason to conclude, that you had abandoned it altogether, and compelled us therefore to adopt other measures, which, in consequence of your present oppositions, have been abruptly broken off, and which will ruin your designs to us."⁴⁴

On 8 February, 1779, Francis recorded a minute in which he charged Hastings for the inconsistency of his policy towards

to the different plans and terms of alliance with Mudaji Bhosle and with Raghunath Rao.⁴⁵ Hastings defended himself and pointed out that there were two separate and unconnected schemes of alliance : the one defensive, for the mutual support of their respective territories immediately bordering upon each other, the other offensive, for other purposes.⁴⁶

On 25 February, 1779, the Supreme Council received from the Madras Government the news of the debacle at Talegaon. The Governor and Council of Fort St. George were apprehensive of the consequences that might attend the disaster. Haidar Ali and the Nizam, they feared, might be encouraged in their hostility towards the English. These two formidable powers, and especially Haidar Ali, had initiated the task of weakening the English power in the Carnatic. The Madras Government could not be blamed for making the observation : "Thus by one ill-timed and unfortunate enterprise, the reputation of our arms is sullied, and the friendship of the principal Indian States hazarded or lost for ever, and that too at a period when we are engaged in a war which calls for the exertion of all our forces, and the good will of every state in alliance with us."⁴⁷ Instead of proceeding to Bombay or Surat, the Madras Government suggested, Goddard should retreat through Berar towards the coast of Orissa.

✓ Amidst these darkening clouds, Hastings remained unperturbed. Yet he believed that the unexampled check which the English arms had sustained on the other side of India was sure to create the impression that the British power in India was declining and to encourage the country Powers to rise in arms against it. The remedy which he suggested to repair 'the partial misfortune' was vigorous exertion and confident display of the British strength.⁴⁸ 'The crisis', Hastings wrote to Rumbold, 'demands bold and determined language, and every studied appearance of a resolution to avenge ourselves.'⁴⁹

The Supreme Council ordered General Stibbert to march towards the banks of the Jumna for defending the Doab against a probable invasion.⁵⁰ Francis objected to this. With his usual warmth he pointed out that the English forces should

to be dispersed in different centres as by 'such unconnected and effort', the whole force of the British Empire in India was liable to be wasted.⁵¹ Hastings sarcastically remarked that had the policies of Great Britain been confined to such narrow limits as Francis would like to prescribe, her power must have been unknown beyond the seas.⁵² Francis was not to be easily silenced: he observed that the limits which he would like to prescribe for the British Empire in India were 'wide enough to answer every wise and profitable purpose.' He remarked pungently that the distant dependencies of the British Empire took their origin from the spirit of commerce and colonisation, and not from conquest.⁵³

On the 18th March, 1779, the Supreme Council received an official communication from the Bombay Government in which they reported the defeat of their forces and their forcible capitulation to the Marathas, with remarks on the invalidity of the stipulations agreed to. Francis deduced from this letter that the Bombay Government intended to renew hostilities with the Marathas. He put forward the motion that they should be forbidden 'in the most precise and positive terms' from commencing hostilities against the Marathas.⁵⁴ It was Francis' wish to make the Bombay Government completely subservient to the Calcutta Council. "In the present critical circumstances," Francis urged, "it is our duty not to leave them the shadow of a pretence of acting in opposition to our intentions."⁵⁵ The majority put a negative on the motion. Wheeler drew a melancholy picture of the Company's affairs in India and urged the necessity of adopting pacific measures. The superiority of English arms had suffered a check to which they should not have exposed it again. The British, Wheeler said, would derive no advantage in a war with the Marathas and it would exhaust all the resources of Bengal. Wheeler also dwelt on the alarming situation of the Madras Government to which they should furnish a supply of money.⁵⁶

The Bombay Council tried to exculpate themselves from the blame of the disaster at Talegaon on the plea that they could not defer the expedition longer on account of the unusual severity and duration of the rains.⁵⁷ They also regretted

that they had not been timely informed of the proposed negotiations with Mudaji Bhosle. Had they been apprised in time, the Bombay Government observed speciously, they should not have prosecuted the plan for the restoration of Raghunath Rao.⁵⁸ 'To prevent any loss of time in correspondence,' the Bombay Government thought it expedient to depute Horsley to Calcutta to give the Supreme Council an exact information of the political condition of their Presidency.⁵⁹ Goddard's determination to come to the assistance of the Bombay Government won their highest encomium and they desired him to attend their Council meetings.⁶⁰

Eyre Coote arrived in Bengal on the 27th March, 1779. The Supreme Council was thus rendered complete and Hastings put forth several proposals to 'retrieve the disgrace' which the British arms had sustained at the hands of the Marathas.⁶¹ The English should conclude peace with the Marathas on the basis of the terms of the treaty of Purandhar. His plan was unanimously agreed to and Goddard appointed the accredited envoy to treat with the Peshwa's Government. The Marathas were to forego the territories acquired by them through the Convention of Wadgaon and they were never to admit any French forces in their dominions or allow them to form any establishment on the Malabar coast. Hastings considered that these conditions should be made the basic principle in their effort to secure a peace with the Marathas. But if peace could not be obtained, the English should exert every power to efface by a vigorous and successful war the loss which they had suffered. Hastings said, "At all events while we seek for peace we ought at least to be prepared for war, as the surest whether immediate or remote, to obtain it."⁶² The Supreme Council duly communicated this resolution to the Peshwa and the ministers. Writes Hastings to Sakharam, "The past cannot be recalled, but for the future, it is my wish that peace may be yet restored and all past grievances buried in oblivion".⁶³ A letter of credence was issued to Goddard⁶⁴ and he was instructed to secure for Raghunath Rao—if he could—some suitable provisions for his personal safety and subsistence.⁶⁵

It was a matter of personal triumph for Francis that Hastings should have proposed peace terms to the Marathas. Francis did not conceal his gratification and wrote to Fowke on 24 May, 1779 :

"How honourable it is to me that after all my efforts to preserve the Peace have failed—after all our expense, and all our disgrace, Mr. Hastings himself is reduced to propose our coming to a final settlement with the Marathas on the terms of our treaty. This is a great personal consolation—as great as any man can receive, who does his duty in vain."⁶⁵

The Supreme Council duly informed the Bombay Government of their appointment of Goddard as Minister Plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty with the Marathas. In case of failure of negotiations with the Marathas, the Bombay Government was instructed to enter into a treaty with the Gaikwads with the express proviso that they should not take part in their domestic disputes.⁶⁷ There was little hope of Mudaji's accepting the proffered alliance of the English, and the Supreme Council directed Goddard to break off the negotiations. If, however, Mudaji showed his willingness to accept the proposed treaty, Goddard was advised to conclude it. The admirable conduct shown by Mahadji Sindhia towards the English induced the Calcutta Council to confirm the surrender of Broach to him. In the event of a war with the Marathas, the Calcutta Council authorised Goddard to enter into a separate arrangement with Sindhia, in case he should find him disposed to take part with the English. The despatch of 14 June to the Bombay Government contained all the above particulars and the Calcutta Council summed up their instructions to them in the following words :

"Our first desire is to obtain peace on the terms proposed by our instructions to Colonel Goddard of the 5th April, and it is only in the event of the failure in this design, that we have formed the subsequent instructions."⁶⁸

Francis sensed danger in the proposed plan of alliance with the Gaikwads, Sindhia and Bhosle. In his opinion these Powers would either stand aloof 'until they see the success of

English arms' or offer their assistance on terms which they could not accept. To commit the Company, Francis said, to a war with the Marathas would endanger the whole of their possessions ; the utmost they could expect in case of victory was some accession of territory on the Malabar coast.⁶⁹ The plan of alliance with Mudaji having failed, Francis did not wish it to be renewed. The British power in India, in the opinion of Francis, would gain nothing by 'the weight of a timid ally'. He dreaded the idea of involving the Company in a 'labyrinth of Asiatic politics.' The English should keep the peace and be satisfied with what they already possessed. Francis deemed the re-establishment of peace on the Malabar coast to be essential not merely to the prosperity of the Company but to their existence. The Bombay Government had 'dreamt too long of inexhaustible wealth from Bengal.' Under the influence of this dream they had embarked upon schemes of the most dangerous nature and wasted the Company's property with unexampled profusion. It was a high time, Francis reiterated, that they should be awakened from it and 'not a rupee' should be sent to Bombay for the purpose of carrying on a war. He did not see 'wisdom, firmness or union' in the Bombay Council and suspected that their attitude was recalcitrant.⁷⁰

✓ The 'disgraceful' Convention of Wadgaon left behind ineffaceable memories upon Hastings' mind. He had sent troops under Leslie to support the Bombay Government and had begun the task of drawing the Bhosles, one of the strongest powers in India, into a system of subsidiary alliance. In a private letter to Hornby, he complained of being abandoned in an undertaking of such 'magnitude and risk', and sought his 'firmest support' for the measures now to be carried into execution. A perfect harmony between Hornby and Goddard was all that Hastings desired. He wrote to Hornby, "the terms of peace are in our power, if we do not yield up the means of securing them by disagreement among ourselves."⁷¹ 'Without animadverting on past miscarriages', Hastings observed to Hornby, their whole attention should be directed to avert the fatal consequences which might be expected from them.⁷²

The independent power with which Goddard was vested by the Supreme Council to treat with the Peshwa drew from Horsley, the Bombay Government's representative at Calcutta, a lengthy remonstrance.⁷³ He considered that the plenipotentiary powers conferred on Goddard in the concerns of the Bombay Presidency were 'illegal, inconsistent, inexpedient.' He reminded the members of the Supreme Council that the Regulating Act gave them a negative power in the political concerns of other Presidencies. The intention of the Act, as pointed out by Horsley, was not to leave any Government to the mercy of another, 'the members of which had perhaps no interest in it, or biasses contrary to it.'⁷⁴

The zeal with which Horsley supported the cause of the Bombay Government disturbed every member of the Calcutta Council. Hastings wrote to Laurence Sullivan, "The Presidency of Bombay has deputed a hot-headed man with a most tranquil exterior to treat with us ; and he has announced the vengeance of his constituents against us because we will not give up our army to their disposal, and all our negotiations to their conduct."⁷⁵ Horsley's protest naturally went unheeded. All that Hastings did was that he instructed Goddard to conciliate the minds of the members of the Bombay Council and to reconcile them to the necessity of acquiescing in the present arrangement. He further instructed Goddard to maintain a 'good understanding and unreserved confidence with Mr. Hornby,' to consult him on all affairs, and to undertake no measure without his advice.⁷⁶ Hastings was aware of the fact that nothing tangible could be effected by Goddard unless 'the gentlemen at Bombay' afforded him all the assistance which he might require for the execution of his object. Hence he warned Goddard to avoid being drawn into any unnecessary dispute with the members of the Bombay Select Committee.⁷ Not being dispirited by this, Horsley made an ineffectual protest to the Court of Directors :

"Permit me, Gentlemen, to remark to you, in behalf of the Government of Bombay, that the conduct of the Governor General and Council has, in my humble opinion, been very repugnant to those principles c

candour, which might have been expected to have prevailed in the proceedings of so respectable a body.”⁷⁸

The atmosphere of the Poona Durbar after the Convention of Wadgaon presented an unpromising picture. Sakharam Bapu was confined at Sinhagad for his alleged complicity with Raghunath Rao⁷⁹ and Chinto Vithal.⁸⁰ The removal of Sakharam left Nana master of the Poona Durbar. “Nana Farnavis is all powerful, he is in fact the Raja of the Deccan,” writes a contemporary.⁸¹ But the all-powerful minister’s cherished ambition of getting hold of Raghunath Rao was not accomplished. The Convention of Wadgaon put Raghunath Rao in the custody of Mahadji Sindhia. Nana grudgingly acquiesced in this arrangement. Goddard with a discerning eye noticed these symptoms of disunion among the Maratha chiefs. With a buoyancy that characterised him Goddard informed Hastings that this occasion—‘a promising occasion,’ of course—could be fully utilised to the benefit of the English by interfering in the affairs of the Marathas.⁸² A studied appearance of hostility, if not of war, Goddard said, would act as a deterrent upon the Marathas in claiming any advantage on the basis of the Convention of Wadgaon.⁸³ He also believed that the Gujarat province, torn with civil war between the two rival brothers—Fateh Sing and Govind Rao—might be easily conquered with the help of his army.⁸⁴

On 21 April, the boy Peshwa had undergone the thread ceremony⁸⁴ and received congratulations from the ministers. There was also rejoicing at Poona on the recent victory over the English. But the news of the flight of Raghunath Rao from the custody of Sindhia’s forces put an end to all their mirth. His flight once more plunged the country into war that was supposed to have come to an end. When the Bombay army retreated from Talegaon, Raghunath Rao went over to Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar and entered into an engagement with them. They gave him a territory yielding an annual revenue of twelve and a half lakhs exclusive of the *taluka* of Jhansi and engaged to give him a further grant of 10 to 15 lakhs.⁸⁵ Sindhia’s troops under Hari Babaji escorted Raghunath Rao in his march towards Jhansi. The ex-Peshwa had

ANGLO-MARATHA RELATIONS

th him 1,500 gardis and 20 pieces of artillery.⁸⁶ Some disagreement arose between him and Hari Babaji, as the latter failed in assisting him with provisions for his troops. Hari Babaji put to death two of his principal jamadars and imprisoned several persons whose liberty was guaranteed by the terms of the engagement.

Raghunath Rao received secret information that Sindhia intended to confine him in the Jhansi fort.⁸⁷ He, therefore, planned to escape from the custody of Hari Babaji and wanted to take shelter in Goddard's camp. This had been suggested to Goddard by some of his secret partisans sometime before his escape.⁸⁸ On 29 May, Raghunath Rao arrived at the Burwa Ghat on the Narbada.⁸⁹ Suspecting some treachery while Raghunath Rao's artillery was crossing the Narbada, Hari Babaji ordered his troops to fire. In the skirmish which ensued, Raghunath Rao emerged victorious and made his escape after mortally wounding Hari Babaji.⁹⁰ Accompanied by Baji Rao and Amrit Rao, Raghunath Rao came to Surat in the early June and sought Goddard's protection which he granted.⁹¹ Reflecting upon this fortunate event, Goddard wrote to Hastings on 12 June, 1779 :

✓ It must be productive of the most advantageous consequences to a final and proper settlement of affairs with the Maratta State, whether they terminate in peace or war.⁹² The Supreme Council, consequently, directed Goddard to afford him protection, provided he should not 'forfeit his right to it by any act of infidelity or attempt to defeat his negotiations with the Marathas.'⁹³ Hastings had reasons to gratulate himself on this happy turn of events. He congratulated Goddard not to part with him and to use him as a political instrument. His advice to Goddard on this 'fortunate' was wise and sagacious. Hastings wrote :

"If there is peace, your connection with him may be regulated and bounded by the Treaty. If war, you will be free to make what use you can of him. The Court will expect you to support him preferably to any other pretender, if you cannot reconcile his interests and views with those of others."⁹⁴

In conclusion, Hastings instructed Goddard not to transfer the person of Raghunath Rao from his protection to that of the Bombay Government. To Raghunath Rao, Hastings wrote, "it gave him the highest pleasure to learn that he was safe and well and that he had chosen the English army for his refuge."⁹⁵

Warren Hastings had been compelled to join in the 'cry for peace' and had reluctantly agreed even to make concessions to obtain it. He was conscious that if peace was concluded, the scene would be closed to all other views, perhaps for ever.⁹⁶ He was afraid whether the desired settlement with the Marathas would ever be accomplished. Hastings voiced his own sentiment by writing to his friend, Sullivan :

"Nothing but war can retrieve the fatal effects of the late miscarriage and that peace can only be a delusion. The world is ever misled by names. Be assured, my friend, that the Marattas are as contemptible enemy as any that we have yet ever had opposed to us."⁹⁷

In the meantime, the cost of maintaining an army far away from Bengal had been pressing on the financial resources of the Company. Goddard was asked to be economical. He should try to secure indemnity from the Poona ministers in any treaty to be formed with them.⁹⁸ The Supreme Council also instructed Goddard to repeat their offer to the Peshwa and his ministers, and to demand their final answer upon them within 24 hours, declaring that their refusal or delay beyond that time would be considered as a declaration of war.⁹⁹ The Bombay Government was advised to help Goddard if he should be reduced to the extremity of engaging in hostilities.¹⁰⁰

When the nerves of the members of the Calcutta Council were at the end of their tether, Horsley drew up a private memorandum, the object of which was to ease the tension between the Marathas and the English.¹⁰¹ He expressed his hope that peace would easily be effected provided the English withdrew from Maratha politics and confined themselves merely to the terms of the treaty of Purandhar. The Calcutta Council, Horsley said, should order the Government of Bombay to confine their attention merely to preserving what they possessed.

and to refrain from hostilities with the Marathas, unless the latter actually attacked them. He observed emphatically, "it would as well or better answer the purposes of those, who wish for peace, because it would more immediately establish it than any other negotiation."¹⁰² But the orders should be precise and clear of ambiguity; all complaints of breach of orders would thus be effectually prevented on both sides.

✓Goddard started negotiations with the Poona Government from Surat. He felt strong misgivings about success in spite of the 'manifest inclinations' of the ministers 'for peace.' He doubted whether the ministers could be brought to relinquish the advantages gained by the Convention of Wadgaon. To his utter dismay Goddard found that Nana was in correspondence with Nizam Ali and other neighbouring powers soliciting them to join the Peshwa against the English. It appeared to him that the ministers would protract the negotiations by some evasive reply till the season was too far advanced to effect anything material in the field. 'To obviate the inconveniency' and delay, Goddard proposed an interview with the Peshwa and the ministers provided the conditions for peace were deemed acceptable to them.¹⁰³

Lachhman Rao Govind and Nihal Chaud, the two agents on behalf of the Poona Government, arrived at Surat on 14 August.¹⁰⁴ Goddard had a lengthy conversation with them on 16 August. The prospect of peace appeared to be somewhat brightened when Goddard became aware of the differences that subsisted between Nana and Mahadji and of the desire of the Marathas to be at liberty to check the progress of Haidar Ali.¹⁰⁵ No overtures respecting Raghunath Rao were made by the agents. It is curious that the Marathas should have maintained such mysterious silence regarding a person who could not but be the principal object of their negotiation. Goddard ascribed this to the desire of the Marathas to obtain a confirmation and performance of the terms of the Convention of Wadgaon by which Raghunath Rao would again be delivered into their hands.¹⁰⁶

About two months had elapsed and Goddard had not yet received the final decision of the Poona Durbar. Much dis-

appointed, Goddard thought it expedient to despatch Nihal Chand to Poona on his promise to return in twenty days.¹⁰⁷ The message which Goddard sent through the agent contained an offer of reviewing those provisions of the treaty made with Upton, that the Maratha Government should make good one crore and twenty lakhs of rupees expended by the English and that Raghunath Rao should have a jagir given him in Gujarat.¹⁰⁸ Goddard believed in Nana's profession to make a peace with the English. "Nana was friendly disposed towards the English and had a great regard for their sincerity", wrote Devakar Pant from Poona.¹⁰⁹ Goddard attributed the delay in the accomplishment of peace to the hostile attitude of Mahadji Sindhia whom he considered as the 'inveterate foe' of the English.¹¹⁰ "I am persuaded", he wrote to Calcutta on 12 September, 1779, "that whatever obstacles may be thrown in the way will originate from Madjee Sindhia."¹¹¹ Goddard thought it prudent not to commence any exclusive intercourse with him unless circumstances should make it necessary for him in the interest of the Company to do so.

While the negotiations were in suspense, Goddard received reports that the Poona ministers were not in a mood to comply with the demands of the English. A sudden turn had also come in Poona politics. Nana and Mahadji, instead of engaging in mutual rivalry, were in concert making preparations for hostilities and settling the plan for the ensuing campaign. A fresh war between the Marathas and the English was near at hand and Goddard fixed the rendezvous of troops coming from Madras and Bombay to strengthen him, at Surat.¹¹² An interview between Goddard and Lachhman Rao, the Maratha agent, took place on 18 October. Goddard remonstrated to him about the 'hostile inclinations and designs' of the ministers. He further told the agent that he would only wait for 15 days more; if a satisfactory reply did not come in the meanwhile from Poona, he should 'consider the delay as a declaration of war and act accordingly.'¹¹³

In the meantime, when the peace negotiations were yet to be concluded, Raghunath Rao's followers, idling in the neighbourhood of Surat, committed depredations upon the people.

This act, 'at so critical a juncture,' was believed to be detrimental to the interest of the English. Goddard, therefore, found it necessary to advance Raghunath Rao 50,000 rupees per month, to satisfy the clamour of his people as well for the support of his family.¹¹⁴ This act of Goddard incurred for him the displeasure of the Supreme Council who made it clear that their orders concerning Raghunath Rao were limited only to protection. They instructed Goddard not to give him any allowance. The Supreme Council had learnt by experience that British interest would not be advanced by maintaining 'an intimate connection' with a person whose influence had sunk to its lowest ebb.¹¹⁵

After being 'amused and bubbled by the Maratta Ministers,'¹¹⁶ Goddard at last received an answer from them on 28 October. Nihal Chand returned from Poona with letters from the Peshwa and the ministers. ✓ It was found that they would not make peace with the English unless Salsette was relinquished and the person of Raghunath Rao delivered up.¹¹⁷ The indemnity which the English demanded, the Poona Government had no intention to pay. They had expended many crores of rupees and queried 'who was to repay them for the expenses they had sustained'.¹¹⁸ Nana Farnavis and Mahadji Sindhia emphatically protested against all the demands of the Colonel and were greatly annoyed with him for his offering a refuge to Raghunath Rao, who, in their opinion, was the root of all troubles. They also declared that since the state of affairs had taken such an unexpected turn they were obliged to prepare for war with the assistance of Nizam Ali and Haider Ali.¹¹⁹ ✓ The door was thus bolted against further negotiation and Goddard, therefore, proceeded to Bombay to concert a plan of operations with the President and the Select Committee. He did not think it prudent to negotiate with Mahadji Sindhia as it might be construed into 'a consciousness of inferiority' on the part of the English.¹²⁰

During Goddard's negotiations with the Poona Government, Mudaji Bhosle came forward with offers of mediation. He sent his Diwan, Devakar Pant, in embassy to Poona. Devakar Pant had several interviews with Nana Farnavis and

found him disposed to make peace with the English.¹²¹ He requested Goddard to send Watherstone to Poona 'with all haste' for settling the terms of accommodation.¹²² But finding himself unable to bring about a reconciliation between the parties, Devakar returned to Nagpur. It would be a mistake to conclude from this episode that Mudaji, by playing the part of a mediator, was friendly in his attitude towards the English. We get a clear picture of his real views :

"Diwan Devakar Pandit is in high favour with Nana. The Diwan represented to him that Mudhaji Bhonsla was obliged to make an outward friendship with the English as the Poona ministers had failed to give him military assistance in order to enable him to realise the *chauth* from Bengal. He was however still a dutiful subject of the Mahratta Government at heart... The Diwan said that the English were a thorn in their side and must be got rid of. Mudhaji Bhonsla is in constant correspondence with Sindhia also."¹²³

News of a confederacy between the Peshwa, Mudaji, the Nizam and Haidar was in the air. Goddard had received intelligence of it on 30 September, 1779, when he was negotiating with the Poona ministers.¹²⁴ The Bombay Government warned Goddard not to rely on this 'fabricated' tale, as the Marathas were adept in the art of 'such artifices'.¹²⁵ But the plan of which Goddard heard on 30 September really grew into maturity. The proposed anti-British confederacy among the Peshwa, Bhosle, the Nizam and Haidar was organised in the beginning of 1780. Nizam Ali was the moving spirit and 'the projector of this alliance'.¹²⁶ The design was this : the grand army under Sindhia and Holkar was to oppose Goddard, Mudaji to invade Bengal and its dependencies, Nizam Ali the Northern Circars and Haidar the Carnatic.¹²⁷

From the inception of the Anglo-Maratha war, Nizam Ali was in close touch with the Poona Government. During the monsoon of 1779, he offered to Nana Farnavis his armed help against the English and promised to take the field after the rains were over.¹²⁸ There were several causes which led the Nizam to side with the Peshwa. The support given by the

Bombay Government to Raghunath Rao had already annoyed him.¹²⁹ In July, 1778, the Madras Presidency, anticipating a rupture with France, opened negotiations with Basalat Jang, jagirdar of Guntur. They asked him to dismiss his French troops, to cede Guntur to the English for a fixed rent and to receive English battalions for the defence of his territory.¹³⁰ Certain hostile demonstrations on the part of Haidar Ali intimidated Basalat Jang; he agreed to the English proposal and on the 27th January, 1779, a formal treaty was concluded to that effect. Nizam Ali became indignant at this procedure. The English had no right to negotiate with one of his vassals, keeping him in the dark all the while. He, therefore, wrote to Basalat Jang forbidding him to cede Guntur to the English. Nizam Ali forewarned his vassal and observed: "The instances of Bengal and other territories go to prove that if any possessions once fell into the hands of the English they became their own property."¹³¹ The attitude of Nizam Ali appeared to be unmistakably hostile and the Madras Government deputed Holland to his Court in order to remove misunderstandings from his mind. The Nizam was not pacified. The English further exasperated him by asking for a remission of annual tribute of five lakhs which the Company were bound to pay for the Circars. Nizam Ali wrote: "If the Governor of Madras is bent on enmity he is free to take the field ... whenever he likes, for he is fully prepared against all eventualities."¹³²

Haidar Ali had a strong inducement to join in the confederacy. He offered to pay the Marathas twenty-five lakhs of rupees 'in settlement of their former accounts,' while he also promised them an annual tribute of eleven lakhs. All the country on the south side of the Tungabhadra were to remain in Haidar's possession; his right to the Maratha territories south of the Krishna was also admitted. The Marathas were to come to his assistance if he was attacked by the English. A two-pronged attack upon the English was also devised—the Marathas to harass the English in the Deccan and Haidar in the Carnatic. Both parties agreed not to make separate peace with the English.¹³³ All these terms were formally settled on

ambition of their hostile neighbour.¹³⁹ The Bombay Government directed the Chief of Surat to keep a vigilant eye upon the proceedings of the Dutch, so that they could easily counteract any design which they might have formed.¹³⁹

The fate of the English thus hung in the balance, and the lengthening shadows of the country Powers were about to envelop all the three settlements of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. In this crisis Hastings' diplomacy sought fresh openings which he found in friendship with the Rana of Gohad.¹⁴⁰ With this Chief he concluded an alliance on 2 December, 1779. According to the terms of the treaty,¹⁴¹ the English forces were to be employed for the defence of the Rana's territory against all foreign or domestic enemies, and for the enlargement of his dominions by conquest on the Marathas'. In any war between the Rana and the Marathas, the English were to help him by furnishing troops, the expenses to be defrayed by the Rana. He was to be included as a party if any treaty should take place between the Company and the Maratha State. No English factory was to be established in the Rana's dominions. On the 19th December, the Rana was informed that if he should require an English detachment as provided in the treaty, he might have it 'at once' on a written application to Eyre Coote.¹⁴²

Francis inveighed against the alliance between the Company and the Rana of Gohad. "On the 2d instant," he intimated Lord North, "a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between this Government and the Rana of Gohad, a person whose name, I conclude, your Lordship never heard of."¹⁴³ Francis pointed out that an alliance with an unknown and inconsiderable Chief, whose army was little better than 'a rabble, ill-armed and clothed, and without regular pay or discipline,' would be dangerous to the interest of the Company.¹⁴⁴ He apprehended that it would involve the English in constant support of his quarrels with his neighbours, without reaping any compensation or assistance in return.

On 6 December, the Governor-General and Council received the news of a Maratha attack upon the fort of Arhaund in the Gohad territory. They, therefore, instructed Eyre Coote to

help the Rana by supplying a detachment of troops if he should make an application for assistance. This resolution drew a mild protest from Francis who said: "He (the Rana) is at constant enmity with the Marathas ; and I look upon this attack as nothing more than a continuance of former hostilities against him. At all events, we shall only distress ourselves, and abandon the protection of our own frontier, by engaging in his defence."¹⁴⁵

The justification which Hastings put forward in forming an alliance with the Rana of Gohad shows how his mind was astir in devising schemes to save the English possessions in India. The English were on the eve of a war with the Maratha State. From Goddard's advice one can reasonably conclude that the English were actually in a state of war with the Marathas and with other powers combined with them. Had the British Government remained in total inaction, had no measure of this kind been adopted, Hastings should have expected to have been reproached with suffering the Company to be drawn into a war with perhaps the first power in India, without any alliance to support it. He had taken effective steps to counteract the Maratha menace but instead of receiving the due applause, he was censured for forming such an alliance.¹⁴⁶

Hastings asserted that the treaty secured the support and assistance of a powerful prince, whose dominions adjoined their frontiers, and lay in one of the principal roads through which the Marathas must pass to invade them. The object of the treaty was to weaken the power of the Marathas in the event of a war with them, by depriving them of a part of their revenues and diverting their attention to various attacks.¹⁴⁷ "I expect no great advantages from the present treaty," Hastings wrote, "except that it may produce overtures from the Rajas of Jeynagur, Oodeypour and Joudpour. These countries form a continued chain from the Jumna to Guzerat. The Rajas are anxious to throw off their present subjection and become our tributaries. If my plan succeeds we obtain a safe communication and distract the attention of the Maratta Chiefs. We raise up enemies amongst them and their own

neighbourhood, and carry the war to a distance from our own territories."¹⁴³

To Francis, however, all these schemes, drawn up with a view to establishing British power in India, signified disaster. He wrote to North on 22 December, 1779 :

"The delirium of conquest predominates almost equally over the three Presidencies. No argument can reach it. We can only be cured by experience ; but we may perish in the operation."¹⁴⁴

CHAPTER VII

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1780—1781

Goddard's peace parleys with the Poona agents proved abortive. Negotiations being broken he came to Bombay on 1 November, 1779, to deliberate with the Bombay Select Committee upon the future course of action to be pursued against the Marathas. The past experiences had strengthened Goddard's belief that the Maratha leaders were not disposed to reinstate Raghunath Rao in the Peshwaship. Evidently he discouraged the idea of forming any new engagement with the ex-Peshwa. But Raghunath Rao was not to be excluded from the British political system. Rather the English were to look forward to his restoration at a future date when circumstances might be more favourable. In a lengthy paper which Goddard laid before the Bombay Select Committee, he proposed that Raghunath Rao should be persuaded to believe that the 'grand and ultimate object' of the English was to establish him in the Poona Government.¹ The line of conduct which Goddard wanted to pursue in regard to the ex-Peshwa afterwards won the approbation of the Calcutta Council. In a letter, dated 3 March, 1780, to the Court of Directors they wrote :

"We are very sorry to say that such an universal indisposition seems to prevail towards Ragoba, either from the character which he bears, or the supposed consequence of his pretensions, that we must fear an open declaration in his favour would only multiply our enemies, and draw upon us the opposition of persons naturally averse to his interests ; a nearer alliance with him would therefore, we apprehend, be detrimental to our views, and burthensome to the Company."²

Goddard wanted a respectable *casus belli* for bringing on a war with the Marathas. The encouragement given to the

French by the Marathas and their rejection of British friendship were treated by him as the cause of hostilities.

In the military operations to be prosecuted against the Marathas, Goddard wanted to strengthen the English by securing the adhesion of Fateh Sing Gaikwad. He asked from the Bombay Government power to conclude a treaty with him. Goddard also proposed to conquer some territories, tributary to the Peshwa, in Gujarat. The Gaikwad might be easily reconciled to this point, if the English could relieve him from dependence on the Poona Government and admit him to a share of the spoils which they would take in Gujarat. There was, of course, the uncertainty whether Fateh Sing would take hold of the proffered alliance of the English. Force was to be employed in case of his refusal. The idea of an alliance with Fateh Sing was long in the air. It was originally-mooted by Hornby in February, 1779, when the Company's affairs on the western side of India had suffered a set-back on account of the English disaster at Talegaon. The Gaikwads occupied such a geographical position which rendered them somewhat independent from the Poona Government against whom they appeared to have nursed a secret discontent. The contiguity of their territories to the northern possessions of the English, the advantageous offers formerly made by Fateh Sing for an alliance with the Company and their military resources opened up a prospect which the English, in the present circumstances, could scarcely neglect.³

The Bombay Government was aware that the war with the Marathas could not be postponed *sine die*. They only wanted to gain time till they were in a better condition to meet the approaching storm. In the consultation of 10 November, 1779, Draper recorded his opinion as follows :

“What ought still further most strongly to weigh with us for deferring bringing matters to a crisis for some time longer, is the great probability, from the advices now before us, of the Company's being involved in a war with Hyder Ally as well as the Marathas.”⁴

Carnac, on the contrary, was in favour of assisting Goddard with a ‘respectable’ force. He pointed out that they had

already experienced the bad effects of 'dilatory and procrastinating measures.'⁵ Policy demanded swift decision. British resources must be harnessed to fight back the Marathas. In order to procure sinews of war, Carnac proposed that the Chief of Surat should be instructed to borrow money from the Nawab and Government officers in the Company's interest. Fateh Sing's alliance, Carnac believed, would enable the English to reduce Mahadji's power and 'to keep him within due bounds.'⁶

Goddard was not in a mood to temporise with the Poona ministers. Their rejection of the peace terms justified his conduct 'in being the first to unsheathe the sword.' In taking the initiative, Goddard affirmed, the English would be able to occupy territories and prosecute the war with 'anticipated' advantages.⁷ It was too late to negotiate and the object of peace could only be accomplished by their acting with vigour.

Goddard's enthusiasm succeeded in disarming the slight opposition of the Bombay Select Committee. His will at last prevailed over the tardy resolution of the Bombay Councillors. On 2nd December, 1779, they welcomed his decision and assured him of their assistance in the struggle against the Marathas. But they disclaimed all responsibility both as to the measure of the war itself and the success of it.⁸ The Bombay troops, consisting of 100 artillery, 200 European infantry and two battalions of sepoys under the command of Hartley, were to reinforce Goddard's forces.⁹ The Bombay Government authorised Goddard to negotiate and conclude a treaty of alliance with Fateh Sing and to make with him an equitable settlement of the province of Gujarat.¹⁰ It was decided that a specific partition of the territory between Fateh Sing and the East India Company, 'according to the proportion of the revenues respectively held by him and the Marathas,' should be the basis of the agreement. Goddard was instructed to reduce the Maratha possessions south of the Tapti and the districts of Olpad, Hasot, Anklesvar, Amod, Dabhoi and Versova.

Goddard took up his task in right earnest. He communicated to Fateh Sing the proposals of the English, but it appeared he took no notice of them. Fateh Sing only expressed

in general terms his intention to maintain the alliance subsisting between them.¹¹ But his covert hostility towards the English could not long be concealed. While he was professing amity, he was in haste in strengthening his army.¹² Goddard became suspicious when he learnt the activities of the Gaikwad. He crossed the Tapti on 1 January, 1780, and halted for three days on the north side of it to put every thing in proper order.¹³ In order to force Fateh Sing to terms, Goddard crossed the Nerbada at Bawapir Ghat on 15 January,¹⁴ and arrived before Dabhoi on the 18th. While Goddard was marching forward, the English agents at Surat and Broach took possession of Olpad, Anklesvar, Hasot, Amod and Dasborah in the name of the Company.¹⁵

Dabhoi was held by Balaji Raghunath on behalf of the Poona Government with a garrison of 2,000 men. Goddard called upon him to surrender the place which he refused. Goddard made the necessary preparations for besieging it by placing a battery of three 18 pounders within 200 yards of the wall of the fort. The garrison evacuated the town and the English took possession of it. Goddard congratulated the Bombay Government upon the acquisition of Dabhoi with the following words, "the possession of it must confer stability and security upon your territories on this side, and in the event of an accommodation with Futtu Sing, from its vicinity to Brodera, prove a check and restraint upon his future conduct."¹⁶

The fall of Dabhoi shook the resolution of Fateh Sing. An interview between him and Goddard on 26 January, 1780, near the village of Candeela in the district of Dabhoi ended in the conclusion of an agreement.¹⁷ The treaty contained twelve articles.¹⁸ The English and Fateh Sing agreed to a league of defensive alliance and to 'protect each other against all foreign enemies whatever' (Art. 1). The Poona Government was to be excluded from all share of territory in the province of Gujarat (Art. 2). The English agreed to 'support and defend' Fateh Sing in possession of his share of the Gujarat province; Fateh Sing was also to give reciprocal assistance to the English in possessing themselves of and keeping the share held by the

Poona Government (Art. 3). Fateh Sing was to furnish the English with 3,000 horse (Art. 4). Ahmedabad and its dependencies, that is, the country to the north of the river Mahi, possessed by the Poona Government, were to be allotted to Fateh Sing, in lieu of which the English were to be put in possession of the Gaikwad division of the country south of the Tapti, known by the name of Athavasi and the Gaikwad's share of the revenues of Surat (Art. 6). Fateh Sing was to be supported in withholding his annual tribute to the Poona Government till the conclusion of peace with the latter when his interests were to be taken care of (Art. 9). In consideration of the advantages arising to Fateh Sing from the 9th article, he agreed to cede to the English the district of Sinor and the villages situated in the Broach district (Art. 10). The 11th article runs as follows: "All the countries and places made over to the English in this treaty by Fattesing are to be delivered into their hands, and the collections accounted for to them from the day that Fattesing is put in possession of the city of Ahmadabad; and no demand and collection for any past time is to be made in them by Fattesing."¹⁹ Thus, the English alliance with Fateh Sing was of momentous significance, 'a most favourable and fortunate circumstance at the commencement of the war'.²⁰ Its influence on the Maratha chiefs would be disheartening. From every point of view, it promised 'permanent and great advantages.' The treaty also gave the English an opportunity to become 'masters of one connected and compact track of country' which, together with the places already acquired from the Maratha Government, would yield an annual revenue of 30 lakhs.²¹

Goddard, reinforced by Fateh Sing's cavalry, arrived on the 10th February, 1780, before Ahmedabad, which he found garrisoned with 6,000 Arabs and Sindhi foot and 2,000 horse. After some fruitless negotiations with the Maratha Governor, Ragho Pandit Tatya, Goddard besieged the place. The batteries were opened on the 12th and continued to play till the evening of the 13th. As a breach was considered practicable, he formed the intention of storming the place the next morning. But the storming of a place would bring in its train a dreadful sla-

ghter. 'From motives of humanity and compassion,' Goddard, therefore, postponed the attack for a day in the hope that the Marathas might be induced to surrender the place upon terms. His hopes, however, were not fulfilled ; the Marathas remained unshaken in their resolution to defend the place. On the morning of the 15th Goddard gave orders for the assault. The Europeans and Sepoy grenadiers, led by Hartley, took the place by storm after a vigorous resistance from the Arabs.²² Hartley behaved upon the occasion with great gallantry and good conduct.²³ About three hundred of the garrison of Ahmedabad fell while the English loss amounted to a little over hundred in killed and wounded. On the 28th Goddard put Fateh Sing in possession of the city and received from him grants for the several districts ceded by him to the Company.²⁴ Goddard obtained from Fateh Sing a relaxation in the tribute usually collected by the Marathas from the Nawab of Cambay. He also secured for the Company the privilege of having a factory at Ahmedabad. The establishment of an English factory at Ahmedabad, he wrote to the Bombay Council on 7 March, "cannot fail to produce great commercial advantages, as there is no doubt but most of the trade will soon pass through our hands from the influence we should possess in the place."²⁵ Goddard wanted to place Malet as Resident at the Gaikwad Durbar. The Bombay Government was opposed to this especially when Fateh Sing was actually in the field as an 'auxiliary in the war.'²⁶ They, however, agreed that Malet might be employed on 'any occasional business' with Fateh Sing.

Hornby and other Councillors were anxious to cultivate the friendship or neutrality of Haidar Ali for safeguarding the Company's commerce in the Malabar Coast. The war with the Marathas made it almost imperative for them to secure the alliance of Haidar Ali. The Bombay Government had already received encouragement from Haidar Ali in regard to this point and the attempt seemed to be worth making.²⁷ They appointed Horsley for this business to Haidar's Court. It is recorded in the consultation of 21 February, 1780 :

"The war in which we are now actually engaged with the Marathas, renders it of the utmost importance to secure

MILITARY

this Prince (Haidar Ali) during the
 it; and if possible to engage him to
 the friendship of is by an attack on their dominions,
 -continuance of only prove a powerful diversion in
 -co-operate with Goddard's operations in Gujarat,... but
 which would not en the fairest prospect to an Hon'ble
 -favour of General peace; at the same time by pro-
 would likewise of views against the Marathas who have
 and advantageous it object of his jealousy, we might pro-
 moting Haidar's from all future connection with the
 ever been the great him to our interest."²⁸
 bably detach him Pondicherry and Mahe had already con-
 French and unite cided enmity towards the English. He
 But the capture of gent to the Fort St. George Govern-
 -verted Haidar to a deake vengeance for it in the Carnatic.'²⁹
 -declared through his a 14 March Haidar was at Seringapatam
 ment that 'he would t a French army.³⁰ Srinivas Rao, in
 It was reported that on r's instructions, was employed in mus-
 -awaiting the arrival of r issued orders that only a small number
 -accordance with Haida left in different stations and that all
 -tering the army. Haida with him.³¹
 -of troops should be the capture of Ahmedabad gave the
 the rest be assembled w Sindhia and Holkar hurriedly forded
 In the meantime, ed to the neighbourhood of Baroda.
 Marathas a good jolt. heavy artillery and stores to Cambay,³²
 the Narbada and proce on the 8th March reached the vicinity
 -Goddard sent off the of Sindhia and Holkar were encamped
 -crossed the Mahi and but 14 miles distant from the English
 -of Baroda. The forces led to attack them, but was prevented
 near Tecu Tallow, abe er reporting that Sindhia and Holkar
 -camp. Goddard intend cable terms with the English.³³ The
 by a letter from Farn their friendly inclinations by releasing
 wished to be on am who were left as hostages with Mahadji
 Maratha chiefs evinced lence of the stipulations of the Conven-
 Farmer and Stewart, v his act of kindness was followed by
 Sindhia for the perform Shabaji, Sindhia's agent, to Goddard's
 tion of Wadgaon.³⁴ Goddard that Sindhia's enmity to Nana
 the arrival of Abaji that which the English bore against him.
 -camp. He declared to
 Farnavis was equal to

He wished to know whether the designs of the English were friendly or hostile towards the Peshwa and Mahadji Sindhia. He requested Goddard to make such proposals to Sindhia as might be conducive to the interests of both parties.

Goddard's previous negotiations with the Maratha agents made him circumspect and wary and he did not like to be seduced by the 'shining advantages' of this proffered alliance. But considering that an alliance with Sindhia would be of infinite benefit to the English at this critical juncture, Goddard gave him every encouragement to unite himself with the English. To expedite the matter Goddard sent off the agent to Sindhia.³⁵ The answer from Sindhia and Holkar which the agent delivered to Goddard on 12 March contained only general professions of friendly sentiments and a request to send a confidential person to their camp with whom they might come to a final settlement. Goddard could hardly be expected to accept this request when he considered that deputing a person to Sindhia would 'carry the appearance of being too eager in making overtures which might be construed in an unfavourable light.'³⁶ Goddard, therefore, decided not to spin out the negotiations and allowed Sindhia three days from the time his agent quitted the English camp, to offer his proposals. The expected proposals on the part of Mahadji Sindhia were at length made on the 16th March³⁷ in the following terms :

"That, formerly when Ragoba was at Talegaon, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered betwixt him and Sindhia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, wherein the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansie, where he should receive an allowance from the Peshwa's revenue of twelve lakhs of rupees per annum ; that the *sicca* should continue to be struck in the name of the young Peshwa Madhavrav Narayan, and that Bajirav, the son of Ragoba, should be appointed his Divan, but that as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it

should be left entirely to Sindhia, by which means the sole control and direction of the Government would come into his hands. This plan Sindhia proposed should now be pursued, that Ragoba should immediately go himself to Jhansie, and young Bajirav accompany him to Poona in order to fix the administration in the manner above-mentioned."³⁸

It appeared that Sindhia's intention was, by this manoeuvre, to get possession of Raghunath Rao and his son, and by that means to aggrandise himself in the state without offering corresponding advantages to the English.³⁹ Abaji, on delivering the proposal, was dismissed with an assurance that the English would, by no means, be induced to put any restraint upon Raghunath Rao nor risk the safety of his son. The enmity of Sindhia was made apparent when it was discovered that he had been carrying on secret correspondence with Govind Rao, a refractory brother of Fatch Sing, whom he not only promised the possession of Gaikwad territory, but even received in his own camp.⁴⁰

Sindhia's hostile attitude converted Goddard to another view. A war was the only alternative left to him to bring Sindhia into submission. He put the army in motion, and advanced to a place called Pilloull, about eight miles to the east of Baroda. Sindhia, unencumbered with any sort of baggage, took post at the distance of about twelve miles.⁴¹ He threw out some of his troops in different bodies to patrol for guarding against any possibility of surprise English attack.

On the 27th March, Goddard changed his ground on account of scarcity of water and marched to a village called Camloul, about five miles distant from his former encampment. On his approach he found a large part of the Maratha horse collected in the neighbourhood of that village ; but after a slight cannonade, they retired with the loss of some men and horses.⁴² For a week there was no action ; the two armies lay motionless watching each other. The Marathas occupied a post only about six miles distant from the English camp. Goddard found it difficult to attack them with all the advantage he could have wished. The artillery, bazaar, baggage and every thing that

could prove any impediment to his movements. Sindhu had sent off eight miles in the rear : the whole army was dispersed at convenient distances, and the horses were "budded" alert and ready to move off upon the smallest alarm."

Goddard meditated a surprise attack upon Sindhu's army, the only expedient by which he could bring the wily Maratha to action. He marched for that purpose at two o'clock in the morning of the 3rd April, with a part of the army, leaving the remainder in the camp under Eartley. The force he took with him consisted of 200 Europeans, ten companies of Company Sepoys, two battalions of Bengali and one of Bombay Sepoys, with two twelve and ten six pounder pieces of artillery, and the regiment of Mogul Cavalry and the Kandahar horse. He divided the whole detachment into two lines : the rear was commanded by Major Hopkins and Colonel Baillie and Major Forbes were posted to the front line.

upon the English troops as they advanced, retreated to a distance of about seven miles. Owing to the season of the year and the ravages committed by the Marathas, the country for near twenty miles round Goddard's camp was an entire desert. "It was not possible to find any grass for the subsistence of the cattle within that space ; even the leaves of such trees as might have nourished them had been mostly stripped off."⁴⁸ Goddard on the 22nd April sent a party of his men under Captain Campbell in search of provisions. They were attacked about twelve miles from Goddard's camp by Sindhia and Holkar with 20,000 of their best horse. But a smart artillery action of the two Grenadier Companies threw the Marathas into a good deal of confusion, and they soon fled with considerable loss. A near relation of Tukoji Holkar was killed in the action. The party having completed their forage halted at a village called Sihoully and reached safely in Goddard's camp.

Despite these successes the will-o'-the-wisp tactics of the Marathas annoyed Goddard. They rallied as fast as they retreated, and by ruining the country which they could not defend, made the English conquests useless to them.⁴⁹ Goddard left the place and moved back to within ten miles of Baroda. He had no intention to penetrate into the Malwa province in order to 'pursue and punish a flying enemy'. It would expose the troops to unnecessary difficulties and dangers and the Company's newly acquired possessions in Gujarat to the depredations of the Marathas.

Goddard received a pressing application from the Bombay Government to attack Bassein and occupy it.⁵⁰ In a letter to Goddard, dated 30 April, 1780, they wrote :

"The possession of Bassein, considered in every point of view, is an object of so much importance to the Company, that we cannot help expressing our anxiety at the probability there appears of this season clapsing, and Bassein still unsubdued. The danger of such a fortification so contiguous to our possessions, remaining in the hands of the enemy at this time of an English war, and the advantage and security the acquisition of it would give to this Presidency, makes us very earnest in our wishes not to leave the

reduction of this place to the hazard of future accident or circumstances ; nor can we think that any other object can claim a preference to your attention, or bring the campaign to a more honourable and advantageous conclusion".⁵¹

Goddard could not with propriety quit Gujarat and leave Fateh Sing to the fury of the Poona Government even for the sake of conquering Bassein. Recent acquisitions in Gujarat, Goddard apprehended, would be imperilled by the withdrawal of English forces and would open before the Marathas 'a certain road to success'.⁵² The enterprise against Bassein should be deferred till the end of the monsoon when it would not only be practicable but easy to undertake the siege.⁵³ At the urgent request of the Bombay Council, Goddard, however, sent back the Bombay detachment under Hartley on 3 May.

On the 9th May, Goddard marched to Carwan on the road to Bawapir Ghat, where he got news that Sindhia with his army had advanced upon the banks of the Dahder river. Goddard accordingly marched back to the Dahder river to offer opposition to Sindhia. But on the 11th, Sindhia retreated to his former encampment in the neighbourhood of Wagoneas, about 16 miles to eastward of Dabhoi. On the 16th Goddard arrived at Bawapir Ghat on the Narbada and found 'the situation exceedingly convenient both on account of the refreshment the troops and cattle derived from the vicinity of the river, and the opportunity of receiving supplies of grain from Broach'.⁵⁴ A body of about six thousand horse, under the command of Bhagirati Sindhia and Paraji Pant, two principal Maratha officers, had advanced upon the banks of the Narbada within six or seven miles of Sinor where Goddard had previously stationed Forbes with two battalions of sepoy for its defence and protection. Forbes on the 22nd instant surprised the camp of the Marathas and captured several horses and some provisions.

On the 17th, Goddard detached Lieutenant Welsh with the regiment of cavalry and the 7th Battalion of sepoy towards Surat, in order to drive Ganesh Pant who had overrun and destroyed the districts of Surat Athavasi. Welsh made a

surprise night attack with his cavalry only and Ganesh Pant, receiving three wounds, fled away, leaving everything to the victors. About a hundred Marathas were killed and nearly twenty wounded.⁵⁵

On 5 June, Welsh reduced Parneyra, a fort situated upon a high hill, about sixty miles from Surat. It was defended for two days by a garrison consisting of about 400 men ; but afterwards they surrendered the place into the hands of the English. Lieutenant Welsh also conquered two inferior forts, called Arzen Ghur and Under Ghur, about twelve miles from Parneyra. These two forts were believed to be constructed by the Marathas to serve as a check upon the encroachments of the Portuguese, whose settlement at Daman lay at the distance of four or five miles from them.⁵⁶

The monsoon put a stop to hostilities. On the 8th June, Goddard entered Surat. He had so far captured Sanewar and twentyeight other parganas of Surat, besides Broach and Jambusar which he held from before. These acquisitions put the English in entire possession of the seacoast from Cambay to Daman, covering a tract of nearly 150 miles. Bassein only remained to complete the conquest of the entire territory to the north of Bombay.

The theatre of war was, however, not confined to the Gujarat area. Simultaneously with Goddard's operations, the Bombay Government made a bid to occupy the village of Culva and Belapur Fort.⁵⁷ The possession of these places, it was hoped, would give them entire command of the Maratha shore from Thana to Belapur, a space of about 12 miles. On 12 April, 1780, Captain Campbell's detachment took possession of Parsik fort.⁵⁸ the people having made no resistance or fired a shot from the fort. An attempt upon Belapur (near the extremity of Karanja) and Panvel was also successful on the 12th and 13th April.⁵⁹ The possession of Belapur and Parsik secured the English supplies of provisions.⁶⁰ But the principal acquisition was the town of Kalyan in the middle of May.

The Marathas set a high value upon Kalyan and with 2,000 horse and foot tried to recover it.⁶¹ Having encamped within a short distance of Kalyan the Marathas stood in expect-

ing Thomas Fyfe, seven Europeans and fifteen sepoy. They forced Fyfe to write to the Commanding officer at Kalyan, Richard Campbell, demanding the surrender of the place. The Marathas also threatened to kill every one of the prisoners and storm Kalyan and Belapur if their demand was not complied with.⁶² In view of this danger, the Bombay Government reinforced Kalyan with 300 men and two field pieces under Major Westphal. On the 13th, the Marathas kept up a constant fire from 8 o'clock till one without doing any other mischief to the English army than killing one European and wounding a sepoy. They renewed the attack on the 14th morning, and continued it till two, when they were obliged to retire. Four sepoy and one Jamdar were killed and among the wounded were ten sepoy.⁶³ The timely arrival of Hartley with reinforcement saved the situation. He surprised the Maratha camp on 24th May, but could not capture their guns on account of the want of good cattle and drivers.⁶⁴ Reports from Poona contained the same account: "Baji Pandit (next) besieged Kalyan which was occupied by a party of the English. The latter were about to surrender when they received a reinforcement from Bombay. This saved the situation and Baji Pandit retired to his camp at a distance of one *kos* from Kalyan."⁶⁵

The occupation of these places was expected to inspire terror in the hearts of the Marathas. Contrary to this expectation they showed no signs of wearing out. Horsley said: "At present I fear peace is hardly to be had on any, and overtures from us would not I believe render it more practicable."⁶⁶ Indeed, Horsley affirmed that the only means of effecting the peace was to act with vigour with definite objects in view and to remain 'strictly confined to them.'

The striking success of the English arms did not encourage Hastings to make fresh exertions. Instead of forming new schemes of conquest, he communicated to Goddard on 24th March, 1780, the different plans devised for securing peace with the Marathas.⁶⁷ Firstly, English acquisitions were to be confirmed and the independence of Fateh Sing and the Rana of Gohad was to be guaranteed. Secondly, Raghunath Rao was to be given provision and an asylum but not in English territories.

Thirdly, the French were to be excluded from the Maratha dominions and the English should get an indemnity for the charges of the war. Fourthly, the English might be induced to surrender a part of their acquisitions only on getting an equivalent. Hastings would be glad if peace could be secured on these terms. He wrote to Goddard: "It is a matter of little moment in your present situation whether the Marathas sue for peace or you at the head of a victorious army, offer it."⁶⁸ If peace could not be secured on these terms, Hastings would like to revive the project of installing Mudaji in the sovereignty of the Maratha *Raj*. It had been his previous design and he would have adopted it in preference to any other, had not the prejudices of the Directors in London stood in the way. The prosecution of the war against the Marathas was to be the 'last resource' left in case the Marathas or Mudaji refused to treat with the English.

The Calcutta Council also on 20 April instructed Goddard to secure 'an honourable and advantageous peace' with the Marathas, the accomplishment of which they should regard as more important than 'the most splendid operations in the field.'⁶⁹ They further authorised Goddard to accept any proposals from the Marathas, conformable to their former instructions, and even to make overtures for peace on such conditions, if he should have grounds to believe that they would be immediately accepted.

But Goddard did not think it expedient to make any overtures to the Poona Government for peace, till Bassein was secured and the English were in control of the Ghats. The possession of these places, from their vicinity to Poona, he believed, would excite 'terror' and create 'a serious inclination in the Marathas to accommodate the present difference, and upon terms of honour and benefit to the Company.'⁷⁰ Goddard also suggested to the Supreme Council the expediency of making a powerful diversion on both sides of Malwa. As Sindhia had retired to Ujjain, this would prevent him from crossing to the southward of the Narbada to succour Nana Farnavis, and then the Poona Government would be compelled to come

to terms. In a private letter to Warren Hastings, Goddard wrote on 20 June, 1780 :

"I am convinced my dear Sir, that one bold push will now bring (the war) to a successful and glorious end, the stake for which we are now contending is great, the prize seems to be certain, the risk in proportion little... I proposed to the Board to begin the campaign and seize the earliest opportunity of doing so by the siege of Bassein and to continue my operations towards the Deccan from that quarter, while a powerful diversion on the northern Maratta provinces should prevent any forces from coming to the Ministers' assistance, and in particular, should detain Sindia and Holkar at Ugein, by which means I was persuaded I should find the Ministers troops an easy conquest, and what was of no small importance at this time, our new acquisitions would not be molested by any considerable body of the enemy."⁷¹

The treaty between the English and the Rana of Gohad has already been described. Although Eyre Coote was reluctant, Captain Popham with a detachment of 2,400 men, four field pieces, one howitzer and two squadrons of horse was sent to the assistance of the Rana. Coote deemed the whole force as inadequate and believed that this small detachment would be of little help in bringing the Maratha war to conclusion. He wrote, "If an offensive and decided war is to be carried on with the Marathas, a more general and extensive scale of action should be pursued."⁷²

Captain Popham crossed the Jumna in the month of February, 1780. At the request of the Rana he attacked the fort of Lahar, situated fifty miles west of Kalpi. Though the walls of the fort were made of mud, it required a battering train to demolish them on account of the vigorous resistance which the English met from the defenders. Popham had none.⁷³ But to avoid the disgrace of a repulse, he was compelled to assault it under every disadvantage. He mined the wall in two places, one of which was countermined by the garrison; the other, however, had its effect and made a breach partly practicable. The storming party under Captain Maclary immediately

advanced, attacked and carried it after an 'obstinate resistance' on 28 April.⁷⁴ Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner who led the attack with great intrepidity were killed.⁷⁵ On the morning of the 29th, small parties of the Marathas appeared in the rear of the English encampment.⁷⁶ Captain Mayaffre was sent with 250 men and a gun to oppose them. He advanced by firing as fast as he could, till at length the whole Maratha army retired from the field. In this action the Marathas had twelve or fifteen men killed and thirty wounded ; the English had one Sepoy killed and a trooper wounded. Popham believed that the English force could have routed the Marathas had the Rana's cavalry exhibited 'a spark of spirit.' The Rana's army was found to be unreliable for a joint action. Popham exclaimed, "Alas! nothing nothing like animation appears amongst them, till the enemy is dispersed, and then it is only conspicuous in plundering." Hastings congratulated Popham upon the capture of Lahar in the following words :

"I for my own part consider every occasion of this kind as in itself of advantages, independent of its substantial effects, and as even necessary to the retrieval of the disgraces which the British name has suffered from the fate of the expedition undertaken last year from Bombay. I sincerely applaud your judgment in ordering the storm notwithstanding the hazards which must have been foreseen as its attendants. It was a desperate service, but a retreat would have been fatal to our reputation and influence and perhaps worse."⁷⁷

Captain Popham, after the capture of Lahar, encamped within ten miles of the fort of Gwalior, then in possession of Mahadji Sindhia. In the month of May, 1780, Hastings asked Popham to capture Gwalior, one of the 'Capital fortresses' of the Marathas and 'the first in Indostan.' Hastings knew that this fort had the reputation of being impregnable from the insurmountable steeps which surrounded it. But the letter which he wrote to Popham on 18 May, is pregnant with suggestions :

"Many such fortified heights we have known in the Carnatic, which were deemed as inaccessible and yet were

successfully attempted. Among many other instances I recollect Gingee and Malwagal as remarkable examples.⁷⁸

The value which the English set upon the possession of Gwalior exercised an irresistible fascination on them. This would not only open the way to Sindhia's country but would also raise the prestige of the Company's arms. But the fortress was found to be too strong and well-guarded for surprise, the garrison too numerous for an open assault.⁷⁹ Popham's spies were employed in searching for any vantage point for escalading. They brought the advice that one part only bore the appearance of practicability. The part that the spies proposed for ascent was where the scarp was about sixteen feet high ; from thence to the wall there was a steep ascent of about forty yards, and the wall to be escaladed was about thirty feet in height.

Lieutenant Cameron, the field engineer, having prepared ladders and other requisites for scaling, Popham on the midnight of 3rd August ordered Captain Bruce to lead the party of two companies of Grenadiers and light infantry. Popham put himself at the head of two battalions, which were immediately to follow the storming party. Captain Maclary with one battalion, cavalry and two guns received order to march at two o'clock in order to cover the retreat of the English in case of failure or to prevent the escape of Ambaji, his troops or baggage in case of success. At 11 o'clock the whole detachment marched from the camp at Reypore, 10 miles from Gwalior, and reached it a little before day break. Wooden ladders were placed against the rock. Lieutenant Cameron next mounted and tied a rope ladder to the battlements of the wall. When all was ready, Captain Bruce with twenty Sepoy Grenadiers, ascended without being discovered, and squatted down under the parapet. But before any reinforcement arrived, three of the Grenadiers accidentally fired on some Maratha troops who happened to be lying asleep near them. The garrison was alarmed, the small party of Grenadiers kept up a 'warm fire' on them until Popham with a reinforcement came to their aid. There was little or no defence at all,⁸⁰ and the Maratha troops retreated precipitately. By sun-rise or a little

later the English became 'masters of the strongest hold in India.'⁶¹ Ambaji who talked of storming the English camp was among the foremost to desert the fort.⁶² On the English side twenty men were wounded, and none killed. On the side of the Marathas Bapoji, the Governor, was killed and many of the principal officers wounded.⁶³ The Rana of Gohad did not assist the English in this undertaking.⁶⁴

Hastings considered the capture of Gwalior as one of the best concerted and most gallant enterprises that had ever been performed in India. He wrote in exultation to Laurence Sullivan on 27 August, 1780 :

"The name of Guallior has been long famous in history. In this country its effect is not to be described. Other congratulations which I have received on the many important successes of our arms were but coldly offered, but scarcely a man mentions this without enthusiasm. The advantages which will result from it are obvious. It is the key of Indostan. It will entirely exclude the Mahrattas from that part of the country, and opinion, which in every region of the world has considerable influence on public affairs, and in so much as in this, will raise the credit of the English arms and strength beyond the effect of anything which has yet been achieved by them. That the consequence may be peace is my firm opinion."⁶⁵

Meanwhile, acrimonious debates began to rage in the Calcutta Council over the conduct of the Maratha War. The very existence of the British Empire in India, Hastings maintained, depended on the speedy and successful termination of the Maratha War. He had no power of carrying it with vigour, for 'Francis was openly hostile, Wheler his echo, Coote unreliable and Barwell fixed in his determination to depart.'⁶⁶ To Horsley, Francis asserted that nothing could save the Company from ruin but 'putting a stop to this pernicious war.'⁶⁷ The Maratha War, Francis continued, had produced nothing but loss of men, loss of honour, an unexampled waste of treasure and an unprofitable strain to the resources of the English. His efforts to prevent this mischief had been steady, indefatigable

On the 12th June, Hastings moved the Board to unite Popham's corps with Camac's and to allow them to march against the country dependent on Mahadji Sindhia. He entreated the Board to give him their support in the prosecution of the plan. His appeal to the members of the Board had a ring of solemnity :

"If they have from its commencement averse to the war, let them join with me in prosecuting it with vigour to its speedy termination. If they consider themselves as free from the responsibility of it, let them allow me to acquit myself of mine. I wish I could venture my life upon the consequences."⁹⁴

Francis and Wheler entered a joint minute against the motion and it was rejected.⁹⁵ They opposed it on the ground of expense—the expense of a detachment of only two thousand draughts under Popham swelling to more than ninety-one thousand rupees a month. Before the motion was debated in the Council on 12 June, Hastings had sent Camac to Wheler to give him prior information. He did so but Wheler received it with 'great agitation' and doubted Francis' assent. Hastings also sounded Francis, met him and had a long discussion of all the motives, objects and probable consequences of his plan. Francis heard these 'with the cool attention of a man already informed'⁹⁶ and made his objection ; Hastings left him.

Hastings drew up instructions for Camac, empowering him to proceed on the proposed expedition with his four battalions, and submitted these to the Board on 19th June.⁹⁷ Wheler proved recalcitrant and the motion was overruled.⁹⁸ He and Francis pleaded the low state of the Bengal treasury and their inability to meet the expense of a new expedition. But Hastings proposed to bear the expenses of the expedition. A messenger from Chait Sing, Raja of Banaras, had come with a 'peace offering' of two lakhs for Hastings. He at first refused to accept the money, and the man was on the point of returning when these debates in the Council began. Hastings at once took hold of the bait, accepted it and proposed to convert it to the purpose of the expedition. In a minute dated 26 June, he reminded Francis of his engagements and offered the sum of

two lakhs for the expense of Camac's detachment.⁹⁹ He wrote : "This circumstance will show how nearly I had the project of the expedition at heart, and with what eagerness and solicitude I pursued it."¹⁰⁰ The irreparable breach between Hastings and Francis in regard to their sentiments on the Maratha War and other points could not be bridged. Hastings was constrained to admit that he had tried in vain to 'accommodate them by a studied attention to his opinions in every measure in the course of the last fifteen months.'¹⁰¹ He wanted the support of his colleagues in the conduct of the Maratha War and recorded his point of view as follows :

"The part which this Government has hitherto borne in the war is mine, and has been made exclusively mine, the other members having repeatedly disclaimed their share in the responsibility attending it. It is hard that while they load me with the weight of such a charge, they should bind my hands and deny me the means of supporting it."¹⁰²

Francis and Wheler refused to sanction the measure until they were informed fully of Hastings' plan. They adhered to their opinion that the rainy season was a great obstacle to the march of the troops and said that those who had not seen the rains of India could have no idea of their violence.¹⁰³ Hastings received the minute on the 28th June while sitting at dinner. It perplexed him. He now saw in 'broad daylight the delusion of Francis' promises.'¹⁰⁴ It appeared to Hastings that Francis had 'deceived' him. He debated within himself and determined to 'expose his perfidy.'¹⁰⁵ He drew up 'a very strong but deliberate and temperate charge'¹⁰⁶ to present to the Council meeting on 3 July.

John Day, who had been the instrument of reconciliation, now intervened to prevent a complete rupture. Francis proposed that Hastings should suspend Camac's expedition till the receipt of advice from England. That advice, which he expected to receive in two months, was to decide whether Hastings was to remain in the Government or not ; after the expiry of that period he promised to allow Hastings to take any measures he might choose. Hastings rejected this proposition as it would

mean the dissolution of the agreement. Day impressed upon Francis the necessity of maintaining harmony, pointing out the bad effect it would have in the 'eyes of the world' if a rupture should take place between them. A solution was found at last. Francis wanted to absent himself from the Council meeting so that Hastings could propose and carry any resolution by his casting voice. The reason of this move was that Francis did not like to be 'concerned in acts to which he could not consistently assent.'¹⁰⁷ The minutes were accordingly withdrawn. Hastings renewed his motion for Camac's instructions and Francis being absent, it passed without any objection.¹⁰⁸

A few days later Francis expressed his astonishment at the withdrawal of the minutes. He declared that he had consented to withdraw the minutes on 'the express and only condition' that Camac's operations should be confined to the province of Gohad.¹⁰⁹ Day remarked that no such condition was either expressed or implied. The minutes were accordingly replaced and Hastings entered his minute which had been intended for the meeting of the 3rd July. Before laying it on the Council meetings, Hastings sent it to Francis on the evening of the 14 August. In it Hastings charged Francis with playing a 'faithless part' against him and alleged that his sole purpose was to defeat every measure which might tend to promote public interests. Hastings declared, "I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his private which I have found to be void of truth and honour."¹¹⁰

This was a severe charge and according to the convention of the day a duel took place between Hastings and Francis on the 17th August in which the latter was wounded.

On the 11th September 1780, Francis attended the Council meeting and declared, "I never was a party to the engagement stated by Mr. Hastings, or had a thought of being bound by it."¹¹¹ He alleged that the plan of another expedition from the upper country into Malwa or any other part of the Maratha dominions had not been suggested to him. With respect to the Maratha War, he had only agreed to prosecute the operations actually proceeding on the Malabar Coast.¹¹²

Francis was a broken man after the duel. He had struggled hard, though ineffectually, to tame the bold foreign policy of Hastings. Utter disappointment and despair dwelled in his mind when he wrote : "We are in the hands of Fortune, or something worse ; that is, our condition, as I think, is beyond the reach of human prudence. In short, Sir, I seriously think we are on the eve of some great calamity, in the consequences of which both the guilty and the innocent will probably be involved together."¹¹³ Francis expected advices from England whether Hastings would remain in the Government. An Act having been passed in April for continuing the existing Government, Francis embarked for England in November. Before his departure, he wrote to Collings on 2 November :

"I wait for the moment of my departure, as if a mountain was then to be removed from off my breast. Be assured the House is on fire. No consideration could make me stay another year with Hastings. Bengal is not tenable for me, in that Company ! nor could I do any good."¹¹⁴

Thus the stormy scenes in the Council Chamber appeared to be closed with Francis' departure. Hastings could now be able to fulfil his cherished hope and expectation of his friends to restore the Bengal Government to that 'firmness and vigour which it possessed in 1774.'¹¹⁵

The early months of 1780 brought happy news to Hastings. Goddard's singular successes against the Marathas and Popham's capture of the impregnable Gwalior fort were brilliant episodes in the military annals of the English in India. But soon afterwards bad tidings began to pour in. In the month of July, 1780, Haidar invaded the Carnatic. On 22 July, he plundered Conjeeveram.

"Every succeeding day brought in accounts of accumulating evils ; Porto Novo was plundered, and the amount of 4 or 5 lacks of pagodas were carried away from it in money and jewels ; the whole of the villages round Vellore and Amboor were burnt to ashes ; while the garrisons, instead of being able to afford assistance, tremble for their own safety. They were incapable of opposing these incursions, through a want of timely preparation ; even

the villages of Poonamalce were burnt and sacked in the presence of the only body of troops which we have assembled ; and we hear to-day, that the villages within the bounds of Cuddalore have shared the same fate."¹¹⁶

On the 23rd September, Hastings heard the loss of Colonel Bailie's detachment and Munro's precipitate flight from Haidar's army. The Calcutta Council met on 25 September and Hastings' minute on this occasion was remarkable for striking sincerity and grasp of realities. He said that the time had come when nothing could be accomplished either by long deliberation or the formal and tedious process of negotiation. The calamity which had befallen the English upon the coast, the alarming superiority which Haidar Ali had acquired in the Carnatic, the despondency of the Madras Government and the consternation and distrust which spread themselves among all those who were subject to its authority, made Hastings not a little frightful. The Madras Government was destitute of all means and resources and was unable to sustain the war with Haidar Ali for a long time. To crown all these misfortunes, information had been received of a great naval and military armament prepared by the Court of France to co-operate with Haidar Ali. Not being dismayed by all these distresses, Hastings demanded the immediate and powerful exertions of the Supreme Government to avert the evil portended by so many concurrent difficulties.¹¹⁷

Hastings possessed a certain strategic comprehension. He proposed to send a large detachment of European artillery and infantry to the relief of Fort St. George ; he also suggested that Eyre Coote should be solicited to go and take the command of the army on that establishment. The sum of fifteen lakhs should be sent to Fort St. George 'not for a civil supply, but for the sole use of the army.'¹¹⁸ Hastings also proposed to offer peace overtures to the Marathas on the following conditions.¹¹⁹ The English would restore all their conquests made against the Marathas since January, 1779, except those which, according to agreements, had been ceded to Fatch Sing and to the Rana of Gohad. If the fort of Bassein should have been in possession of the English at the time of the ratification of

the treaty, it was to remain in their hands ; the Marathas were to receive in exchange the territories of Olpad, Jambusar, Anklesvar, Chikhli, Variav and Amod. A provision should be made for the maintenance of Raghunath Rao, and he should be allowed to reside wherever he pleased, except Bombay. The 'Peshwa and rulers of the Maratha State' should form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Company, against Haidar Ali and the French. The territories conquered from Haidar Ali were to be shared between the parties. If the Peshwa would not agree to the proposed alliance, peace should nevertheless be proclaimed and a suspension of hostilities was to take place on both sides for one year. The treaty should be concluded on the mediation and with the guarantee of Mudaji Bhosle. A letter was written to Mudaji Bhosle to this effect :

"The needs of the time demand that the English and the Peshwa should immediately unite to check the growing power of Haidar Ali and the French in the Carnatic. To expedite the matter therefore two letters in the name of the Peshwa and Nana Farnavis are being sent to the Maharaja together with two copies of a treaty ready executed under the Company's seal. It is requested that the Maharaja, after signing them in the capacity of a guarantor may forward them to Poona for the Peshwa's ratification."¹²⁰

Hastings also informed the Peshwa, Mahadji Sindhia and Nana Farnavis of his desire to conclude an alliance on the above terms.¹²¹ The Peshwa was informed that to avoid the delay the Governor General had drawn up a solemn treaty executed under the seal of the Company, and had transmitted the same to Mudaji Bhosle for his signature in the capacity of a guarantor. When the latter had affixed his seal and signature the treaty should be forwarded to Poona for the Peshwa's ratification.¹²² Thus Hastings had to abandon his design of 'aggrandising the British name and enlarging the interests of the Company'¹²³ to save the Carnatic. It seemed to him that every other object should give place or be made subservient to the preservation of the Carnatic. To the Court of Directors, Hastings wrote on 19 November, 1780 :

"Peace with the Marathas was the first object. To conciliate the alliance and that of every other power in natural enmity with Haidar Ali Khan the next. Important measures were taken... to employ the government of Berar as the channel and instrument of accomplishing them."¹²⁴

Hastings had reasons to court the mediation of Mudaji Bhosle. Although Mudaji had joined in the anti-British confederacy and had sent an army of 35,000 cavalry under the command of his second son, Chimnaji Bhosle, to Bihar, he had always a soft corner for the English. He wanted to keep the private wire with the English open without breaking the older one with the Poona Government. The brunt of the Maratha-Mysore-Nizam league he was unable to resist; also he did not like to incur the enmity of the English by engaging in hostilities with them. Henceforth he secretly instructed Chimnaji to proceed at a very leisurely pace. The Berar army marched on the dussera of 1779, corresponding with the 7th October. The army took a different route and by 'varied deviations and studied delays' arrived at Cuttack in May, 1780.¹²⁵ They stopped just before the commencement of the rains in order to gain an interval of five months and to postpone their design against British territory. Naro Pandit, the Peshwa's *vakil* who was with the Bhosle's army, complained of their slow progress and suspected the Maharaja's officers to be the secret allies of the English.¹²⁶ Though within 'marauding distances' of the English border, the army remained at Cuttack 'as quiet as an herd of cattle.'¹²⁷

On receipt of the news of Haidar's invasion of Arcot, Hastings had determined to send overland to Madras a Company of European artillery and a body of six battalions of Native Infantry under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pearse. But it was agreed to postpone the march of the detachment because its route lay through the territories of Mudaji Bhosle, and it was to pass by the armies waiting at Cuttack under the command of Chimnaji. Besides this, the English had a political motive for deferring the march of the detachment. They were anxiously waiting for replies to 41

to Mudaji with offers of peace to the Maratha State. The precipitate march of the English detachment through the borders of Cuttack might prejudice the success of their negotiations with Berar Government. The long-expected answer from Mudaji Bhes'e arrived on the 9th January, 1781. Hastings observed that his answer "contained, as usual, liberal professions, but dictated in short language, mixed with reproach, in a manner which marked disappointment, and an opinion that our affairs were grown so desperate as to warrant the assumption of the tone of superiority."¹⁵¹ Mudaji entertained grave doubts whether the proposed treaty would be accepted by the Poona ministers. He suggested to Hastings that the treaty should provide for the mutual restitution of all conquests made on either side since the treaty of Purandhar.¹⁵² He refused to affix his seal to the treaty and despatched a copy of the same to the Governor-General with necessary amendments.¹⁵³

Mudaji's evasive reply did not affect the policy already decided upon by the Supreme Council. They ordered Colonel Pearce to march towards Madras avoiding, however, all hostilities with the Government of Cuttack or with the Berar army lying within that province.¹⁵⁴ To reconcile Mudaji to this measure and to prevent a rupture from the meeting of the two armies, it was agreed to depute David Anderson to Chimnaji, who commanded the army at Cuttack. Anderson was instructed to desire Chimnaji to move his troops from the line of the route which the English army would follow, lest their neighbourhood might lead to 'serious and alarming consequences'.¹⁵⁵

About this time Chimnaji had led his army to Dhenkanal. Anderson, therefore, on reaching Cuttack, missed him. He was ordered to return. At the request of Chimnaji, Anderson was a second time deputed to him. On the 25th March, he returned accompanied by Raja Ram Pandit, the Naib of Cuttack,¹⁵⁶ with whom an agreement, as a preliminary to a treaty of alliance with the superior Government of Nagpur, was concluded and executed in Council on 2 April. The terms were as follows¹⁵⁷ :

- (1) A body of 2,000 effective horse should be detached from the army at Cuttack and placed under the command of Colonel Pearce to assist the English in the

war against Haidar Ali. Their pay was fixed at one lakh per month.

- (2) A party of the Company's force should assist the Government of Berar in asserting its pretensions to the district of Garh-Mundela, a small territory lying on the banks of the Narbada and in the possession of the Peshwa.
- (3) A person should be deputed to Nagpur by the Supreme Council to treat on the proposed alliance.

It was resolved by the Supreme Council to offer Chimnaji 13 lakhs of rupees for paying the arrears of his army. It was also resolved that a loan of 10 lakhs, requested for the same purpose, should be granted to Chimnaji on Raja Ram's security. During the course of this transaction, the detachment under the command of Pearce proceeded quietly to Ganjam. Thus Hastings succeeded in converting 'an ostensible enemy into a declared friend', and in detaching the most formidable member of the confederacy. He saved Bengal at a moment, as Grant Duff puts it, "when, with thirty thousand horse, it is scarcely to be doubted that they might have pillaged Bengal and burnt the towns from Burdwan to Point Palmyras".¹³⁵ It was, of course, a questionable means by which Hastings detached the Bhosle from the confederacy. Hastings had no doubt that he would be censured by cavillers as they would ascribe his conduct in supplying Chimnaji with money to weakness or want of foresight. But the end justified the means. The military position of the Company, Hastings said, was strengthened by this alliance. The mere fame of an alliance between the English and the Government of Berar would have a great effect. The English should no longer be considered as sinking under the weight of every state in Hindostan, and the scale of power was evidently turned in their favour. Hastings concluded by saying : "This is of more importance than could be well imagined in Europe, where the policy of nations is regulated by principles the very reverse of those which prevail in Asia".¹³⁶

Meanwhile, during the rains of 1780, the Bombay Council resolved to bring the war to 'as speedy a conclusion as possible' by adopting 'the most resolute and decisive measures'.¹³⁷ Deci-

sions were taken after mature deliberations ; Goddard was to besiege Bassein and the English army to attack Konkan. The expedition into Konkan, the Bombay Government maintained was essential to the success of the war.¹³⁸ To carry on a plan like this into execution required a huge amount of money and the Bombay Government was destitute of this important resource. As Horsley puts it, "We have not a rupee in the treasury and by what means we are to raise money, I own I cannot tell you".¹³⁹ But this should not impede a plan so ingeniously devised by Hornby for putting an end to the Maratha War. It has been well observed by Hornby, "if our want of money is now great, it is likely to become much greater, unless relieved by our own efforts".¹⁴⁰ The Bombay Government looked to Bengal, the paymistress of all wars, for a supply of treasure.

It appeared that the design of an attack upon Bassein was urged upon by the Bombay Select Committee who, about the middle of September, received information from their Resident at Goa of the secret intrigues of the Portuguese Government with the Court of Poona.¹⁴¹ It was alleged that the Portuguese Government were making hasty preparations to forestall the English in getting possession of Bassein.

The severity of the weather did not permit Goddard to commence operations against Bassein until the 16th October. Even then, the army met with such difficulties and obstructions from the extreme badness of the roads and the numerous rivers, that they did not reach their ground before Bassein until the 13th November. Meanwhile Hartley, with the Bombay detachment, was instructed by the Bombay Government to act under Goddard's order and to cover the siege.¹⁴² Finding the place very strong and defended by a numerous artillery and garrisons under the command of Visaji Pant, Goddard determined to carry on his operations with regularity and precaution. On the 28th in the morning he completed a battery of six guns and six mortars within 900 yards of the place, and under cover of the fire, carried on his approaches to the spot where he erected the grand battery of nine 24 pounders. During the 9th and 10th in the morning the grand battery fired without intermission, and when a practicable breach was nearly completed the garrison

offered to surrender. After some hesitation on their part, during which the English 'kept up an exceeding hot fire both from the guns and mortars for about half an hour', the place surrendered on the 11th at discretion.¹⁴³ The garrison marched out and laid down their arms in front of the fort, and were escorted by a company of Sepoys out of the island. The news of the surrender of Bassein made Nana Farnavis alarmed and uneasy. He had sent two large guns, each requiring 50 yoke of oxen, with the intention of their being transported to Bassein. But the fall of Bassein obliged Nana to recall them.¹⁴⁴

In the meantime Hartley had been engaged with the Maratha troops in the neighbourhood of Kalyan and Borghat. On Hartley's corps fell the full fury of the Maratha attacks. He, however, on the 8th December, moved to Titvala in the direction of Bassein to prevent the Maratha force cutting him off from Goddard. On the 10th December, Ramchandra Ganesh made a desperate attempt to destroy Hartley's corps. Throughout the 10th and 11th, the Maratha force, numbering about 20,000,¹⁴⁵ with five guns attacked on the flanks and in the rear. On the 12th morning, taking advantage of a fog, Ramchandra Ganesh attempted to surprise Hartley's right flank. But 'the mist suddenly cleared away, the sun shone forth' and the English guns opened briskly. A chance shot killed Ramchandra Ganesh and this decided the battle.¹⁴⁶ The Marathas retreated hastily. Immediately on the surrender of Bassein, Goddard advanced to the relief of Hartley, and on the 13th the army was united.¹⁴⁷

The next operation was the reduction of Arnala, a small island-fort ten miles north of Bassein. On the 18th January, 1781, the Killedar of the fort surrendered the place.¹⁴⁸ The acquisition of Arnala strengthened the Bombay Government and 'completed the line of conquests from Gujarat to Bombay'. The Bombay Government observed, "It is however an acquisition of importance from its situation with respect of Bassein and our other possessions on the sea-coast."¹⁴⁹

The 'fatal disaster' in the Madras Presidency decided the Bombay Government to carry on the war in Western India with all possible vigour. It was therefore determined to threaten Poona rather than secure Konkan, and the army marched across

the Ghats. On the 8th February, the troops under the command of Colonel Parker stormed Borghat¹⁵⁰ and occupied Khandala. On the 10th February, 1781, Goddard wrote to the Supreme Council :

"I cannot but most sincerely congratulate you on this event, which secures to us so many and great advantages, in our future hostile operations, if compelled by the obstinacy of the enemy, to persist in them, whether we choose to do so upon an offensive or defensive plan ; but the circumstance that renders this success doubly valuable at present, is the effect I trust it will have in producing that disposition for peace in the minds of the Poona Government, which we have so long desired, and which is now become so much more, the necessary object of our wish"¹⁵¹

Goddard was, of course, not disillusioned in his expectations. An unauthorised agent from the Poona Government came to Goddard's camp on 12 February, and made specious offers of concluding a peace with the English. But it was apparent from the beginning that the peace talks had no chance of success. The agent related that the Marathas would hardly make peace on terms in which Haidar Ali, their ally, was not included. It was also alleged by the agent that the Poona Government had not received any peace proposals from Calcutta sent through Mudaji Bhosle. Goddard hastily despatched a copy of the proposals fixing a time limit of nine days for acceptance or refusal.¹⁵² With meticulous care Nana read the treaty and disdainfully rejected the terms of it. He sent a sharp rejoinder to Goddard and stated that if the English were serious in their professions of friendship, they should make a treaty in which the names of those persons allied to and connected with the Poona Sircar were to be included.¹⁵³ This letter confirmed the suspicion which Goddard had entertained that Nana was too closely leagued with Haidar to be induced to separate from him by any bait which the English could hold out for him. The late success of Haidar had buoyed up the Maratha minister with 'presumptuous hopes and encouragement' and Goddard believed that 'nothing but a check put to his career' could 'effect a change of sentiment or humble their expectation.'¹⁵⁴

The war, now resumed, was destined to be ruinous to the English. The ability with which Nana Farnavis directed the administration of Poona amidst these darkening days excited the admiration of all. He sent Parashuram Bhau to Konkan to cut the English lines of communication. Accompanied by Haripant Phadke and Tukoji Holkar, he himself proceeded to meet Goddard.

On the night of the 16th March, Parashuram Bhau with 12,000 troops made 'a bold and daring' attack at Chauk upon an English detachment of two regiments under Captain Mackay which was returning from Panvel with a convoy of stores.¹⁵⁵ The English loss was heavy, but with the assistance of a reinforcement sent by Goddard from Khopoli, Mackay succeeded in reaching the main army with his convoy.¹⁵⁶

The desultory warfare carried on against the Marathas and the unexpected check which the English had received from them convinced the Bombay Government of the futility of keeping a large force at the Ghats during the monsoon. This measure had not prevented the Marathas from sending reinforcements to Konkan, by which a large English convoy was exposed to danger. It was, therefore, recommended to Goddard to drop the idea of strengthening the Ghat and to employ the army in protecting Konkan during the remainder of the season.¹⁵⁷ The exigencies of the situation reduced the Bombay Government to the necessity of adopting a system of defence and of confining their military operations to the security and preservation of their own possessions.¹⁵⁸ The Bombay Government also decided to send back the Madras troops serving on the Malabar Coast.¹⁵⁹

It was a task of gigantic magnitude to carry back the English forces in the face of the harassing attacks of the Marathas. On the 28th March, three battalions of Sepoys and a large body of horse with ten guns under the command of Colonel Brown proceeded to Panvel to bring a supply of provisions to Goddard's army. A formidable Maratha force, numbering about 25,000 horse under Parashuram Bhau, intercepted and attacked the escort.¹⁶⁰ Fortunately for Brown, the Bombay Government sent a relief to his army and saved them from annihilation. It was with a great sacrifice of troops (106 killed and wounded in-

cluding five officers) that the convoy got back from Panvel after a three days' march.

Goddard was joined by Brown and they moved from the Ghat on the 19th April, at daybreak. Hari Pant, following the English army, succeeded in taking a considerable quantity of baggage and ammunition. Goddard's route lay through a 'country full of thick jungles, broken ground and narrow defiles',¹⁶¹ and the Marathas seized every opportunity to harass the English.¹⁶² The English encamped at Khalapur on the 20th April, and proceeded towards Chauk.¹⁶³ On the 21st, the Marathas attacked them 'by the discharge of artillery and rockets, and a very smart firing of musketry'.¹⁶⁴ 'After a very troublesome and fatiguing march', with the Maratha army numbering about 50,000 hovering round him, Goddard reached Panvel on 23 April after losing 466 killed and wounded, of whom eighteen were officers.¹⁶⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Parker of the Bengal Establishment received a mortal wound in his belly while commanding the rear guard. In fact, the military efforts of Goddard in March and April, 1781, were attended with disastrous results. The army remained at Panvel till the 20th May, employed in embarking the sick and wounded, stores and baggage, for Bombay and Kalyan. Afterwards, they marched to Kalyan where they cantoned for the monsoon. Goddard returned to Bombay.

About this time, news arrived to Goddard of the alarming state of the English on the Coromandel coast. The growing power of Haidar Ali overwhelmed the English so much that Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-Chief, made a pressing appeal to Goddard to patch up a peace with the Marathas and to create a diversion in Haidar's territory on the Malabar Coast.¹⁶⁶ 'An accommodation with the Marathas on any terms rather than prosecuting a destructive war', Eyre Coote observed, was the cure of all distress.¹⁶⁷ But Goddard believed that the only way of terminating the Maratha War was to ensure the success of the English arms in the Carnatic. Haidar's successes encouraged Nana Farnavis in his determined hostility towards the English and 'therefore no proposition for peace', Goddard wrote to Coote, 'could hitherto have succeeded nor will it I am persua-

ded be now attended to till you shall have given that favourable turn to the Company's affairs on this coast which report here confidently says you have already effected'.¹⁶⁸ The Bombay Government also wrote in the same strain on 26 April, and concluded by saying :

"We are convinced of the necessity, and sincerely desirous of bringing the Maratha War to a conclusion ; but it is not because we are desirous of peace ; or that peace is necessary to our affairs, that will prove arguments with the enemy for consenting to an accommodation."¹⁶⁹

The fertile mind of Hastings sought to discover the cause of the stubborn resistance of the Marathas ; he found it in Sindhia's adhesion to the Poona Government. It is hard to foretell what would have been the fate of Nana's astute diplomacy had it not been supported by the soldier-statesman Mahadji Sindhia. Hastings clearly diagnosed the situation : Sindhia must be crippled and in his own territory. He must not be allowed to come to the aid of the Poona Government. Despatched by Hastings, Lieutenant Colonel Camac arrived at Gohad and in collaboration with the Rana settled the plan of operations for the conquest of Malwa.¹⁷⁰ Camac was assured of the Rana's assistance.

Camac began his operations by an attack on the fort of Sipri, the possession of which was necessary to keep the channel of communication open with Gwalior.¹⁷¹ Sipri fell on 2nd February, 1781, without any resistance. Camac proceeded to Sironj and during his march the Marathas in large bodies continually harassed the English.¹⁷² They carried off the baggage of the English ; Camac attributed their success to the lack of English cavalry. He petitioned to Calcutta for a regiment of cavalry, pointing out that this requisition was of 'the utmost importance and indeed of absolute necessity.'¹⁷³

Camac reached Sironj on the 16th February. Provisions were running short, and Camac decided to stay at Sironj. Mahadji Sindhia marched upto this place and surrounded the English army. Camac had hoped that Sironj would supply the English with adequate provisions. But a few days sufficed to dispel his optimism. With Sindhia's army hemming the

English on all sides, Sironj could not supply provisions. Camac sent an urgent appeal to Colonel Muir in the following terms :

"We are now arrived to the greatest distress for provisions and I must conjure your immediate and expedite advance towards us. You must not delay a moment, or I do not know what we shall do for sustenance, this place not being able to afford us a Chittack more."¹⁷²

Sindhia's guns opened fire and the booming continued for a week.¹⁷⁵ On the 7th March at midnight the English army moved off secretly.¹⁷⁶ But at daybreak Sindhia, with his troops numbering about 30,000 attacked them 'from all quarters.' The retreat was badly conducted, and was little better than a rout. This disgrace was somewhat retrieved by a daring feat which Camac performed on the night of 24 March. He surprised Sindhia's camp and captured 13 guns, 13 tumbrils, 21 camels and 2 elephants.¹⁷⁷ Muir who was coming to the assistance of Camac felt a sense of relief at this happy turn of events. Experience had confirmed him in his belief that in all military operations in India 'spirited resolve and brisk actions generally secured better, than slow counsels and too circumspect a conduct.'¹⁷⁸ But before the news of Camac's success reached Calcutta, he was removed from the command and ordered to hand over charge to Muir.¹⁷⁹ With deep regret and great reluctance, Camac quitted the detachment. The memorandum which he issued from his camp on 3 May, records his regret in the following words :

"Nothing could tempt him to leave the companions of his fatigues and dangers but the undeserved treatment which he has met with from his superior and to support his honour and reputation which have been unjustly impeached. Words cannot give adequate ideas of the feelings of his heart on this occasion, or sufficiently convey to them the just indignation which he suffers for their sake, as well as his own."¹⁸⁰

Before the junction of his forces with those of Camac, Muir had tried unremittingly to secure supplies of provisions from the Rana of Gohad. But his conduct was found to be evasive. Muir could not procure any provisions as without positive orders.

from the Rana not a single farmer dared to sell the English 'a chhatak' of food.¹⁸¹ The Rana's influence over the neighbouring chiefs was considered to be 'next to a sovereign authority' ; and Muir had no hope of gaining their alliance unless the Rana joined the English.¹⁸² It was believed that the Rana's recalcitrant attitude was due to his not being put in possession of Gwalior. On one occasion, he asked Muir's agent (sent to him for negotiations), 'when he was to be put in possession of Gwalior'.¹⁸³

On 2 April, 1781, the Supreme Council issued orders for the delivery of the fortress of Gwalior to the Rana of Gohad.¹⁸⁴ The English were obliged by treaty to surrender the place to the Rana. Muir confessed that it would have redounded to the credit of the English nation had a more punctual and early attention been paid to the sacred faith of treaties. Had that been the case, he maintained, the Maratha War might have been drawn earlier to an honourable conclusion.¹⁸⁵ Admitting that the treaty with the Rana had not been faithfully observed on the part of the English, Hastings said that the possession of Gwalior was likely to prove an encumbrance to them. It had already encouraged the expectations of the Marathas, and had alienated the Rana from the English. By possessing Gwalior, Hastings wrote, the English occupied 'no more ground than the rocks on which it stands, and of an influence not an inch'.¹⁸⁶

The Rana was put in possession of Gwalior, but his attitude towards the English remained unchanged. Under one pretext or other, he still refused to co-operate with the English. Muir indignantly wrote to Goddard on 7 June, 1781 :

"He is the only man on this side India who has benefitted by our war with Mahratta State and the only Eastern Prince who has effectually duped the English. He is now in peaceable possession of Gwalior, his country well tilled and in a quiet and tranquil state. He laughs at all our demands, promises fair with a determined resolution to perform nothing."¹⁸⁷

CHAPTER VIII

SALBAI AND THE LAST THREE YEARS

The year 1781 did not augur well for Hastings. His conduct with regard to the Maratha War had begun to be investigated by a Secret Committee in London. His enemies were 'in great spirits' and talked of removing him from the Governor-Generalship.¹ The fortunes of the English in the Carnatic had fallen to a low-water mark. Scott, his best friend, wrote pressingly :

"I am confident that you will find out resources for retrieving our affairs in the Carnatic, as you have already done at Bombay...The rapacity of Sir Thomas Rumbold and the stupidity of Sri Hector Munro should induce you rather to wish for peace than the most brilliant successes by a continuance of the war."²

Hastings was not blind to the force of circumstances. He had already initiated the task of conciliating the Poona ministers through the mediation of Mudaji Bhosle. Devakar Pant, the *Dewan* of Mudaji, was sensible of 'the value of an alliance between the Poona Ministers and the English'³, and promised to go to Poona for this purpose. Simultaneously the Supreme Council, on 11 June 1781, empowered Goddard to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the Peshwa.⁴ They asked Goddard to consult the *Dewan* of Mudaji and make him the instrument of accommodation if he arrived at Poona. They further instructed him to keep Bassein, if possible, but to give it up if the ministers refused to 'accede to a Treaty either of Alliance or Peace unless it be restored'. If the Maratha Government was found reluctant to join in an offensive alliance with the Company against Haidar Ali, the English were willing to consent to a 'Treaty of Peace simply which should not engage them in such offensive alliance'. The English were to withdraw their protection from Raghunath Rao ; in return, the ministers should

make provision for his subsistence and give a formal assurance that they were not to make any attempt against his life or liberty. The fortresses of Ahmedabad and Gwalior, the possession of which the English had confirmed by treaty to Fateh Sing and the Rana of Gohad respectively, were not to be restored to the Marathas. Goddard was also instructed to include the Government of Berar in the treaty, if practicable ; if not, the Supreme Council wrote, "nothing be included in the Treaty which shall be contrary to our present relation to the Government of Berar or hurtful to its interests".⁵

Goddard did not receive these instructions until the month of August. So, while the Supreme Council were endeavouring to bring the Maratha War to an end, he was broaching fresh plans for the renewal of war.⁶ He proposed an increase of eight battalions of sepoy and suggested that Muir should be asked to join him. He also expected to secure support from Fateh Sing and the Nawabs of Surat and Cambay—three country Powers in alliance with the English. With an army thus strengthened Goddard proposed entering the Deccan and acting offensively against the Marathas in the very heart of their empire. It would bring the Poona ministers to terms and enable him to march into Haidar's country, 'not merely by fixing the Mharattas in a convenient neutrality but by making them parties and confederates' of the English.⁷ But the Bombay Government found it impracticable to enter upon a plan of such extent and magnitude without an assurance of funds to support it. They wrote : "Our own resources are totally inadequate even to our present demands of which the distress we have so long experienced is sufficient evidence".⁸ The Supreme Council also could not consent to such a plan when the Madras affair and increased expenses were straining their resources to the breaking point. They recommended the Bombay Government and Goddard to try to promote an accommodation with the Marathas 'as the only means of enabling the Company's forces to contend successfully with their numerous enemies'.⁹

Apart from the harsh facts, Hastings had other reasons in trying to form a treaty with the Marathas. To the Court of Directors 'the restoration of peace be an object of earnest

desire'.¹⁰ Hastings had already been pressed by them to conclude the Maratha War, even by renouncing Gujarat. A wave of popular opinion surged forward among the Englishmen in London. They wanted to hold nothing beyond their present possession and they should convince all Indian powers of this, by making peace, and withdrawing from every connection that could possibly risk a rupture. Hastings' friends were finding it difficult to maintain his credit at home unless he could bring the Maratha business to a speedy termination. No wonder one of his friends in London informed Hastings rightly : "In truth the torrent runs strong against us."¹¹ Another friend wrote :

"It is impossible for you to conceive, how all the moderate men here, pant after a peace. Give them one in India, Sir, for the love of God and your own good fame. Nothing ever hath done you more honour, than a general peace in India will do you almost on any terms".¹²

By coincidence, the unmistakable desire of both Hastings and his friends for peace was admirably seconded when, in the early days of August, Mahadji offered his mediation to Muir to bring about a general peace between the English and the Peshwa.¹³ In wishing for peace, Sindhia was guided more by political considerations than by any other motive. He wanted to have a free hand in Hindustan. A separate peace with the English would afford him ample opportunity for territorial aggrandisement in the north.¹⁴ From Chunar, where Hastings had arrived to subdue the recalcitrant Chait Sing, he issued credential to Muir authorising the latter to treat with Mahadji Sindhia.¹⁵

On 27 August, Muir received Sindhia's proposals through his agent Chimnaji Rao.¹⁶ (Sindhia offered to make a separate peace with the English and to act as a mediator for a peace with the Peshwa and Haidar Ali.) He required sufficient time for securing this object. If peace was not established with the Poona Government and Mysore he would observe strict neutrality, permitting the English to 'act as they think proper.' The territory conquered by the English in Bundelkhand should be restored to him. Sindhia also required that his elephants.

and artillery should be returned to him. On the final conclusion of peace, both parties were to return to their respective territories till a peace with the Poona Government was effected. Hastings agreed to most of these propositions except peace with Haidar and the restoration of territories belonging to the Rana of Gohad.¹⁷ Sindhia's proposals, however, were on the whole agreeable to Hastings.¹⁸ He instructed Muir to keep Gwalior for the Rana. But if Sindhia insisted on having Cutchwaghur and other territories which had been put into the Rana's possession, Muir should not 'let these territories be an obstacle to the conclusion of peace.'¹⁹

How anxious Hastings was to conclude peace with Sindhia may be gauged from his letter to Macpherson, written from Banaras, dated 12 October, 1781 :

"My primary, and I may add, my sole motive, since every other operated only as a subservient to it, in making this distant excursion, was Peace. A separate Peace concluded with Mahadjee Sindia will be a great leading step to it, and his assistance heartily given will complete it,— will in effect command it. And I will venture to promise that if this end can be accomplished early, it will as surely draw after it a peace in the Carnatic : I do not mean a peace with Hyder, but his retreat from the Carnatic, or his destruction, if he stays".²⁰

To Hastings' satisfaction, a treaty was concluded on the 13th October between Muir and Mahadji Sindhia.²¹ The credit of concluding the treaty belonged to Muir. During the negotiations the Rana of Gohad was in close correspondence with Sindhia. Muir had little knowledge of this 'clandestine practice' of the Rana and insisted that he should be included in any treaty between the Company and Sindhia. But Sindhia's agent objected strongly declaring that the Rana had made a separate written agreement with Sindhia. Apparently Sindhia did not place much reliance on this agreement, for the Rana had at one time veered round the English, and at another, the Marathas. As Muir wrote : "The Marattas themselves seem greatly dissatisfied with his conduct."²² It was, therefore, very difficult for Muir to prevail upon the Maratha agent

agree that the Rana's existing territories, including Gwalior, should be guaranteed in the treaty. Thus, what might have produced embarrassing consequences was saved by Muir's tact and diplomacy. "In my negotiations with Mahdajee Scindia", Hastings admitted, "my merit is so small that, in comparison with Colonel Muir, it is imperceptible."²³

About the same time when Hastings was striving hard to bring about a rapprochement with Sindhia, the Madras Government made peace overtures to the Poona Government. A letter dated 11 September, 1781, was addressed to the Peshwa in the joint names of Macartney, Eyre Coote, Edward Hughes and Macpherson. It was stated that orders had arrived from the Company and from the King of Great Britain to settle a treaty of friendship with the Poona Government which would be ratified by the King and Parliament and which could not be altered by 'any servants of the Company in India.'²⁴ This was an unauthorised action and, probably by implication, was said to have criticised Hastings' policy. But Hastings rejoined with unanswerable truth that the way to obtain peace was not 'by concession and entreaty', but to make it worthwhile to the other party. The following letter to Macpherson brings out in clear light the course of policy which Hastings had pursued and which he wanted to pursue :

"In the first place let me conjure you to believe, and I call God to witness my Truth, that I seek for nothing but Peace as the end and design of all my pursuits. The Maratta State exists by the power and abilities of Mahdajee Sindia, and by gaining him I expect the rest to follow as a consequence of inevitable necessity. I suppose him likely to coincide with our views, if we employ him as our instrument and mediator, and therefore I suppose that he will gladly undertake that office. The accumulated weakness of the Maratta State, the loss of its resources, the imbecility of its rulers, and the separation of their great support, I mean Mahdajee Sindia, must compel them to submit to Peace, unless the dread of falling again under the ascendant of that Chief should induce Nana Furness to the most desperate extremities to avoid it ;

which I think not so likely. I am determined to bring about a Peace ; but I must use for this end the weapons which I can trust, which I can manage, and which I have hitherto practised... This is not a time to temporise. If my superiors, and the whole people of England in a body join in proscribing this system of policy, and in exclaiming 'Peace, Peace, Peace', with a host of enemies assailing us. I must either persist in my own line, and you and Mr. Wheler must unite with me in it ; or I must yield up my place, and trust to that providence or fortune which has hitherto wrought miracles for our deliverance, for our future salvation."²⁵

✓ On the 26th November, 1781, the Bombay Government became acquainted with the peace proposals made by Macartney, Coote, Hughes and Macpherson.²⁶ The cry for peace echoed from Bengal and Madras and drowned all Goddard's efforts to commence offensive operations against the Marathas. Muir had already concluded a treaty with Sindhia. With a view to ascertaining the reaction of the Peshwa's Government, Goddard now proposed to send a confidential person to Poona. Despite the lack of intimation from the Poona Durbar, the Bombay Council agreed to it, anxious as they were to end the ruinous war. Thereupon Goddard wrote a formal letter to Nana Farnavis informing him of his intention to send an agent to Poona. Nana reciprocated his desire for peace and sent a passport for the agent's safe conduct.²⁷ Captain Watherstone was selected for this business because his official knowledge and intimate acquaintance with Maratha politics qualified him for the post.²⁸ He was instructed to explain the general wish of the English for peace and to 'obtain a perfect knowledge of the intentions of the Ministry.' Goddard further instructed him "not to enter into any formal or positive engagement, further than to declare they will be acceded to by me in the name of the Bengal Government if the minister should accept of them."²⁹ It was expected by Goddard that Mudaji might visit Poona 'to make use of his personal mediation with the Minister.' If this should happen, Watherstone should consult him and make him the instrument of accommodation.

By the time Watherstone reached Poona than he was recalled to England. He could place no reliance upon Watherstone as my contractor to be an instrument of peace.³⁰ He appointed David Anderson as Minister Plenipotentiary to treat with the Marathas ; for this purpose he was deputed to the camp of Mahadji Sindhia.³¹ Hastings also opened a new channel of communication by deputing Chapman to Nagpur. This deputation, Hastings expected, might prove the means of quickening the conclusion of the peace with the Maratha State by making it an object of competition to two most powerful members of it.³²

Meanwhile, Watherstone had arrived at Poona in the middle of January, 1782. Peace talks began between him and the Maratha Chiefs after ceremonies of mutual compliments were over.³³ Watherstone insisted that an offensive and defensive alliance should be immediately agreed to between the Peshwa and the English against Haidar Ali. The Marathas could not with justice accept the proposal as Haidar was bound in treaty with the Peshwa. Nana expressed his wish of including Haidar in any treaty of peace that should be settled between the Peshwa and the English. Watherstone declared his inability to treat upon terms of friendship with Haidar. Finding the inflexible determination of the English agent, Nana proposed to settle immediately the terms of a general peace, in which Haidar should be included, and afterwards 'he was ready to join with the English in attacking his dominions.'³⁴

Haidar Ali was not the only obstacle in the way of restoring peace. The joint letter written by Macartney, Coote, Hughes and Macpherson to the Peshwa had raised the expectations of the Marathas. To make the confusion worse confounded, there was added the despatch of Nawab Muhammad Ali of Arcot to the Poona Durbar in which he assured them of the restoration of all territories acquired by the English ; necessary orders to this effect should be sent upon Macpherson's arrival in Bengal. All these factors gave Nana Farnavis a lever to extort more concessions from the English and to protract the negotiations. As Watherstone wrote to Goddard on 16 January, 1782 :

"It is the desire of the Mharatta Government to conclude a treaty of friendship with the English, but that from the tenor of the letters they have received from Madras, the orders they expect in consequence from Bengal, the convention lately entered into with Mhadajee Scindia, and the plan proposed of sending Mr. Anderson to him for the purpose of negotiating an alliance with the Peshwa and Hyder Ally Khawn, the Ministers will think it prudent and political to protract, and avoid coming to any final settlement until the direction of these several persons can be drawn to one single point, and the real intentions of the Bengal Government be clearly and unalterably ascertained."³⁵

Thus, the fact remains that the letter from Madras and the deputation of Anderson had created doubts in the mind of Nana Farnavis relative to the validity of any treaty that might be concluded by Watherstone.

Despite this clog in the machinery of negotiations efforts were not wanting on the part of the English agent and the Poona Government to arrive at a compromise. On behalf of the Poona Durbar, Madhavrao Sadashiv met the English agent on 17 January and emphasised the two following points as essential to the establishment of peace and friendship between the English and the Maratha State : Haidar Ali should be included in the treaty and every place in possession of the English, which had formerly belonged to the Peshwa, should be restored.³⁶ The views of the Poona Durbar with respect to Haidar, Watherstone wrote to Goddard on 20 January, appeared to be of a difficult and almost incomprehensible nature. "The destruction of Haidar, however much he may merit the Peshwa's enmity, and in policy ought to feel it, is at present but a secondary object and that it is held out with a view of reconciling us to the important sacrifices which are expected in a treaty and will be pursued hereafter or otherwise as circumstances shall render most expedient."³⁷

The deputation of Anderson to Sindhia required the dismissal of Watherstone from Poona lest his presence should counteract or embarrass Anderson's negotiations. Hastings

ordered his recall and forbade Goddard to negotiate. Watherstone sought Nana's permission to depart, pointing out that he could now render little service by remaining at Poona as all powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty were now transferred from Goddard to Anderson.³⁸ But Nana wilfully delayed his departure and asked him to remain till a letter should be received from Sindhia. It was suspected that by detaining the English agent at Poona, Nana would like to thwart the final settlement of terms between Sindhia and Anderson.³⁹ The weight and consequence which Sindhia would attain by being made the instrument of a treaty between the English and the Maratha State was too much for Nana to swallow. Another motive was the advantage it would give him in the negotiations which he was carrying on with Haidar Ali by holding out the fear of an alliance with the English.⁴⁰

Watherstone's mission to Poona proved to be a fiasco as Hastings wished it to be. It would be interesting to know what fate awaited Chapman in his negotiations with Mudaji Bhosle. Chapman reached Nagpur on 22 January, 1782. On 12 February, he reported from Nagpur that Mudaji was really inclined to mediate between the Peshwa and the English under the following conditions⁴¹ : that peace be concluded under his guarantee ; that Raghunath Rao be induced to reside in Mudaji's dominions ; that Bassein and its dependencies were to remain in the possession of the Company ; that all the rest of English conquests in Konkan and Gujarat be restored ; and that Fateh Sing be confirmed in his original *jaigir* on returning to his allegiance to the Peshwa. Regarding an alliance with the English against Haidar, Mudaji did not say anything as he believed this would be the inevitable consequence of a peace with the English. Mudaji was anxious to interpose his good offices for a termination of the disputes with a view to reaping credit and advantage from the settlement and warding off dangers to which his conduct exposed him. The indecisive manner in which he acted the part allotted to him in the grand confederacy against the English had rendered him obnoxious to the administration at Poona. Mudaji's relation with the Nizam was by no means cordial and in the event of an attack

taking place, British arms might save him if he could mediate a peace between the English and the Peshwa.⁴² In such circumstances the negotiations were only protracted without any concrete result, particularly because any agreement with Mudaji on such conditions was anathema to Hastings.

Anderson's negotiations, however, brought happy results. From the beginning, he was hopeful of effecting, through the mediation of Mahadji Sindhia, 'an equitable and permanent peace with the Maratha State.'⁴³ The groundwork had been completed by Muir and it only required a little tact and ingenuity to raise the structure. The principal difficulty, Anderson apprehended, would arise from the nature of the connection of the English with Fateh Sing. The Poona Durbar could hardly reconcile themselves to the loss of Ahmadabad and other districts in Gujarat. By the 9th Article of the treaty between the English and Fateh Sing, it was stipulated that he should withhold the payment of the money which he used to remit annually to Poona, and that when negotiations for peace should take place between the English and the Peshwa, his interest would be considered. This article implied that the exemption stipulated was merely temporary and subject to discussion at the close of the war. If this was not the sense, Anderson said, it would be difficult to adjust this article with the fixed principles of the Maratha Government which did not admit of relinquishing their right to any *chauth* or tribute they had once acquired.⁴⁴ All these technical difficulties seemed to be removed when Hastings advised Anderson that the 9th Article of the treaty must be construed as temporary exemption only from the payment of the money to Poona. With regard to the territories granted to Fateh Sing, Hastings wrote to Anderson :

"Reserve to him an equitable share of the acquisitions which our arms have obtained for him and, if he should persist in maintaining the whole, do not permit such claims to be a hindrance to peace or to the success of the views which we have formed for engaging the Marathas in any alliance with us against Hyder Ally Cawn."⁴⁵

In the early days of January, 1782, Anderson reached Sindhia's camp near Datia. Here he was received by Mahadji,

who with most of his principal officers came out to meet him about three miles from the camp.⁴⁶ Sindhia also evinced his pacific disposition by agreeing not to assist Chait Sing whose coquetting with Sindhia had aroused some alarm in the minds of the English. Bhau Bakshi was appointed by Sindhia to transact business with the English agent.⁴⁷ In the course of his conversation with him Anderson learned of the desire of the Poona Durbar to include Haidar Ali in any treaty which they might conclude with the English.⁴⁸ Sindhia declared that the ministers at Poona could not accede to any terms of peace unless Haidar's name was 'for the sake of appearance' included in the articles of the treaty.⁴⁹ At the same time, he insinuated to Anderson that the ministers neither expected nor desired that a peace should actually take place between the English and Haidar Ali ; on the contrary, he hinted, they would afterwards find a pretence to join the English against Haidar. Anderson, however, refused to listen to anything in favour of Haidar Ali. Again, Sindhia wanted to include Nizam Ali and Mudaji Bhosle in the treaty. To this proposal, Anderson acceded.⁵⁰

Despite the disagreement over Haidar the political atmosphere was clear as both parties were bent on establishing peace.⁵¹ But the news of Chapman's deputation to Nagpur and Watherstone's visit to Poona unnerved Sindhia. The opening up of so many channels of communication, Sindhia said to Anderson, would afford satisfaction to the ministers at Poona whose expectations would be proportionately augmented. It appeared that Mahadji Sindhia was afraid lest the negotiations should be taken out of his hands and thrown into some other channel.⁵² It required some pains on the part of Anderson to remove Sindhia's uneasiness and suspicion which these circumstances produced. He explained to Sindhia the nature of Chapman's instructions which gave him no liberty to interfere in the negotiations. He also informed Sindhia that they might continue the negotiations, subject only to this restriction, that if any treaty should previously have concluded at Poona, it must supersede theirs.⁵³ Sindhia derived satisfaction from the hope that no treaty could take place at Poona without his participation.

The simultaneous activities of three negotiators produced among other things a keen desire in Sindhia's mind of bringing the negotiations to 'a speedy and equitable conclusion.'⁶⁴ On the 14th February, he sent to Anderson a paper containing his proposals. Anderson returned an answer which, though not explicit with regard to the places the English were willing to restore, gave Sindhia a general idea of the terms on which peace could be concluded. Sindhia acquiesced in all the points except three on which he required clarification.⁶⁵ First, he wanted to know the particular places to be restored by the English. Secondly, he also wished to know in what manner and on what terms Fatch Sing was to be included in the treaty, observing that he was not an independent prince like the Nizam, Mudaji or Haidar but a tributary to the Peshwa. Thirdly, Raghunath Rao, Sindhia said, had been 'the constant cause of all the late disturbances' and precautions should be taken respecting him. Anderson's answers left an opening for future difficulties as Raghunath Rao might either go to Nizam Ali, Mudaji or Haidar Ali, or to the Portuguese at Goa and excite fresh trouble. Sindhia threw up a hint that he should be obliged to reside in his territories and offered to give every assurance regarding his life and liberty.

About this time, Sindhia received letters from the Peshwa and Nana Farnavis which gave him full powers to negotiate and settle a treaty and an assurance that nothing would be done in the meantime at Poona. But 'peace for Haidar' was the positive condition on which he was authorised to treat with the English.⁶⁶

Anderson replied to each of Sindhia's queries.⁶⁷ The English should retain Bassein together with other territories acquired during the war. With respect to Fatch Sing, it was incumbent on the English to support his rights, but 'for the sake of peace' the English were willing to restore to the Peshwa all territories that they had acquired from Fatch Sing. The English could not in honour put any restraint on Raghunath Rao: 'he must be at liberty to go wherever he pleases. The English could do this to withdraw their protection after a reasonable time. Sindhia would'.

a hardship on the Peshwa not only to lose the fort and city of Ahmedabad, but also a considerable part of his ancient share in Gujarat. He was reluctant to give up Bassein and expiated much on the labour and expense with which it had been conquered by Chimnaji from the Portuguese.

All these minor differences, Anderson hoped, would be removed to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. But how could the Poona ministers be absolved from their connection with Haidar ? From Sindhia's camp, Anderson reported to Hastings on 12 March, 1782 :

"The great and indeed I may say the only difficulty has been about Hyder Ally. Sindia did not choose to agree to make a peace without including him some way or other in it ; and as I had no authority for that purpose from you and knew not how it might affect your political operations with other Courts I could not agree to include him in any way whatever. Whenever I had suggested to him the idea of an alliance against Haidar he had frequently insinuated that as soon as peace was made with us and Hyder's name included in it, the Peshwa would immediately write to Haidar to desist from hostilities and to restore all the countries which the Marattas had ceded to him."⁵⁸

If Haidar refused to comply with either of these requisitions the Peshwa would join the English in hostilities against him.

Haidar was not, however, the only problem that loomed large before the English ; territorial settlement proved no less vexatious than peace with Mysore. Sindhia refused to make peace unless Bassein and Ahmedabad were restored to the Peshwa.⁵⁹ Naturally Anderson's negotiations went on slowly and Hastings' anxiety began to increase proportionately. Hastings was afraid of nothing but delay. It was not peace with conditions of advantage that he wanted, but a speedy peace ; he was prepared to purchase it with the sacrifice of every foot of ground that the English had acquired from the Marathas, except Salsette and the little islands adjacent to Bombay. He had given great offence both to Nizam Ali Khan and Mudaji

employing a multitude of negotiators. Poona politics, Hastings said, were too deep to be unravelled. Whatever might have been the cause of the delay in ratification, he could never think that Nana was engaged in a treaty with Haidar and the French to oppose the operation of the treaty.⁷³

Ratification was to come from Poona and Sindhia kept himself in close touch with Nana and the Peshwa. Nana Farnavis expressed satisfaction with the terms of the treaty, but he emphasised the necessity of establishing a more complete alliance against Haidar Ali and of settling a plan to prevent Raghunath Rao from taking refuge with the enemies of the Peshwa.⁷⁴ It was Nana's wish that Raghunath Rao should be obliged to reside at any place on the banks of the Godavari.⁷⁵

Anderson's patience was wearing out and he ascribed the delay to two reasons⁷⁶: Either Nana was well inclined himself but prevented from sending the ratification by the threats and influence of others; or Nana was not disposed to ratify the treaty at all. In the former case, it was settled that Sindhia, accompanied by Anderson, should go to Poona to support Nana with all his power and influence. Sindhia's presence would free Nana from the awe of others and enable him to complete the treaty by his signature and the seal of the Peshwa. In case of the treaty not being ratified, a new treaty should be settled between Sindhia and the English in which all the articles of the Salbai agreement should be confirmed and the name of the Peshwa be retained. Sindhia's forces in conjunction with the English troops should then enforce these articles against all opposition that might be made by any officer of the Maratha Government.⁷⁷

Negotiations dragged on till the early days of October when Naro Sheo Deo arrived from Poona to settle with Anderson some points preliminary to the ratification of the treaty by the Peshwa.⁷⁸ He produced the form of a treaty to be filled in relative to Haidar.⁷⁹ The substance was this: The Peshwa should call upon Haidar to restore the territories that formerly belonged to the English. If he refused, the English should repulse him from the Carnatic, and the joint army of the Marathas and the English should attack him on the other side ;

after the English had recovered their territories, they should not listen to any proposals of peace Haidar might make until the Peshwa consented thereto ; the Peshwa would call on all powers who were included in his State to assist in the war, and if any of them refused, the English should assist the Peshwa in compelling them to obedience.⁸⁰ Anderson informed Bhau Bakshi, Sindhia's agent, that the nature of his instructions would not admit of his settling any separate treaty till the treaty already concluded was ratified. He also observed that it would be improper for the English to engage to compel Nizam Ali or Mudaji to fight against Haidar if they wanted to remain neutral. The English had no right to molest them ; besides, such a clause would be imprudent as it would stir up a very formidable league against them.⁸¹

Hastings' mind grasped to the full extent the consequences if the treaty was not ratified. The war flames on the western coast of India had been extinguished with the signing of the treaty of Salbai. There only remained to give a death-knell to the fury of Haidar Ali. This was Hastings' sole object now, and to achieve it he required the assistance of the Marathas. He was impatient to obtain the ratification from Poona as he firmly believed that this would be instantly followed by a co-operation of the Marathas against Haidar Ali.⁸² The Governor-General and Council had ratified the treaty as early as June, 1782 ; but if inexorable forces stood in the way of obtaining ratification from Poona, Hastings should not be blamed for this. To Scott, he wrote, "I am impatient only for the ratification of the Maratha Treaty because others are so. War may be made by one party only and best, when the other is averse to it. Peace must be the work of both."⁸³ Hastings wanted to bring the contest with Haidar immediately to a decided issue while the English had a superiority in strength. He apprehended that Haidar might be reinforced by a powerful armament from France in the next year which would enable him to defy all united efforts, if delayed so long. "That in this act," Hastings wrote, "we must require the sanction of the Peishwa's name, and the concurrence of the minister to give it its due influence and credit ; and for the same reason I wish for the rati-

fication of the Treaty likewise, because the world will not believe them to be in earnest, while they withhold it".⁸⁴

Towards the first week of December, 1782, a gleam of hope appeared when Sindhia assured Anderson about the certainty of ratification.⁸⁵ Sindhia had now good reasons to hope that it would soon arrive as his *Dewan* Madhu Rao Gangadhar had received a letter from his brother at Poona mentioning that Nana Farnavis had come to the determination of ratifying the treaty.⁸⁶ The death of Haidar on 7 December,⁸⁷ as Grant Duff puts it, had 'a speedy effect in deciding the measures of the Mahratta Ministers and the ratification of the treaty of Salbye was the immediate result.'⁸⁸ But even at this stage Nana's decision to ratify the treaty met with opposition from Haripant and other ministers. It was only after stormy debates that he could convince them of the necessity of the measure. He argued that by declining the ratification, he could not suffer to draw the perpetual enmity of the English and to lose the allegiance of Sindhia who commanded 50,000 horse.⁸⁹ Then the treaty was ratified by the Peshwa on 20 December, 1782. Along with the ratification,⁹⁰ the Poona Government also sent a blank paper under the seal of the Peshwa in order that Sindhia might fill it up with 'more complete articles' of an alliance against Mysore.

In the month of January, 1783, Bhau Bakshi laid before Anderson some proposals on behalf of Mahadji Sindhia.⁹¹ (1) Regarding Raghunath Rao it was proposed that Sindhia should send a person of rank to invite and encourage him to accept of the provision made for him in the 6th Article of the treaty and that Anderson should also write a letter to Raghunath Rao recommending his compliance. In this point Anderson acquiesced. (2) Orders should immediately be sent to Eyre Coote to carry on the war in the Carnatic and to reject all overtures of peace from Mysore. Anderson remarked that no orders could be given to Coote unless the treaty was exchanged. (3) On the restoration of several forts to the Marathas, all guns and Rankelabs belonging to them should likewise be restored. Anderson promised to write for this purpose to the Governor-General after the delivery of the treaty. (4) As the Bombay Government had been 'the cause of past disturbances and it was

from them only that future disputes could be apprehended. it was desired that some testimony might be obtained of their acquiescence in the terms of the treaty. Anderson gave the assurance that the Governor-General and Council would enforce their strict compliance with the terms of the treaty. (5) The Peshwa would request the assistance of the English in case he should find it necessary to punish any of his chiefs. Reciprocal assistance would be given by the Peshwa to the English in case of necessity. The immediate object of the Peshwa was to get the assistance of the English against the Sidis of Rajapuri. Anderson remarked that he was not authorised to enter on new negotiations like this. With the arrival of the ratification, Bhau Bakshi made specious offers to Anderson to settle a treaty regarding Mysore. But Anderson said that he would settle it 'after the ratification was delivered'.

On the morning of 8 February, 1783, the two ratified treaties were read but their exchange was suspended till a more auspicious day.⁹² The treaty was formally exchanged on 24 February. The Supreme Council felt happy at the ratification and exchange of the treaty and wrote in a congratulatory letter to Anderson :

"We sincerely rejoice at the final interchange of the ratified treaty with the Maratta State, and take this occasion to express our entire approbation of your steady and persevering endeavours under all the discouragements and procrastinated suspense which you have met with to bring it to a conclusion."⁹³

They asked the Bombay Government's punctual performance of every condition of the treaty 'without admitting any plea'.⁹⁴ From a sense of gratitude for Sindhia's conduct towards the English, the Supreme Council agreed to deliver the fort, town and district of Broach to him.⁹⁵ A *sunrud* for this purpose was sent to Anderson. They also assented to the propositions made by Bhau Bakshi to Anderson for the better preservation of peace established with the Maratha Government.⁹⁶

The Bombay Government viewed with concern the great loss of revenue which the Company sustained by this treaty, although they affirmed their adherence to its terms.⁹⁷ Gambier protested against the treaty as 'highly disadvantageous and

dishonourable to the Company'. The Marathas, Gambier wrote, would not have given their ratification, had Haidar lived. He added : "Had the Maratta Government a right to hold us in suspense while he (Haidar) lived and added weight to their scale, have we no right to avail ourselves of the favourable opportunity his death had presented us... The present treaty depresses Bombay beyond any power, or at least probability, of future recovery. It must in future be, an heavy clog on the Company without any means of supporting itself."⁹⁸

To make the treaty permanent and to guard against any provocation by which its ends might be defeated, were the tasks which now demanded the serious attention of Warren Hastings. Writing to the Earl of Shelburne on 2 April, 1783, he observed :

"I am sorry to say that the credit of the English faith is not well ascertained in the estimation of the people of India. It will be utterly blasted by a revival of enmity with the Marattas on grounds of doubtful provocation. Such an event, if it should early happen, must proceed from the Presidency of Bombay which is adverse to the Treaty, not from this government which made it nor from that of Fort St. George which by its situation is precluded from any grounds of contention with the Mahrattas."⁹⁹

Hastings, therefore, recommended Anderson to the favour of Shelburne so that he might be appointed to succeed Hornby after his retirement from the office of Governor of Bombay. The talents which Anderson had displayed in the negotiation with Sindhia won for him universal applause. He also possessed some experience in the administration of the public revenue, 'a science yet new to the Presidency of Bombay and much wanted.' The treaty originated with Hastings and had been conducted throughout by his separate authority. He had, therefore, more than common interest in the maintenance of it and appealed to Shelburne to yield to his recommendation. Afterwards it appeared to Hastings that Boddam stood next in succession to Hornby. As Shelburne was out of office, he asked Scott to exert his influence in securing his appointment.¹⁰⁰ Boddam was 'a man of worth, candour and honour', and Hastings was convinced that he would inviolably observe the treaty if he was

placed at the head of the Bombay Government. Anderson might be placed next in succession to Boddam.

Immediately after the ratification, Sindhia issued a passport for the safe conduct of Colonel Charles Morgan with six battalions from Surat to Calcutta.¹⁰¹ He also granted to the English Company the exclusive privilege of trade in the city and *pargana* of Broach.¹⁰² The Bombay Government sent orders to the Chiefs and Councils of Surat and Broach for delivering up the different districts to such persons as might be properly authorised to receive the same.¹⁰³

Anderson proposed to Sindhia that he should proceed to Poona to be witness on behalf of the Company to the delivery of the ceded country to the officers of the Peshwa and to the due execution of the rest of the articles of the treaty of peace. Sindhia informed Anderson that it was unnecessary as the most material parts of the business between the English and the Marathas would rest with him.¹⁰⁴ On the 26th April, 1783, Anderson concluded with Sindhia an additional treaty regarding the intercourse of shipping and the conduct to be observed by both Governments in respect to fugitives.¹⁰⁵ Intercourse of shipping between the two nations should be carried on 'according to former customs'; and if any chief, merchant, or other person should fly from the territories of the Company to those of the Peshwa or from the territories of the Peshwa to those of the Company, no protection should be afforded to any such person by either party.

A short time after the conclusion of peace an event took place which for a time threatened to precipitate war between the English and the Marathas. The *Ranger*, a cruizer, was on her way to Calicut when the Maratha fleet under Anandrao Dhulap suddenly attacked it on 8 April, 1783, on the coast near Ratnagiri.¹⁰⁶ The battle was fierce and lasted from 11 o'clock till 3 in the afternoon.¹⁰⁷ 'Captain Pruett fought his vessel, with the greatest courage.'¹⁰⁸ The defence of the English was desperate. The Marathas boarded the ship in hundreds and plundered everything. The *Ranger's* loss in the action was 5 killed and 25 wounded.¹⁰⁹ The Marathas lost about 8 men and about 75 were wounded. The vessel was carried into Vijaydrug where

the prisoners suffered privations. The Bombay Government remonstrated to the Peshwa and asked him to release the prisoners and to give up the cruizer with its cargoes.¹¹⁰ The capture of the vessel was so signal an act of hostility that the Bombay Government countermanded the orders for making the restitutions stipulated in the treaty unless the affair was properly settled.¹¹¹ The Poona Government immediately gave orders for the release of the vessel and also of the surviving captured officers.¹¹² The matter was thus amicably settled and the Bombay Government wrote to the Peshwa : "I hope the memory of this disagreeable affair will be worn away by future good offices and acts of friendship".¹¹³

The most absorbing question now was the restoration of places which had formerly belonged to the Peshwa. To expedite the business, the Bombay Government sent orders to the Chiefs of Surat, Broach, Thana, Bassein, Kalyan and Belapur and instructed them to deliver to authorised persons forts, places and districts under their charge, stipulated to be restored to the Peshwa.¹¹⁴ But the restoration of Ahmedabad and the districts of Fateh Sing to the Peshwa proved to be a thorny problem to the Bombay Government.¹¹⁵ They pleaded that it was not stipulated in the treaty that Ahmedabad was to be restored to the Peshwa. They had no power to restore Ahmedabad as it had for a long time been in possession of Fateh Sing. With regard to the restitution of the districts of the Gaikwade, the Bombay Government wrote to the Peshwa :

"Your Highness likewise desires that orders may be sent for the Guicawar country. We understand fully by the Treaty that this country is to be taken from the Company and we shall accordingly faithfully give it up. But it should be restored to Fatty Sing Guicawar from whom the Company received it and we have agreeable to the Treaty long ago sent orders to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach to surrender the said country to such persons as may be sent by Fatty Sing to receive it in the same manner that the country belonging to your Circar is to be restored to such persons as may be deputed by your Highness."

But the Supreme Council intervened and

should be restored to the Peshwa upon the same footing as he held it before the war. Fateh Sing was to be placed exactly in the same situation with respect to the Maratha Government as he stood in before the war.¹¹⁷ This was the plain and unequivocal sense of the 8th Article of the treaty and if Fateh Sing should refuse to accede to it, he would forfeit the Company's protection and force was to be employed in compelling him to restore the territories to the Peshwa.¹¹⁸

After his father's death, Tipu Sultan professed outwardly his acquiescence in the treaty of Salbai.¹¹⁹ On 29 July, 1783, he wrote to Sindhia, "The peace which has been established through you, I agree to."¹²⁰ But Tipu was a man of deep artifice. Without informing Sindhia, he agreed to a cessation of hostilities with the Madras Government. How could Sindhia disbelieve Tipu's profession when the latter had sent to the Peshwa a copy of his proposals in which it was stated that he would relinquish to the English all the territories taken from the Nawab of Arcot ? Tipu also said : "That whilst the Sun and Moon shall last he shall adhere to the Peace which the Peshwa has settled for him."¹²¹ But Tipu's negotiations with the English Commissioners alarmed Sindhia as his chief object was to bring the exclusive management of all transactions between the English and Tipu either into his own hands or into those of the Peshwa. In Sindhia's opinion, Tipu had not acceded to the terms of the treaty of Salbai. He had not yet restored the territories of Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan and the English and released the prisoners.¹²² Moreover, the Marathas were anxious to get back the territories which they had lost to Haidar Ali. The English were also no less eager to recover their territory in the Carnatic.

In the sunshine of autumn, on 28 October 1783, a new treaty was concluded between Anderson and Sindhia.¹²³ If Tipu refused to accede to the terms of the treaty of Salbai, the Peshwa would assist the English and make war against him ; in that case neither of the contracting parties should make peace with Tipu without the consent of the other. "The territories of the English Company and the Nabab Mahomed Ally will be delivered to the English Company and Nabab Mahomed Ally,

the territories of the Peshwa and the Maratta State will be delivered to the Peshwa and Maratta State."¹²⁴

The draft of the separate treaty relative to Tipu, which Sindhia had forwarded to Poona, was highly approved of, and the Peshwa and Nana being then ignorant of its having actually been signed, urged him to lose no time in concluding it.¹²⁵ This separate treaty between the English and the Marathas against Tipu was an event of great significance. But Anderson viewed with dismay the establishment of peace between the English and Tipu through the mediation of the Marathas. On 22 October, 1783, he wrote to Hastings :

"The Marathas have themselves very considerable claims against Tippoo Saheb which there is every reason to think they are resolved to get settled before a complete peace be established betwixt that Prince and us. Considering this circumstance, the distance of their situation, and their fixed habits of procrastination, if peace be still thought obtainable it will perhaps be deemed expedient to take some step for establishing it without relying on their mediation, which would inevitably be productive of great delay."¹²⁶

The Peshwa and Nana made feverish effort to execute the separate treaty relating to Tipu.¹²⁷ But while the Marathas prepared themselves in secrecy counting upon the British support, Lord Macartney, the Madras Governor, concluded a treaty with Tipu. On 11 March, 1784, the treaty of Mangalore was signed, without any reference whatsoever to the Marathas. On 18 January, 1784, Macartney had written to the Bombay Government that peace was not only desirable, but so necessary an object in their desperate situation, that it was their duty to accomplish it by every means.¹²⁸ The object was attained ; but in their anxiety to terminate the war with Tipu, the Madras Government were 'led into a train of most injudicious proceedings, in the course of which they were systematically insulted by Tippoo, their representatives treated with indignity, the British nation held up as supplicants for peace.'¹²⁹ Nana and Mahadji were offended at the contempt shown to them by the omission of the 9th Article of the treaty of Salbai which

to meet him in his camp near Fatehpur Sikri. The Emperor now appointed him Deputy of the Peshwa and on 4 December, 1784, honoured him with the title of *Vakil-i-Mutlak* or Vice-regent of the Empire.¹⁴² "This post was so rarely filled that only three previous instances of it are known in the long annal of the Timurids, once under Akbar, once under Shah Jahan and the last time under Bahadur Shah I. As Mahadji returned to his tent after being appointed dictator of the Delhi Empire, his troops lined the entire route and fired salutes, while all the officers presented nazars in his tent. Thus at one stroke all the machinations of the great Maratha's puny rivals were reduced to nullity."¹⁴³

While recounting the rewards which Mahadji Sindhia earned by his courage, circumspection and foresight, we should not overlook the persistent misunderstanding and hostility which fell to the lot of Warren Hastings in England throughout the war. The last stage was peculiarly embarrassing for him and his friends who were, however, able partly to wrest even from unwilling quarters some recognition of the services rendered by him to his country against tremendous odds.

In the spring of 1781 the news of the disasters to the Company's arms in India found its way to the British public, already embittered by the American tragedy. In August Sullivan said, "the plot seems deep, and the Mahratta war, I conjecture, is to be the engine to crush us."¹⁴⁴ Francis leagued himself with a cabal, strenuously endeavouring to deprecate Hastings' merit and arrange a censure on his administration.¹⁴⁵ Peace with the Marathas was the desire of every Englishman, and this only could secure the continuance of Hastings in the Government of Bengal, unthwarted by faction.¹⁴⁶ From his friend Sykes at London came the message :

"All America expect the port of New York is lost and a capital army under Lord Cornwallis captured, in short disgrace upon disgrace—an attack is certainly made upon some part of India before this arrives ; wish much peace had been made with the Marhattas or I fear you will be overpowered, having so many powers in India against us."¹⁴⁷

Thicker clouds began to gather, and on 15 April, 1782, the Lord Advocate, Dundas, delivered his famous speech in which he condemned the acts of Hastings. On 28 May, 1782, a resolution was passed in the House of Commons to the effect that it was the duty of the Court of Directors to recall Hastings from the Government of Bengal because he had 'acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of the British nation.' On 18 June, however, the directive was negatived by the Court of Proprietors. Scott informed Hastings on 21 June, 1782 :

"The world are at last convinced that you did not plunge the Company into the Maratha War and that you have from the commencement of it, been anxious to secure a firm and honourable peace. The Carnatic all men allow has been preserved by measures entirely your own."¹⁴⁸

Hastings received this news when the ratification of the treaty of Salbai still hung in the balance. He had yet to win the assistance of the Marathas for the protection of the Carnatic. He was afraid of the consequence the report of these happenings in England would produce in the minds of the country Powers. "Think my Lord," he wrote to the Earl of Shelburne on 12 December, 1782, "of the English newspapers and Leyden Gazettes circulating through every state in Europe and every European colony in Asia, the suspension of the powers of the first British Government in India, at a period such as the present, in the express words of the resolution of the House of Commons."¹⁴⁹ Hastings vindicated his position by saying that he had no more concern with the origin and commencement of the Maratha War than the Lord Advocate of Scotland ; that it began without his knowledge ; and that he supported the Government of Bombay with money, with a powerful military aid and with encouragement. The timely arrival of the detachment from Bengal saved the credit of the Bombay Presidency and the military reputation of the English. The invasion of the Carnatic was not caused by the Maratha War but by the known weakness of the Carnatic and by a great confederacy formed against all the British Governments in India, a confederacy which was the avowed act of Nizam Ali Khan. But the Nizam proved lukewarm to the cause of the confederacy ;

Hastings' influence detached Berar from it and in the end produced a general peace with the Marathas. Thus the Maratha War was the creation of the Presidency of Bombay and of the Court of Directors. Hastings wanted to reap the whole credit for the prosecution of it with tenacity and the conclusion of peace with the Marathas. All things considered, it was not vanity that prompted Hastings to declare that he had been "the instrument of rescuing one Presidency from infamy, and both from annihilation."¹⁵⁰

On 23 October, 1782, after violent debates at the India House, 13 Directors voted for the removal of Hastings; but ten Directors opposed the measure and seven of them protested against it in the strongest manner. On the 24th, this resolution was laid before a General Court, when it was fully and ably debated. Johnstone moved that the resolution should be rescinded on the following grounds:

"That it appears to this Court, from incontestable evidence drawn from the records of the Company that the war in which we are now engaged with the Marattas was evidently founded on the sentiments of the Court of Directors ... and that consequently it would be the highest of injustice to lay the blame of that war, or the evils which have followed from it, upon Mr. Hastings when it appears that the dissatisfaction of the Court of Directors expressed at the Treaty of Poorunder, in their letters to Bengal of the 5th of February, and to Bombay of the 16th of April, 1777, gave the strongest encouragement to both presidencies, to seize the slightest pretence of provocation from the ministers of the Maratta State, to renew their engagements with Ragobah. Neither have the measures adopted by Mr. Hastings, in consequence of such instructions ever received the slightest censure from the said Court of Directors."¹⁵¹

The motion was carried by an overwhelming majority. For the time being Hastings was vindicated.

But in the early months of 1783 a faction in England supposed that Hastings was not serious in his wish for peace with the Marathas. But his friends, especially Scott, exposed the fallacy

of their reasoning on this subject and tried to convince everybody that no man could be more anxious for peace as Hastings was.¹⁵² In the month of March, 1783, letters were received in London from Bombay in which it was stated that all hopes of peace with the Marathas seemed at an end.¹⁵³ Burke and Smith went to the House of Commons and said that Hastings had been deceived by Sindhia and peace was not to be had. This report obtained credence and gave great uneasiness to Hastings' friends, till they learnt that peace had actually been ratified in Calcutta on 6 June. Hastings' friends were in high spirits. The Court of Directors, however, coldly expressed their pleasure at the conclusion of peace and went on to censure the Governor General because he had used Sindhia as his agent in the negotiations. They had other complaints as well. Though they acknowledged the necessity of peace and expressed their determination to abide by the terms of it, they did not approve of such territorial cessions to the Marathas. They condemned the entire cession of Broach and thought half of it would have been sufficient. They regretted that Raghunath Rao could not be protected. In a word, the Court of Directors became cynical with regard to the Treaty of Salbai.¹⁵⁴

Once again the Directors and the Proprietors disagreed. The latter met on 7 November, 1783, and voted their formal thanks for Hastings' long and invaluable service. Governor Johnstone pointed out the contrast between Britain's success in India and her reverses in other parts of the world :

"When we come to reflect that this East is the only quarter of the globe in which the British arms have sustained their lustre without losing territories, we should be more cautious in imputing blame to the Governor General, who has preserved them ; or in withholding our praise for his having so done ;—if I look to North America, the prospect is too melancholy ; if I cast my eye to the West Indies, a number of islands appear under the flags of our enemies—if I go to the Mediterranean, I see Minorca lost ; it is in the East alone we have sustained the shock with credit ; ... Whoever will trace the progress of the negotiation with the Marattas from the

beginning to the conclusion, the means applied to bring about that event, will find sufficient cause to excite his admiration, and to extinguish any malevolence he may entertain against Mr. Hastings.”¹⁵⁵

Continuing in the same strain Dallas asked : “Not to have despaired of the Commonwealth, was, in Roman times, a subject for public thanks. What praise then is due to him, by whose spirited conduct, through a long season of general despondence, we have at length obtained a most honourable and advantageous peace?”¹⁵⁶ Sullivan referred to Hastings as ‘the best servant the Company ever had,’ to whose ‘wonderful and unparalleled exertions’ England owed her ‘salvation’.¹⁵⁷ Even critics were charitable on this occasion. Watson said : “I blamed, and still do blame him, for the war ; but I think him entitled, in a tenfold degree, to my warmest thanks for this peace.”¹⁵⁸

Hastings was weary of holding his post after more than a decade of strenuous services and tremendous anxiety. In a letter to the Court of Directors, dated 20 March, 1783, he announced his intention to resign the Governor-Generalship and requested that a successor might be appointed.¹⁵⁹ A year later he became very anxious to leave Bengal and on 26 December, 1784, he wrote to his wife, “If I receive no other advices, or no letter from England by the 31st of January, I will wait no longer, but instantly embark.”¹⁶⁰ On 1 February, 1785, he attended the last Council, delivered up the keys of the public treasury and of Fort William and generously took leave of the members of the Board. On the 6th, he took his passage in the *Berrington* after a long period of ceaseless toil in India, only to find disgrace and humiliation at home.

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15. Bom. Sel. Cons. 27 November 1771.
16. Bom. Sel. Cons. 30 November 1771.
17. Bom. Cons. 30 October 1772.
18. Bom. Cons. 30 October 1772 ; Tayler's letter to Bombay Government, 26 October 1772.
19. Letter from Bombay Government to Court of Directors, 4 December 1772.
20. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 67-69.
21. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 62-64.
22. "Candy" is a weight which may be stated roughly at about 500 lbs.
23. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 48.
24. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 53-54.
25. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 56.
26. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 64.
27. Aitchison, *Treaties*, Vol. IV, p. 176.
28. Gense and Banaji, p. 85. Mostyn told Ramaji Chitnis : "Now we had accommodated matters (with Fateh Sing), his master (meaning the Peshwa) had opened his eyes and wanted us to give it up to him." (Gense and Banaji, p. 86).
29. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 85-86.
30. Gense and Banaji, p. 87.
31. Gense and Banaji, p. 101.
32. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 103. As early as the 16th January, 1773, Mostyn noted in his diary : "The Ministers are divided into two parties ; Sacaram Bapoo with a few against Nana and Moroba Furneese : the former wish by any means to get Ragobah out of Naron Rows hands ; the latter dread his coming into power." (Gense and Banaji, p. 74).
33. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 103.
34. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 122.
35. Gense and Banaji, p. 142.
36. Gense and Banaji, p. 145.
37. Mostyn's Diary, December 27, 1772.
38. - Polier, *Narrative of the Transactions at the Court of Delhi*. Ed. by P. C. Gupta, p. 29. According to a news letter (C. P. C., IV, 122) the Maratha army *cum* zabita Khan's contingent was 35,000 strong, and a total of 3 to 4 thousand fell on the two sides taken together.
39. C. P. C., IV, 121, 230.
40. C. P. C., IV, 245.
41. J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 77-85.

42. Grant Duff (Vol. II. p. 3) is wrong in saying that he was at Theur at the time of Madhav Rao's death.
43. Mostyn's Diary, 27 December, 1772, contains the following statement : "Jonajee Bouncello's brothers, Moodajee and Sabajee, are contending for the Government ; the latter has received the Sirpaw from this Durbar in the name of the Rajah, but which the former disputes on account his son having been adopted by Jonajee, who had no children of his own." (Gense and Banaji, p. 54).
44. *History of the Mahrattas* Vol. II, p. 3.
45. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 113, 117.
46. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekha Samgraha*, Letter No. 1252.
47. Khare, Letter No. 1252.
48. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 188.
49. As early as December 1772-January 1773, Nizam Ali sent his vakil to Poona to request assistance against Mudaji and he was promised 5,000 cavalry. (Gense and Banaji, p. 71).
50. Khare, Letters Nos. 1255, 1256.
51. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 141.
52. Gense and Banaji, p. 153.
53. Gense and Banaji, pp. 183-184.
54. Kharc, Letter No. 1237.
55. Khare, Letter No. 1240.
56. Khare, Letter No. 1243.
57. Khare, Letters Nos. 1234, 1235, 1237, 1238. Later on Visajipant paid a heavy fine of several lakhs to the Peshwa's Government and was reinstated to the charge of Bassein in June, 1774.
58. About these differences between Narayan Rao and Sakharam Bapu, Mostyn wrote on the 16th January, 1773 : "He (Narayan Rao) stands in some awe of Sacaram Bappoo, but does not like him ; it's therefore imagined Sacaram will not long keep the Duanship." (Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 75).
59. Khare, Letter No. 1249.
60. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 131.
61. Gense and Banaji, p. 139.
62. Shivaji's confidential secretary Balaji Avji Chitnis, a Prabhu by caste, performed the sacred thread ceremony of his sons at the same time as that of Shivaji himself, by using Vedic chants under the direction of the celebrated Gaga Bhat.
63. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 21.
64. It was given out that this domestic was actuated by motives of personal revenge, in consequence of having been publicly flogged by Narayan

Rao's orders. He was executed for the murder of Narayan Rao several years afterwards by Nana Farnavis.

65. These Gardis and their subordinates at this time were in charge of the person and palace of the Peshwa. Their corps were composed mostly of north Indian men, Pathans, Abyssinians, Arabs, Rajputs and Purbias, each drawing Rs. 8/- to 15/- as monthly pay. They worked only for their wages and had no personal attachment to the master they served.
66. Tulaji Pawar was found to be the chief culprit in the enquiry into the affair. He long escaped capture and when in 1780 his evidence came to be recorded, he said that the plot had started in the days at Theur, meaning that the decision was taken by Raghunath Rao, while the late Peshwa was at Theur, to secure the Peshwaship for himself after he was dead.
67. Tayler gives the wrong date because in his memorial presented to Calcutta Council on the 9th October, 1775, he put it on the 18th August.
68. Khare, Letter No. 1257 ; B. S. C., 12 February 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 35.
69. Khare, Letter No. 1260.
70. Khare, Letter No. 1264.
71. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 5.
72. Khare, Letter No. 1257.
73. *Ibid.*
74. Khare, Letter No. 1260.
75. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 199-200.
76. Gense and Banaji, p. 212.
77. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 199.
78. *Harivanshachi Bakhar* by Balkrishna Harihar Patwardhan, ed. by Khare (1909).
79. Grant Duff, Vol. II, p. 6.
80. B. S. C. 9 October 1775. *Fifth Report from Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 83.
81. Khare, Letter No. 1257.

Chapter II—Events Leading to the Treaty of Surat

1. Khare, Letter No. 1264.
2. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 203.
3. Gense and Banaji, p. 203. As the Gardis intended to kill him, Haripant on hearing of the murder of Narayan Rao fled from Poona. (Khare, Letter No. 1257)

4. Gense and Banaji, p. 204.
5. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 204.
6. Gense and Banaji, p. 208.
7. Gense and Banaji, p. 220.
8. Khare, Letter No. 1258.
9. Khare, Letter No. 1261.
10. Khare, Letter No. 1262.
11. It seems that Appaji Ram had been released before the murder of Narayan Rao took place. (Khare, Letter No. 1263)
12. Khare, Letter No. 1259.
13. Petlad is situated about 20 miles from Baroda.
14. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 226-228.
15. Gense and Banaji, p. 207.
16. Bom. Council to Mostyn, 18 September 1773 (Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 231-232).
17. Gense and Banaji, p. 234.
18. Appaji Ram's letter to Haidar requesting him to attack Sira, Hoskote, Mudgere, Balapur was intercepted by the Subedar of Sira. The Chief of Balapur was informed accordingly by the Subedar of Sira. (Khare, Letter No. 1267).
19. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, p. 565.
20. A letter from Shivaji Pant to Vamanrao, dated first fortnight of September 1773, reported that Ganga Bai was with child (Khare, Letter No. 1259).
21. Khare, Letter No. 1272.
22. One typical instance of this was that Raghunath Rao nominated Bhavanrao as Pratinidhi in place of Bhagawantrao who had been appointed to this post by Madhav Rao on the advice of Sakharam Bapu (Khare). See also Khare, Letter No. 1272.
23. Khare, Letter No. 1273.
24. Saswad, situated 16 miles south-east of Poona city, was the original Deccan home of the Peshwa's family.
25. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 262.
26. Naldurg village is in the Tujapur taluk of Osmanabad District, Hyderabad. The fort of Naldurg is situated above the ravine of the Bori river and is one of the best fortified and most picturesque places in the Deccan.
27. Khare, Letter No. 1295.
28. Khare, Letters No. 1304, 1308.
29. Khare, Letter No. 1304.
30. Khare, Letter No. 1303.

31. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 10.
32. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 279.
33. Gense and Banaji, p. 280.
34. Khare, Letters No. 1311, 1314, 1316. Also Secret and Pol. Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 16-17.
35. Khare, Letter No. 1311.
36. *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 11.
37. Tanjore was carried by storm on 17 September 1773.
38. Khare, Letter No. 1299.
39. Khare, Letter No. 1322 ; also Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 310. Kincaid and Parasnis, referring to Khare's Life of Nana Farnavis observed that Durgabai, Anandi Bai's daughter, also accompanied them so that she might be a witness of the confinement. (*History of the Maratha People*, Vol. III, p. 108).
40. Gense and Banaji, p. 323.
41. *Selections from the Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXXVI, Letter No. 25.
42. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letters No. 30, 34.
43. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letter No. 34.
44. There are many instances of the lands of Raghunath Rao's men being confiscated (Vad, *Selections from the Satara Raja & the Peshwas, Diaries*, Vol. I, 124).
45. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 321.
46. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letter No. 13 ; also Gense and Banaji, p. 324.
47. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letter No. 13 : also Gense and Banaji, p. 330.
48. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letter No. 21.
49. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 335-336.
50. Khare, Letters No. 1333, 1342. Nizam Ali was marching across the country from Gulbarga to co-operate with the army that might first appear, although he still pretended to be a friend of Raghunath Rao.
51. Khare, Letter No. 1344.
52. *Patre Yadi*, 230 : quoted by Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 41.
53. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letter No. 41
54. Khare, Letter No. 1349.
55. B. M. Add. MSS. 29, 209.
56. Khare, Letter No. 1357.
57. Mostyn wrote on 10 April : "the late conduct of his (Raghunath Rao's) retreat hurt his credit much." (Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 344).
58. Gense and Banaji, p. 349.
59. *Ibid.*

60. Gense and Banaji, p. 366.
61. Gense and Banaji, pp. 347-348.
62. Khare, Letter No. 1385. Tipu also attacked Chenraidurg.
63. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 18.
64. Khare, Letter No. 1408.
65. Khare, Letter No. 1356 ; also Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 347. It has been questioned whether this child was the son of Peshwa Narayan Rao. But there is not only evidence, but 'unimpeachable evidence.' It appears that Raghunath Rao had two vakils at Purandhar immediately after the young Peshwa's birth, and his own daughter, Durgabai, was in the room at the time of the infant's birth. Grant Duff states that no doubt prevailed amongst the Marathas that the infant was the child of Narayan Rao. The parentage was also confirmed, it was said, by his striking resemblance to his cousin, Baji Rao II. Wilson, in the note appended to Mill's *History of India*, Vol. III, points out that the doubts regarding the birth of the infant Peshwa originated with the imperfect information and credulity of the English authorities at Bombay. "The reality of birth of Seway Mahdoo Rao Narrain is no longer doubted." (B. M. Add. MSS. 29, 209).
66. Khare, Letter No. 1367 ; also Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 350.
67. Khare, Letter No. 1360. Anandvalli is a village about eight miles west of Nasik.
68. *Shindeshahichi Rajkarane*, Letter No. 3. Raghunath Rao crossed the Narbada towards Indore with Sakharām Hari, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Maloji Ghorpade and Baburao Patankar. (Khare, Letter No. 1363).
69. Khare, Letter No. 1368.
70. Khare, Letter No. 1382.
71. S. P. D., XXXVI, Letter No. 48.
72. According to Patwardhan Daftar.
73. Khare, Letter No. 1388.
74. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 327.
75. Gense and Banaji, pp. 357-359.
76. Baramati, a town 50 miles south-east of Poona.
77. Khare, Letter No. 1393.
78. Khare, Letters No. 1406, 1408.
79. In Letter No. 1401 of Khare's *Lekha Samgraha* we find the following account : "Raghunath Rao will soon cross the Tapti, but still he is scheming to free himself from Sindhia and Holkar."
80. Khare, Letter No. 1372.

81. Srirangam is an island in the river Kaṁberi near Trichinopoly.
82. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 343-344.
83. Bombay Council to Mostyn, 17 April 1774 (Gense and Banaji, p. 346).
84. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 348.
85. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 82-83.
86. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 118-122.
87. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 118-122.
88. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 122-125.
89. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 128-132.
90. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 141-143.
91. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 141-143.
92. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 144-147.
93. *Ibid.*
94. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 147-149.
95. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 150-154.
96. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 158-164.
97. Secret and Political Dept. Dairy, No. 15, p. 226.
98. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 232-238.
99. Jambusar, Amod, Desborah, Olpad, Hasot and the lakh and a half stipulated to be ceded from any pergunnahs the Company might choose.
100. Secret and Political Dept. Diary No. 15, pp. 247-248.
101. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 248-251.
102. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 44-46.
103. Bom. Sel. Com. 28 November 1774. *Fifth Report from the Com. of Secrecy*, App. No. 58.
104. Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 370-371.
105. Forrest, *Selections from the Letters, Despatches, etc., Maratha Series*, p. 205.
106. Bom. Sel. Com. 28 November 1774. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 58. Also S. P. D., XXXV, 207.
107. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 208-213.
108. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 208-213.
109. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 15, pp. 240-244.
110. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 180.
111. Bom. Cons., 16 December 1774. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 180.
112. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 180-181.
113. Gordon to Hornby, 14 December 1774. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 187.

147. S. P. D., XXXVI, 105.
148. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 7-11.
149. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 12-16.
150. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 19-22.
151. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 27-30.
152. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 33-36.
153. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 65-67.
154. Khare, Letter No. 1439.
155. Khare, Letter No. 1440.
156. Khare, Letter No. 1441.
157. S. P. D., XXXVI, 148.
158. Khare, Letter No. 1441. The English account is that Raghunath Rao, apprehending some defection in his troops, mostly Arabs, whom it was supposed the ministerial party had corrupted, immediately fled from the battlefield with 'utmost precipitation' towards Cambay. (Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 67-71, 149-153).
159. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 71-73 ; also Khare, Letter No. 1441.
160. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 73-75 ; also S. P. D., XXXVI, 159.
161. S. P. D., XXXVI, 177.
162. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 211-215 ; also Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, etc.*, Vol. VI, p. 21.
163. These jewels, after many vicissitudes, were returned to his son, Baji Rao, in June, 1798.
164. Meaning Karanja, Kenery, Elephanta and Hog Island.

CHAPTER III—Upton's Mission and the Treaty of Purandhar

1. Hornby to Keating, 17 February 1775. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 215-217.
2. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, p. 172.
3. Keating to Bombay Council, 21 March 1775. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 219-220.
4. S. P. D., XXXVI, 185.
5. S. P. D., XXXVI, 197, 199.
6. S. P. D., XXXVI, 196.
7. S. P. D., XXXVI, 159.
8. S. P. D., XXXVI, 201.
9. Keating to Bombay Council, 19 April 1775. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 220.

10. Keating to Francis, 28 October 1775. Francis Mss. No. 47, pp. 251-260.
11. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 223.
12. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 223-225.
13. One curious incident was that Maratha soldiers had penetrated into Raghunath Rao's forces wearing the typical headwear of leaves which Raghunath's soldiers were wearing under instructions of the English and effected a general massacre. (Khare).
14. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 226-230 ; also Khare, Letter No. 1464.
15. Khare, Letter No. 1464.
16. S. P. D., XXXVI, 223.
17. S. P. D., XXXVI, 238.
18. S. P. D., XXXVI, 230.
19. Francis Mss. No. 47, pp. 251-260.
20. Khare, Letter No. 1475.
21. Gense and Banaji, *The Gaikwads of Baroda*. Vol. II, Introduction. p. XVI.
22. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 282-285 ; also B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 209.
23. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 282-285.
24. S. P. D., XXXVI, 257.
25. S. P. D., XXXVI, 289.
26. S. P. D., XXXVI, 263.
27. S. P. D., XXXVI, 248.
28. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, 1782, App. No. 1 ; also A. C. Banerjee, *Indian Constitutional Documents*, Vol. I, pp. 15-23.
29. For details of the Regulating Act see Kaye, *Administration of the East India Company*, and Ilbert, *Government of India*.
30. Hastings to Sullivan, 21 March 1776. Gleig II, pp. 41-42.
31. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 199. Company's General Letter to Governor-General and Council, 24 December 1774.
32. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 199. Thomas Rumbold's letter to Court of Directors, January, 1780.
33. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 325.
34. Hastings to Lord North, 2 April 1775. Gleig, I, p. 543.
35. Forrest, *Selections from State Papers, Warren Hastings*, II, pp. 74-75.
36. Gleig, II, P. 179.
37. Gleig, I, P. 517.
38. Wietzman, *Warren Hastings and Philip Francis*, p. 20.

39. Francis Mss. No. 47, pp. 37-44 : also *Memoirs of Philip Francis*, II, pp. 18-19.
40. Francis Mss. No. 47, pp. 105-111 : Francis to D'Oyly, 12 January 1775.
41. Francis Mss. No. 47, pp. 56-59 : Francis to Welbore Ellis, 1 December 1774.
42. Gleig, I, pp. 470-471 : Hastings to Sullivan, 4 December 1774.
43. Gleig, I, pp. 472-473 : Hastings to North, 4 December 1774.
44. B. S. C., 8 March 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 62.
45. B. S. C., 30 January 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 63.
46. Forrest. *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 232-233.
47. Forrest. *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 232-233.
48. B. S. C., 3 February 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 64.
49. *Ibid.*
50. B. S. C., 8 March 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 65.
51. B. S. C., 31 May 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 68.
52. B. S. C., 31 May 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 68 : also Forrest. *Selections, Foreign Dept.* II, pp. 390-392.
53. Hastings wrote to Sullivan on 21 March 1776. "I never approved of the treaty with Ragobah, nor the precipitate measure of the war undertaken without a force or treasure to support it, without a plan of conduct, and with little necessity and less profit to require it. But as it is almost impossible to withdraw from a war before the conclusion of it with honour or safety, had it rested with me I would have directed them to prosecute their original design by escorting Ragobah to Poona, and to get clear of the war as soon as they could with honour and safety. But I was not in a situation to dictate, and the language of the majority was to order the Presidency of Bombay to withdraw their forces immediately, and without any reservation." (Gleig, II, pp. 33-34).
54. B. S. C., 31 May 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 68. Forrest. *Selections, Foreign Dept.* II, P. 393.
55. B. S. C., 31 May 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 68.
56. B. S. C., 31 May 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 68 : also C.P.C., IV, Letter No. 1842.

57. B. S. C., 21 June 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 69.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid* ; also Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 269-270.
60. B. S. C., 24 July 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 75.
61. B. S. C., 24 July 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 74.
62. B. S. C., 10 August 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 76.
63. *Ibid.*
64. B. S. C., 7 September 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 78.
65. B. S. C., 7 September 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 78. Governor-General's Minute.
66. B. S. C., 7 September 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 78. Monson's Minute.
67. B. S. C., 7 September 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 78.
68. B. S. C., 7 September 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 78. Clavering's Minute.
69. *Ibid*, Governor-General and Council to Bombay Council, 7 September 1775.
70. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, p. 301.
71. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 304-309.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 313-314.
74. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 317-318.
75. B. S. C., 5 October 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 82.
76. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 324-337.
77. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 324-337.
78. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 333-334.
79. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 393-408.
80. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, p. 401.
81. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 247-268.
82. B. S. C., 9 October 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 83.
83. *Ibid.*
84. B. S. C., 18 October 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 84.

85. *Ibid.*
86. C. P. C., IV, Letter No. 2024.
87. B. S. C., 29 November 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 87.
88. B. S. C., 29 November 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 87.
89. B. S. C., 29 November 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 88.
90. B. S. C., 29 November 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 88.
91. *Ibid.* Clavering's Minute.
92. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 89.
93. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 89.
94. Secret Letter to the Court of Directors from Bengal, 5 August 1775. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 90.
95. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 94.
96. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 556-563 : Bombay Council to the Court of Directors, 28 November 1775.
97. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, p. 582.
98. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 16, pp. 571-574.
99. Secret and Political Dept. Diary No. 16, pp. 590-592.
100. B. S. C., 26 February 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 101.
101. Francis Mss., No. 47, pp. 261-263.
102. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 26 February 1776, No. 25.
103. B. S. C., 8 January 1776.
104. B. S. C., 12 February 1776 : Upton to Calcutta Council, 5 January 1776.
105. B. S. C., 12 February 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 98.
106. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 April 1776, No. 2A.
107. Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, p. 257.
108. *Ibid.*
109. Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, p. 259.
110. Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, p. 261.
111. Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, p. 264.
112. B. S. C., 12 February 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 99.
113. B. S. C., 15 February 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 100.
114. B. S. C., 15 February 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 100.

115. B. S. C., 6 March 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 102.
116. Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, p. 272.
117. B. S. C., 6 March 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 102.
118. B. S. C., 6 March 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 102.
119. B. S. C., 7 March 1776 ; Upton to Calcutta Council, 7 January 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 102.
120. B. S. C., 7 March 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*,

Chapter IV—Diplomatic Interlude

1. Gleig. II, p. 194 ; Hastings to Sullivan, 18 August 1778.
2. Keating to Bombay Council, 11 March 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 122.
3. Bombay Council to Upton, 15 March 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 122.
4. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17, pp. 266-271.
5. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 May 1776. No. E.
6. B. S. C., 6 May 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 124.
7. B. S. C., 9 May 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 124.
8. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 125.
9. B. S. C., 15 May 1776.
10. B. S. C., 16 May 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 127.
11. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 129.
12. B. S. C., 20 May 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 129.
13. B. S. C., 20 May 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 129. Letter from Raghubunath Rao to Hornby, 9 April 1776.
14. B. S. C., 20 May 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 130.
15. B. S. C., 6 June 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 131.
16. B. S. C., 6 June 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 131.
17. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 June 1776. No. A.
18. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 June 1776. Nos. B and C.
19. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, pp. 360-361.
20. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 June 1776. No. 2.
21. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 July 1776. No. A.
22. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, p. 371.
23. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, pp. 427-428.
24. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 July 1776. No. A.
25. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 July 1776. No. A.
26. Bombay Records, Public Dept. Letters from the Court of Directors, IX, p. 249.
27. Gleig. II, pp. 45-46 ; Hastings to Maclean, 14 July 1776.

28. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 30 September 1776, No. S ; 21 October 1776, No. G.
29. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 30 September 1776, No. T.
30. B. S. C., 30 September 1776. *Fifth Report*, App. No. 140. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 284-285.
31. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 21 October 1776, No. G.
32. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A.
33. B. S. C., 24 July 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 135.
34. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 9 December 1776, Nos. D, E.
35. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 307.
36. B. S. C., 23 December 1776. *Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 144.
- 37. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 447.
38. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, pp. 484-488.
39. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 October 1776, No. H.
40. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, p. 560.
41. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 23 December 1776, No. 1
42. C. P. C., V, Letters No. 385, 386.
43. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, p. 592.
44. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, pp. 599-601.
45. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, p. 602.
46. B. S. C., 27 January 1777. Peshwa to Upton, received 19 November 1776. *Fifth Report*, App. No. 147.
47. B. S. C., 30 December 1776. *Fifth Report*, App. No. 146.
48. B. S. C., 26 February 1777. *Fifth Report*, App. No. 147.
49. B. S. C., 26 February 1777. *Fifth Report*, App. No. 147.
50. Quoted by Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, pp. 302-304.
- 51. Quoted by Macpherson, *Soldiering in India*, p. 304.
52. Kincaid and Parasnis, *A History of the Maratha People*, Vol. III, p. 117.
53. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 July 1776, No. 2.
54. Khare, Letter No. 1874.
55. Khare, Letter No. 1881.
56. Khare, Letter No. 1880.
57. Khare, Letter No. 1883.
- 58. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, pp. 453-469.
59. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 October 1776, No. E. Also Secret and Political Dept. Diary No. 17A.
60. Khare, Letter No. 1890.
61. Khare, Letter No. 1889.
62. Khare, Letter No. 1893.

63. Khare, Letter No. 1901
64. Khare, Letter No. 1906.
65. Khare, Letter No. 1907.
66. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 17A, pp. 565-568.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Khare, Letter No. 1913.
69. Khare, Letters No. 1927, 1932.
70. Khare, Letter No. 1932. Also For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 26 February 1777, No. 0.
71. Khare, Letter No. 1935.
72. Khare, Letter No. 1957.
73. Khare, Letter No. 1947.
74. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 16 June 1777, No. A.
75. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 16 June 1777, No. A.
76. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 16 June 1777, No. A.
77. *Ibid.*
78. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 August 1777, No. 5.
79. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 August 1777, No. 2.
80. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 August 1777, No. 4.
81. "M. St. Lubin is a person without any visible fortune, who, by a long unsettled residence in India, has acquired an uncommon knowledge of the customs, manners, policy, trade, languages, situations and dispositions of the several powers of that country, both native and European. From the station of a private soldier in Mauritius, by genius, activity, address, fluency of speech, and withal a considerable share of assurance, he has risen to his present eminence." (Mackintosh, *Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa*, Vol. I, Letter No. VI, 12 May 1778, pp. 64-65.)
82. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139 ; Farmer to Hastings, 24 November 1777.
83. *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XXXI : Article contributed by V. G. Hatakar, *French Documents throwing fresh light on the Embassy of M. De. St. Lubin to the Maratha Court, 1777-1778.*
84. Mackintosh, *Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa*, Vol. I, Letter VII, 17 May 1778, pp. 74-75.
85. B. S. C., 29 December 1777 ; Madjett to Lewis, 9 November 1777. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 20. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 291-296.
86. *Ibid.*
87. For. Dept. Sec. Cons. 16 June 1777, No. 8.

88. B. S. C., 2 February 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 29.
89. Bom. Sec. Cons., 23 May 1777.
90. B. S. C., 2 February 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 29.
91. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 July 1777, No. G.
92. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 July 1777, No. 3.
93. *Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XXXI, Article by V. G. Hatakar.
94. Quoted by Hallward : *William Bolts, a Dutch Adventurer*, p. 151.
95. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 140 ; Mostyn to Hastings, 12 May 1778.
96. B. S. C., 26 January 1778.
97. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 18, p. 82.
98. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 138 ; Boddam to Hastings, 22 May 1777.
99. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 18, p. 200.
100. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 301.
101. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 138 ; Mostyn to Hastings, 15 June 1777.
102. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139 ; Farmer to Holmes, 22 October 1777.
103. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139.
104. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139 ; Hornby to Hastings, 3 November 1777.
105. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139.
106. Bombay Records, Public Dept. Letters from the Court of Directors, Vol. IX, pp. 293-296.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Bom. Sec. Cons. 17 December 1777. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 26.
109. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 17-18.
110. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 43-44.
111. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Hornby, 28 January 1778.
112. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Hornby, 30 January 1778.
113. B. S. C., 2 February 1778. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, II, pp. 577-579.
114. B. S. C., 2 February 1778. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, II, p. 579.
115. Francis Mss. No. 50 ; Francis to North, 23 February 1778.
116. B. S. C., 23 February 1778. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, II, p. 595.
117. Francis Mss. No. 48 ; Francis to Upton, 13 February 1778.
118. Gleig, II, P. 222 ; Hastings to Sullivan, 29 November 1778.
119. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Leslie, 21 February 1778.
120. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Leslie, 21 February 1778.

121. B. S. C., 23 February 1778. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, I pp. 592-594.
122. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 199.
123. B. S. C., 23 March 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 39.
124. B. S. C., 6 April 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 42.

Chapter V—Politics at Poona and the Convention of Wadgaon

1. Khare, Letter No. 2204.
2. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 29 January 1778, No. 2.
3. *Riyasat, Uttara Vibhag I*, pp. 121-122.
4. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139.
5. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139.
6. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 16 February 1778, No. A.
7. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 139 ; Farmer to Holmes, 22 October 1777.
8. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 April 1778, No. 3.
9. *Riyasat, Uttara Vibhag I*, pp. 121-122.
10. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, p. 109.
11. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 108-110.
12. Khare, Letter No. 2300.
13. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 27 April 1778, No. 4 ; B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 140 ; Mostyn to Rumbold, 27 March 1778.
14. Khare, Letter No. 2292.
15. Bom. Sec. Cons., 10 April 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 89.
16. Bom. Sec. Cons., 16 April 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 90.
17. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 21 May 1778, No. 1.
18. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 168-173.
19. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 21-23.
20. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 178-180.
21. B. S. C., 22 June 1778 ; Lewis' Journal of his deputation to the Maratha Court. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 58.
22. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 140 ; Farmer to Hornby, 7 May 1778.
23. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 212-213.
24. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 July 1778, No. A.
25. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, pp. 239-241.
26. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, 234-244.

27. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 29 June 1778, No. 1.
28. Bombay to Calcutta Council, 3 June 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 95.
29. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 10.
30. B. M. Add. Ms. 29, 141; Montagu to Hastings, 11 June 1778.
31. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 11.
32. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 9.
33. Khate, Letter No. 2353.
34. Khate, Letter No. 2362.
35. *Enlila Jear Vatar* (May 1907), quoted in *Rozzat*, p. 176.
36. Khate, Letter No. 2371.
37. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. G.
38. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. A.
39. *Ibid.*
40. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. G.
41. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. G.
42. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. L.
43. Khate, Letter No. 2352.
44. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19A, pp. 51-52. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 12.
45. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19A, pp. 57-59.
46. Kincaid and Paterson, *A History of the Maratha People*, III, pp. 125-126.
47. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19, p. 257. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 11.
48. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. C.
49. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. L.
50. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. F.
51. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. F.
52. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. L.
53. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. L.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 19A, pp. 64-69.
56. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, pp. 35-36.
57. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 939.
58. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 946.
59. *A Journal of the march of the Bombay Detachment*, p. 2.
60. B. S. C., 8 June 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 54.
61. *Ibid.*
62. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 June 1778, No. 2.

63. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 June 1778, No. 3.
64. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 June 1778, No. 4.
65. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 June 1778, No. 2.
66. Francis Mss., No. 51, pp. 265-268 ; Francis to Lord North, 11 June 1778.
67. Francis Mss., No. 48, pp. 282-283 ; Francis to Rumbold, 13 June 1778.
68. B. S. C., 22 June 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 64.
69. *Ibid.*
70. Francis Mss., No. 51, pp. 285-289.
71. Francis Mss., No. 51, pp. 285-289.
72. *A Journal of the march of the Bombay Detachment across the Mahratta Country, from Culpee to Surat in 1778*, written by an unknown soldier.
73. *A Journal of the march of the Bombay Detachment*, p. 3.
74. B. M. Add. Mss., 29, 118 ; Hastings to Leslie, 20 June 1778.
75. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 7 July 1778, No. 1.
76. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 7 July 1778, No. 6.
77. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 9 July 1778, No. 2.
78. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 9 July 1778, No. 2.
79. *Ibid.*
80. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 117 ; Hastings to Eyre Coote, 21 January 1779.
81. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 July 1778, No. 17.
82. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 July 1778, No. 17.
83. For. Dept. Sec. Procs., 16 November 1778, Vol 39A.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Gleig, II, p. 202.
86. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Hastings to Elliot, 30 July 1778.
87. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Hastings to Elliot, 2 August 1778.
88. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 July 1778, No. 3.
89. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 July 1778, No. 4.
90. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 July 1778, No. 2.
91. Quoted by Parkes and Merivale, *Memoirs of Philip Francis*, II, p. 132.
92. For. Dept. Sec. Procs., 16 November 1778, Vol. 39A.
93. Francis Mss. No. 48 ; Francis to Carnac, 14 August 1778.
94. Parkes and Merivale, *Memoirs of Philip Francis*, II, pp. 131-132.
95. Francis Mss. No. 41 ; Francis to Rumbold, 5 August 1778, Quoted by Wietzman.
96. Francis Mss. No. 51 ; Francis to Wombwell, 15 August 1778.
97. Hastings in a letter, dated 27 July 1778, to Rumbold wrote, "An immediate attack on Pondicherry could hardly fail of succeeding and

would probably decide the fate of us in India." (B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118).

98. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, II, pp. 639-640.
99. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 7 July 1778, No. 5.
100. *A Journal of the march of the Bombay Detachment*, p. 10.
101. For. Dept. Sec. Procs., 2 November 1778, Vol. 39, pp. 2239-2253.
102. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 30 July 1778, No. 3.
103. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1037.
104. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 30 July 1778, No. 2.
105. *Ibid.*
106. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1029.
107. For. Dept. Sec. Procs., 2 November 1778, Vol. 39, pp. 2256-2272.
108. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Goddard to Hastings, 24 July 1778.
109. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 199.
110. *A Journal of the march of the Bombay Detachment*, p. 9.
111. For. Dept. Sec. Procs., 2 November 1778, Vol. 39, pp. 2256-2272.
112. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 September 1778, No. 3.
113. Francis Mss. No. 48, pp. 293-294 ; Francis to Carnac, 14 August 1778.
114. B. S. C., 2 September 1778. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 138.
115. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 September 1778, No. 3.
116. C. P. C., V, Letters No. 1114, 1115. For Dept. Sec. Cons., 5 October 1778, No. 3.
117. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Leslie to Hastings, 18 August 1778.
118. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 4 September 1778, No. 4.
119. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141.
120. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Leslie to Hastings, 29 August 1778.
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123. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 5 October 1778, No. 1.
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125. For Dept. Sec. Procs., 5 October 1778, Vol. 39, pp. 2072-2080.
126. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 5 October 1778, No. 4. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141. Francis Mss. No. 48, p. 300 ; Francis to Rumbold, 30 September 1778.
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128. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 117 ; Hastings to Eyre Coote, 21 January 1779.
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130. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 12 October 1778, No. 1.
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133. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Goddard to Hastings, 24 July 1778.
134. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 October 1778, No. 2.
135. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Goddard, 21 October 1778.
136. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Goddard, 26 October 1778.
137. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 141 ; Cockerell to Hastings, 3 October 1778.
138. Francis Mss. No. 52, pp. 291-301 ; Francis to North, 23 November 1779.
139. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 16.
140. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1778, No. 16.
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143. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 329.
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145. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 331.
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157. *Ibid.*
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159. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 353.
160. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 352.
161. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 357.
162. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 142 ; Farmer to Popham, 24 December 1778.
163. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 142.
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169. Khare, Letter No. 2460.
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172. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 20, pp. 210-215.
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176. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 381.
177. *Ibid.*
178. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 142 ; Boddam to Hastings, 31 January 1779.
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180. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 368.
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184. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 369.
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188. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 371.
189. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 371.
190. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 372.
191. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 372-373.
192. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 374.
193. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 142 ; Carnac & Egerton to Goddard, 19 January 1779. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 374.
194. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 142 ; Farmer to Popham, 20 January 1779.
195. Farmer to Macpherson, 7 June 1781. Dodwell, *Letters of Warren Hastings*, pp. 175-176.
196. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 143 ; Draper to Hastings, 4 April 1779.
197. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 143 ; Goddard to Hastings, 21 March 1779.
198. *Ibid.*
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200. Francis Mss. No. 51, pp. 777-779 ; Francis to Eyre Coote, 2 June 1779.
201. Francis Mss. No. 51, pp. 657-659.
202. Gleig, II, p. 272 ; Hastings to Sullivan, 18 April 1779.
203. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 20, pp. 41-44.
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205. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 20, pp. 287-290.
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207. Bom. Records, Public Dept., No. 10 : Letter from the Court of Directors, 12 April 1780.
208. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER VI—Futile Negotiations

1. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119.
2. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Goddard to Hastings, 29 October 1778.
3. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Goddard to Hastings, 5 November 1778.
4. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Goddard to Hastings, 16 November 1778.
5. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Goddard to Hastings, 5 November 1778.
6. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119, 29, 142 ; Goddard to Hastings, 3 December 1778.
7. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Goddard to Hastings, 3 December 1778.
8. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 16 November 1778, No. 8.
9. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Goddard, 18 November 1778. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 16 November 1778, No. 10.
10. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Goddard, 26 November 1778.
11. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119, 29, 142 ; Goddard to Hastings, 12 December 1778.
12. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 142.
13. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 February 1779, No. F.
14. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 February 1779, No. F ; Watherstone to Goddard, 20 December 1778.
15. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1329.
16. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1353.
17. *Ibid.*
18. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 February 1779, No. F ; Watherstone to Goddard, 20 December 1778.
19. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119.
20. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 February 1779, No. 4.
21. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Goddard to Hastings, 15 January 1779.
22. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 March 1779, No. 2.
23. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 March 1779, No. 1.
24. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 143 ; Goddard to Hastings, 8 February 1779.
25. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 143 ; Goddard to Hastings, 9 February 1779.
26. *Ibid.*

27. Francis Mss. No. 51, pp. 447-448 ; Francis to Carnac, 20 October 1778.
28. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 143 ; Sykes to Hastings, 24 May 1779.
29. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 20, p. 261.
30. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 May 1779, No. 1.
31. Gleig, 11, p. 272 ; Hastings to Sullivan, 18 April 1779.
32. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 May 1779, No. 2.
33. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 May 1779, No. 3.
34. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 May 1779, No. 3.
35. Francis Mss., No. 52, pp. 291-301 ; Francis to North, 23 November 1779.
36. B. S. C., 11 January 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, Appendix No. 166
37. B. S. C., 11 January 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 166.
38. Francis Mss., No. 52, pp. 351-372 ; Francis to North, 22 December 1779.
39. Francis Mss., No. 48 ; Francis to Martin, 18 January 1779.
40. Secret Select Committee Proceedings, 25 January 1779. Forrest, *Selections*, *Foreign Dept.* 11, pp. 665-668.
41. Gleig, 11, p. 243.
42. B. S. C., 4 February 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 171.
43. B. S. C., 8 February 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 171. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118, Hastings to Goddard, 5 February 1779.
44. B. S. C., 8 February 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 171.
45. B. S. C., 8 February 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 171.
46. B. S. C., 15 February 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 171.
47. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, p. 64.
48. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 March 1779, No. 3.
49. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Rumbold, 27 February 1779.
50. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 March 1779, No. 4.
51. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 March 1779, No. 5.
52. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 4 March 1779, No. 1.
53. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 8 March 1779, No. 1.
54. For. Dept. Sec. Procs., 18 March 1779, Vol. 40, pp. 432-441.
55. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 March 1779, No. 1.

125. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 23 December 1779, No. B ; Bombay Government to Goddard, 7 October 1779.
126. Gleig, II, p. 315 ; Hastings to Sullivan, 27 August 1780.
127. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1857.
128. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1594.
129. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 January 1780, No. 4.
130. "The Guntoor Circar had long been an object which both the Government of Bengal and Madras thought it extremely proper to get possession of, even by force of arms if other methods failed. When the present war with France broke out, it became absolutely necessary to secure it ; for such is the situation of that country, that if possessed by an enemy, it cuts off all communication by land with our other circars." (For Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 January 1780, No.4).
131. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1612.
132. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1681.
133. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 24 January 1780, No. D.
134. *Riyasat*, p. 216.
135. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 February 1780, No. 4.
136. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1416.
137. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 October 1780, No. 1.
138. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 September 1780, No. A.
139. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 24 February 1780, No. 1.
140. Gohad is a small stretch of territory on the Jumna, about 60 miles south-east of Agra.
141. B. S. C., 2 December 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 239.
142. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1689.
143. Francis Mss., No. 52, pp. 351-372 ; Francis to North, 22 December 1779.
144. B. S. C., 2 December 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 239.
145. B. S. C., 6 December 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 243.
146. B. S. C., 2 December 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 239.
147. Francis Mss. No. 86, pp. 465-479 ; Hastings to Palmer, 6 December 1779.
148. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 144 ; Hastings to Goddard, 24 March 1780.
149. Francis Mss. No. 52, pp. 351-372.

Chapter VII—Military Operations, 1780-1781

1. Bom. Sel. Com., 3 November 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 253A.
2. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 250B.
3. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 20, pp. 180-208.
4. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 21, pp. 732-737.
5. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 21, pp. 732-737.
6. Bom. Cons., 16 November 1779. Gense and Banaji, *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. III, pp. 45-46.
7. Bom. Cons., 16 November 1779. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 253A.
8. Bombay Council to Goddard, 2 December 1779 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 389.
9. Bombay Council to Hartley, 2 December 1779 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 390.
10. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 21, p. 795. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 24 January 1780, No. 1.
11. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 1 May 1780, No. 2 ; Goddard to Bom. Sel. Com., 30 December 1779.
12. B. S. C., 24 February 1780. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 254A.
13. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 6 January 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 390-391.
14. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 16 January 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 391.
15. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 22, pp. 31-32.
16. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 20 January 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 392.
17. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 26 January 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 392.
18. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 394-396, B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 144.
19. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 395.
20. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 22, pp. 171-181 ; Bom. Govt. to the Court of Directors, 16 March 1780.
21. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 23 March 1780, No. 1.
22. Goddard to Bom. Govt. 15 February 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 397-399. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 22, p. 85.
23. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 April 1780, No. 4.

24. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 1 March 1780 ; *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 255B.
25. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 22.
26. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 22.
27. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 396-397.
28. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 396.
29. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 March 1780, No. 2.
30. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1857.
31. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1857.
32. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 7 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 401-402.
33. Boddam to Bom. Govt., 12 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 402-403.
34. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 May 1780, No. 9.
35. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 10 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 403-405.
36. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 13 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 405-406.
37. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 April 1780, No. 15.
38. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 17 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 406.
39. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 22, pp. 268-279.
For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 May 1780, No. 9.
40. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 17 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 406-407.
41. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 24 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 407-408.
42. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 27 March 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 408.
43. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 May 1780, No. 2.
44. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 May 1780, No. 2.
45. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1955.
46. Francis Mss., No. 60, pp. 121-124 ; Horsley to Francis, 14 April 1780.
47. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 May 1780, No. 3.
48. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 25 April 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 412.
49. Francis Mss., No. 48, p. 398 ff ; Francis to Andrew Ross, 3 June 1780.
50. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 July 1780, No. 2.
51. Bom. Govt. to Goddard, 30 April 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 410.

52. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 July 1780, No. 3.
53. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 July 1780, No. 3.
54. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 September 1780, No. A.
55. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 September 1780, No. A.
56. B. S. C., 24 August, 1780. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 274.
57. Bom. Sel. Com., 8 April 1780. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 265.
58. Opposite Thana.
59. Bom. Sel. Com., 13 April 1780. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 266.
60. Francis Mss., No. 60, pp. 137-140 ; Horsley to Francis, 9 June 1780.
61. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 415-416.
62. Bom. Cons., 14 May 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 414-416.
63. Thana to Bom. Govt., 16 May 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 417.
64. Hartley to Bom. Govt., 24 May 1780 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 418.
65. C. P. C., V, Letter No. 1952.
66. Francis Mss., No. 60, pp. 137-140 ; Horsley to Francis, 9 June 1780.
67. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 144 ; Hastings to Goddard, 24 March 1780.
68. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 144 ; Hastings to Goddard, 24 March 1780.
69. B. S. C., 20 April 1780. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 280.
70. B. S. C., 24 August 1780.
71. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 145 ; Goddard to Hastings, 20 June 1780.
72. B. S. C., 15 May 1780 ; Eyre Coote to Supreme Council, 21st April 1780. *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 284.
73. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 May 1780, No. A.
74. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 145 ; Palmer to Hastings, 28 April 1780.
For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 May 1780, No. E, Popham to Eyre Coote, 28 April 1780.
75. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 May 1780, No. E.
76. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 145 ; Popham to Hastings, 31 May 1780.
77. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Popham, 18 May 1780.
78. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 118 ; Hastings to Popham, 18 May 1780.
79. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 145 ; Palmer to Hastings, 10 June 1780.
80. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 145 ; Letter from Popham, 4 August 1780.
81. B. S. C., 21 August 1780 ; Popham to Calcutta Council, 5 August 1780.

88. Grant Duff, II, p. 153.
89. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 23 January 1783, No. 22.
90. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 March 1783, No. 14.
91. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 March 1783, No. 15.
92. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 March 1783, No. 16.
Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 28, pp. 161-162.
93. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 March 1783, No. 8.
94. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 March 1783, No. 6.
95. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 March 1783, No. 6.
96. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 March 1783, No. 5A.
97. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 28, pp. 179-189.
98. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 28, p. 273 ; Gambier to Bombay Govt., 10 April 1783.
99. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 129.
100. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 129 ; Hastings to Scott, 23 October 1783.
101. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 March 1783, No. 14.
102. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 21 April 1783, No. 11A.
103. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 27 May 1783, No. 1.
104. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 12 May 1783, No. 12.
105. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 12 May 1783, No. 13.
106. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 27 May 1783, No. 4.
107. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 27 May 1783, No. 6.
108. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 7 July 1783, No. 16 ;
28 July 1783, No. E.
109. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. XXIII ff.
110. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 July 1783, No. D.
111. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 July 1783, No. A.
112. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 July 1783, Nos. C, D.
113. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 July 1783, No. D.
114. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 July 1783, No. 1.
115. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 August 1783, No. 1.
116. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 August 1783, No. 3.
117. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 August 1783, No. 5.
118. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 August 1783, No. 5.
119. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 13 October 1783, No. 38.
120. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 October 1783, No. 39.
121. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 November 1783, No. 30.
122. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 November 1783, No. 31.
123. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 November 1783, No. 31.
124. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 November 1783, No. 32.
125. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 January 1784, No. 37.

126. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 November 1783, No. 29.
127. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 February 1784, No. 17.
128. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 17 February 1784, No. 54.
129. Grant Duff, II, p. 155.
130. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, III, p. 1094.
131. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 20 April 1784, No. 5.
132. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 December 1784, No. 1.
133. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 14 December 1784, No. 1.
134. Khare, Letter No. 2677.
135. Khare, Letter No. 2685.
136. *Riyasat, Uttara Vibhag*, I, p. 412. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 9 March 1784, No. 5.
137. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 August 1783, No. 2.
138. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 23 March 1784, No. 3.
139. Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, 1761-1785, p. 146.
140. Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, 1761-1785, p. 145.
141. Sarkar, *Delhi Affairs*, 1761-1785, p. 145.
142. C. P. C., VI, Letter No. 1519. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, III, p. 294. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 28 December 1784, No. 4.
143. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, III, p. 294.
144. Quoted by Keith Feiling, *Warren Hastings*, p. 282.
145. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 152 ; Stuart to Hastings, 10 December 1781.
146. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 152 ; Price to Hastings, 21 December 1781.
147. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 152 ; Sykes to Hastings, 4 January 1782.
148. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 154.
149. Gleig, III, p. 23.
150. Gleig, III, p. 25.
151. *Proceedings at a General Court of Proprietors held at the India House on 7 November, 1783, Introduction.*
152. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 158 ; Scott to Hastings, 11 February 1783.
153. Gleig, II, p. 518.
154. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 160.
155. *Proceedings at a General Court of Proprietors, 7 November 1783*, pp. 12-13.
156. *Proceedings at a General Court of Proprietors, 7 November 1783*, p. 42.
157. *Proceedings at a General Court of Proprietors, 7 November 1783*, p. 61.
158. *Proceedings at a General Court of Proprietors, 7 November 1783*, p. 86.
159. Gleig, III, pp. 72 ff.
160. Gleig, III, p. 216.

INDEX

A

Ahaji Mahadev, 11, 38, 44
 Ahaji Shabaji, 163, 165
 Abdul Ahad, 221
 Abdul Gunney, 82
 Adas, battle of, 42, 43
 Adoni, 25
 Aera, 221
 Ahmadnagar, 102
 Ahmedabad, 19, 42, 161-163, 195,
 203, 206, 207, 217
 Akbar, 222
 Algaum, 21
 Ali Bahadur, 15, 23
 Allahabad, 10
 Ambaghat, 82
 Ambaji, 174, 175
 Amboor, 180
 America, 106, 222, 225
 Amod, 30, 37, 39, 121, 159, 160, 182
 Amrit Rao, 19, 37, 59, 146
 Anandibai, 3, 12, 13, 15, 20, 32,
 132, 221
 Anandrao Gopal, 43
 Anandrao Ram, 34, 35
 Anandvalli, 26
 Anderson, David, 184, 200-207,
 209-216, 218-220
 Anderson, James, 133, 220
 Angria, Raghuji, 13, 35, 82
 Anjanvel, 6
 Anklesvar, 30, 39, 78, 121, 159,
 160, 182
 Anroth Singh, 112-115
 Apaji Dhodapkar, 35
 Appa Balvant, 96, 124

Appaji Ganesh, 41
 Appaji Pant, 38
 Appaji Ram, 12, 18, 19
 Apte, Baburao, 24
 Arcot, 183
 Arhaund, 154
 Arnala, 187
 Arzen Ghur, 169
 Asaf-ud-daula, 52
 Athavasi, 161
 Aurangabad, 22, 96
 Auriol, 111

B

Baber, 138
 Babuji Naik, 18, 23, 27, 82
 Baburao Patankar, 38
 Bagalkot, 24
 Bahadur Khan, 13
 Bahadur Shah I, 222
 Baillie, Colonel, 166, 181
 Bajaba Purandare, 15, 27, 81, 91,
 95, 97, 102, 103
 Baji Pandit Appa, 124, 170
 Baji Pant, 96, 122
 Baji Rao, son of Raghunath Rao,
 132, 146, 164, 165, 221
 Baji Rao Burwe, 18, 24
 Balaghat, 89
 Balaji Pant, 104, 113-115, 132, 133
 Balaji Pant Damlia, 96
 Balaji Pant Patak, 124
 Balaji Raghunath, 160
 Balapur, 18, 19, 101
 Balapur, Chief of, 24
 Baloji Palande, 10

- Banaras, 197
 Bapoji, 175
 Baramati, 27, 96
 Barbhais, Council of, 23, 24, 26, 68
 Barker, Sir Robert, 10
 Baroda, 36, 38, 163, 165, 167
 Barwell, Richard, 46, 48, 54, 58, 65, 130, 137, 138, 175, 176
 Basalat Jung, 25, 152
 Bassein, 1, 2, 8, 11, 29-32, 34, 37, 39, 51-53, 56, 57, 62, 64-67, 91, 121, 167-169, 171, 172, 181, 186, 187, 194, 202, 205-207, 217
 Bawapir, 43, 160, 168
 Belapur, 82, 169, 170, 217
 Bellary, 23
 Bengal, 1, 2, 29, 30, 39, 48, 49, 51, 66, 77, 80, 90, 93, 105, 106, 108-112, 128, 140, 141, 143, 147, 151, 152, 180, 185, 186, 199-201, 224, 226
 Berar, 94, 108, 110, 111, 116-118, 133, 135, 137, 139, 183-185, 195, 208, 224
 Berrington, 226
 Betwa, River, 105
 Bhagwantrao Khanvilkar, 34
 Bhagwantrao Pratinidhi, 20
 Bhaji Pant, 38
 Bhau Bakshi, 204, 212-214
 Bhavanji Ghare, 34
 Bhavanrao Pratinidhi, 13, 15, 23, 24
 Bhavnagar, 38
 Bhawanrao Kadam, 36
 Bhivrao Panse, 81, 82, 87, 122, 124
 Bhopal, 27, 132, 133
 Bhosle, Chimnaji, 183-185 ; Janoji, 10 ; Mudaji, 10-13, 19-21, 25, 26, 41, 108-111, 117-119, 133-139, 141-143, 150, 151, 171, 182-184, 188, 194, 199, 202-206, 209-212 ;
 Raghuji, 10, 13 ; Sabaji, 10 11, 13, 19-21, 23-25, 41
 Bidar, 21
 Bisa Pundit, 115
 Boddam, 215, 216, 220
 Bombay, 1, 2, 5, 8, 28-30, 33, 35, 36, 39, 43, 46, 47, 49, 53, 57, 64, 66, 72, 73, 76, 77, 79-86, 89, 91-94, 97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 114, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124-128, 130, 132-136, 139, 143, 144, 149, 150, 154, 157, 164, 169, 173, 182, 187, 190, 206, 215, 220, 224, 225
 Bombay Council, 6, 8, 19, 25, 28-32, 37, 38, 42, 44, 49, 50, 53, 55-58, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 80, 85, 89, 91, 93, 97, 99, 102, 103, 106, 119, 122, 135, 140, 143, 144, 162, 168, 185, 199
 Bombay Presidency, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 73, 94, 109-111, 117, 130, 135, 144, 215, 223
 Bombay Select Committee, 5, 32, 53, 77, 104, 119, 120, 128, 129, 131, 136, 144, 157, 159, 186
 Borghat, 82, 121, 187, 188
 Briancourt, Anquatil de, 89
 Broach, 2, 4-8, 18, 19, 28-31, 37, 39, 43, 44, 64-69, 99, 128, 142, 160, 161, 168, 169, 207-209, 214, 216, 225
 Broach, Chief of, 75, 216, 217
 Brown, Colonel, 189, 190
 Browne, Major, 221
 Bruce, Captain, 174
 Bundelkhand, 104, 105, 112-114, 118, 132, 196
 Burdwan, 185
 Burgoyne, 106
 Burhanpur, 10, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 136

Burke, 225
 Burwaghat, 146
 Byramji Homji, 84

C

Calcutta Council, 57, 58, 60-62,
 67-69, 71, 73, 78, 85, 86, 90,
 92-94, 99, 105, 108, 114, 116-118,
 127, 140, 142, 144, 147, 157,
 166, 171, 175, 181
 Calicut, 216
 Camac, Major, 176-179, 191, 192
 Cambay, 38, 40, 41, 163, 169; Nawab
 of, 38, 162, 195
 Cameron, Lieutenant, 174
 Camloul, 165, 166
 Campbell, Captain, 167, 169, 170
 Candeela, 160
 Carnac, 90, 97, 119, 121-123, 127,
 128, 130, 131, 158, 159
 Carnatic, 2, 39, 139, 151-153, 163,
 173, 180-182, 190, 194, 197, 208,
 209, 211, 213, 218, 223
 Carwan, 168
 Cay, Lieutenant Colonel, 124
 Chait Sing, 177, 196, 204
 Champion, Colonel, 10, 71, 80
 Chandernagore, 112
 Chapaji Tilekar, 14
 Chapman, 200, 202, 204
 Chauk, 189, 190
 Chaul, 34, 87-89
 Chauth, 64, 75, 110, 151, 203
 Chenraidurg, 18, 23
 Chhatarpur, 105, 112-115
 Chikhli, 44, 182
 Chimnaji Appa, 9, 206
 Chimnaji Nilkanth, 23
 Chimnaji Rao, 196

Chinto Vithal, 11, 13, 18, 22, 26,
 90, 96, 145
 Chitaldurg, 11, 18
 Chunar, 196
 Clavering, Lieutenant General
 46-48, 51, 55, 60, 65, 72, 73
 Clive, Lord, 108, 208, 210
 Cockburn, Colonel, 124, 125, 126,
 130, 131
 Collings, 180
 Committee of Correspondence,
 Conjeeveram, 180
 Cornwallis, Lord, 222
 Coromandel Coast, 89, 190
 Court of Directors, 1, 4, 36, 46,
 52, 57, 60, 70, 73, 76, 77,
 93, 98, 104, 119, 120, 131,
 157, 182, 195, 223-226
 Court of Proprietors, 223
 Crawford, Captain James,
 Cuddalore, 181
 Culva, 169
 Cutchwaghur, 197
 Cuttack, 75, 110, 183, 184

D

Dabhoi, 43, 159, 160, 168
 Dadarao, 67
 Dadoo Pant, 91
 Dahder, 43
 Dahder, River, 168
 Dallas, 226
 Daman, 34, 79, 80, 169
 Dariabai, 10
 Dasborah, 78, 160
 Daulatgir, 82
 Day, John, 176, 178, 179
 De Boigne, 221
 De Santy, 87
 De Sartine, 86, 89

Deccan, 5, 10, 152, 172, 195

Delhi, 9, 221

Devakar Pant, 134, 135, 149-151,
194

Dewaji Pant, 10

Dhar, 32

Dhawalka, 41

Dhenkanal, 184

Dhondoba Appa Purandare, 82

Dhondopant, 83

Dhulap, Anandrao, 216 ; Janoji,
35 ; Janrao, 36 ; Krishnaji, 11

Dhulkot, 27

Dick, George, 81

Don Joze Pedro de Camera, 32

Dow, Colonel, 51

D'Oyly, Charles, 48, 68

Draper, 119, 129, 158

Dundas, 223

Dussom Gain, 30

Dutch, 4, 153, 154

E

East India Company, 1, 2, 4, 8, 17,
19, 21, 28-32, 39, 44, 45, 51-54,

57, 59, 60, 62-66, 68-70, 72,

74-76, 81, 84, 86, 87, 91,

92, 97, 103, 106, 107, 143, 146,

149, 152, 154, 155, 157-159, 162,

167, 171, 174, 175, 182, 185,

191, 194, 195, 197, 198, 202,

208, 214-218, 221-224, 226

Egerton, Colonel, 119-122, 124, 127,
128, 130, 131

Elephanta, 1, 66, 207

Ellichpore, 11

Elliot, 109-111, 116, 133

Etawa, 10

Eyre Coote, 120, 137, 141, 154,
172, 175, 181, 190, 198-200, 213

F

Faltankar, 20

Farmer, 90, 95, 96, 98, 123, 126-129,
163

Fatehpur Sikri, 221

Fatte Buruj, 34

Fazal Beg Khan, 75

Field, Captain, 38

Forbes, Major, 166, 168

Fort St. George, 117, 139, 163, 181,
215

Fort Victoria, 1

Fort William, 80, 92, 210, 226

Fowke, 142

Francis, Philip, 46, 48, 62, 65, 68,
73, 92, 93, 104-107, 109-111,
114, 116-119, 130, 133, 136-140,
142, 143, 154-156, 175-180, 222

Frederick, Major, 126

French, 70, 86-89, 92-95, 99, 102-104,
108, 109, 111, 118, 119, 134,
141, 152, 153, 158, 163, 171,
182, 209-211

Fyfe, Thomas, 170

G

Gaikwad, Fateh Sing, 6, 7, 19, 36,
43, 44, 54, 55, 57, 59, 64,
69, 83, 86, 99, 145, 158-162,
168, 170, 181, 195, 202, 203,
205, 207, 217, 218 ; Govindrao,
18, 19, 36, 38, 40, 41, 44, 145,
165 ; Khanderao, 40, 42 ; Sayaji,
207

Galgale, 24

Gambier, Robert, 29-31, 33, 37,
75, 214, 215

Ganesh Pant, 122, 168, 169

Ganesh Vithal, 38

Gangabai, 15, 20, 23, 26, 27, 67

CURRICULUM VITAE
 CURRICULUM VITAE
 CURRICULUM VITAE

—

Hyat Khan, Nawab of Bhopal, 133
Hyderabad, 208

I

Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa, 20, 21
Iccharam Pant, 14
Impey, 110
Indore, 26
Ismail Khan Patan, 10

J

Jambusar, 37, 39, 78, 84-86, 121, 169,
182
Janjira, 2, 8
Jejury, 27
Jhansi, 145, 146, 164, 165
John Call, 86
Johnstone, 81, 224, 225
Jumna, River, 104, 105, 139, 155, 172

K

Kachesvar, 221
Kaine, River, 113-115
Kaliandurg, 23
Kalpi, 10, 62, 92, 104, 105, 107, 112,
113, 172
Kalyan, 82, 124, 169, 170, 187, 190,
217
Kaman Singh, 112-115
Kamil, 83, 85
Kanauj, 83
Kapadvanj, 40
Karanja, 1, 2, 8, 29, 36, 66, 169, 207 ;
Subadar of, 6
Karnatak, 26, 96, 124
Karod, 61
Kartickswamy, 24
Kasegaum, 25
Keating, Lieutenant Colonel, 36, 40-
44, 56, 60-62
Kenery, 1, 66, 121

Khalapur, 82, 190
Khandala, 121, 123, 124, 131, 188
Khanderao Pawar, 32
Kharagsing, 13, 14
Khopoli, 122, 124, 189
Kishen Rao Ballal, 88
Kittur, Chief of, 68
Kolaba, 82
Kolhapur, Chief of, 68, 81, 82, 95
Kolis, 6, 68
Konkan, 11, 82, 87, 124, 131, 186, 187,
189, 202
Kopergaon, 69, 221
Kora, 10, 104
Koral, 44
Krishna, River, 68, 152
Krishnarao Ballal, 12
Kukaji Shivram, 38
Kuradu Fort, 82

L

Lachhman Rao Govind, 148, 149, 153
Lahar, 172, 173
Lakshman Kashi, 13
Lakshman Pant Natu, 38
Lambert Simmel, 81
Le Sartine, 87
Leslie, Colonel, 92-94, 104-110, 112-
118, 132, 136, 143
Lewis, 91, 95, 98, 119
Logan, Lieutenant, 173
London, 225

M

Macartney, 198-200, 219, 220
Mackay, Captain, 189
Maclary, Captain, 172, 174
Macleane, 77
Macpherson, 197-199, 200
Macpherson, Captain Allan, 64, 66,
67, 71, 80

- Macpherson, James, 81
 Madaji Ramchandra, 84
 Madanrao Sadashiv, 64, 66, 67
 Madec, 9
 Madhavrao (Madhura) Sadashiv, 88, 201
 Madhu Rao Gangadhar, 213
 Madras, 30, 41, 46, 47, 86, 109, 111, 149, 153, 154, 183, 184, 195, 199, 201
 Madras Government, 139, 140, 152, 153, 181, 198, 218-220
 Madras Presidency, 8, 112, 152, 187
 Madura, 153
 Mahadji Pant Guruji, 82
 Mahe, 87, 153, 163
 Mahi, River, 38, 161, 163
 Mahipat Rao Trimbak, 101
 Mahtur, 42
 Malabar Coast, 141, 143, 162, 179, 189, 190
 Malet, Charles, 38, 162, 220
 Malharrao Panse, 18
 Malwa, 41, 43, 167, 171, 179, 191
 Malwan, 11
 Malwagal, 174
 Mandalesvar, 132
 Mangalore, 86
 Mangalore, Treaty of. 219, 220
 Maunau, 112-114
 Marathas, Captain, 173
 Menavali, 96
 Mill, 66
 Miraj, 10, 23, 26
 Monson, George, 46-48, 54, 65, 73
 Moresvar, 100
 Morgan, Colonel Charles, 216
 Morley, 4
 Moroba Farnavis, 21-23, 27, 90, 91, 95-103, 119, 131
 Mostyn, 1, 2, 4-9, 15-19, 21, 25, 27-29, 33, 58, 79, 83, 84, 87-89, 95-103, 110, 119, 121, 122, 129
 Mudgere, 11, 18, 19, 23
 Muhammad Ali Khan, 22, 29, 200, 209, 218
 Muhammad Beg, 221
 Muhammad Yusuf, 11, 13, 14
 Muir, Colonel, 192, 193, 195-199, 203
 Mulheera, 112
 Munro, 181, 194
 Munro, Captain, 113
 Myers, Captain, 42
 Mysore, 196, 206, 208, 213, 214
- N
- Nadiad, 42
 Nagar, 15
 Nagpur, 10, 13, 19, 111, 116, 133, 134, 151, 184, 185, 200, 202, 204
 Najaf Khan, 9, 52
 Naldurg, 21
 Nana Farnavis, 2-5, 12, 14, 15, 17, 21-25, 27, 28, 62, 68, 81, 87-90, 95-104, 122, 124, 127, 145, 148, 151, 153, 163, 171, 182, 187-191, 198-202, 205, 209-211, 213, 218, 219
 Nara Sheo Deo, 211
 Narbada, River, 43, 133, 136, 146, 160, 163, 168, 171, 185
 Naro Anand, 41, 44
 Naro Appaji, 12, 23
 Naro Ganesh, 102, 124
 Naro Pandit, 183
 Naroji Naik, 14
 Nasarvanji Modi, 6, 84
 Nasik, 221
 Nav Ratan, 29-31, 37
 Navapur, 44
 Nawab of Oudh, 92

New York, 222
 Nihal Chand, 148-150, 153
 Nimbalkar, 43
 Nizam Ali, 1, 10, 19-23, 25, 41, 58,
 66, 70, 74, 75, 133, 139, 148, 150-
 152, 202, 204-206, 209, 210, 212,
 223

O

Olpad, 30, 37, 39, 121, 159, 160, 182
 Orissa, 139
 Oudh, 10

P

Pandharpur, 25
 Pandurang Rao Naik, 96
 Panhala, 82
 Panipat, 3, 81
 Panvel, 101, 127, 128, 169, 189, 190
 Paraji Pant, 168
 Parker, Colonel, 188, 190
 Parneyra, 169
 Parsik Fort, 169
 Parvati Bai, 23, 97, 121
 Parvati Hill, 16
 Patankar, 22
 Patwardhan, Bhaskar Pant, 82 ; Pan-
 durang Rao, 82 ; Parashuram
 Bhau, 20, 23, 68, 82, 100, 124,
 189 ; Vamanrao, 10, 12, 18, 20,
 21, 26, 68
 Pearse, Lieutenant Colonel, 183-185
 Pedgaon, 20
 Peshwa, Baji Rao, 23 ; Madhav Rao,
 1-3, 6-8, 11, 20, 81, 84, 95, 128 ;
 Narayan Rao, 2-4, 9-17, 20, 21,
 24, 64, 121 ; Savai Madhav Rao,
 44, 52, 59, 67-69, 78, 79, 87, 88, 95,
 100-103, 120, 121, 141, 144, 145,
 147, 148, 150, 151, 164, 182
 Petlad, 19, 44

Perkin Warbeck, 81
 Phadke, Haripant, 5, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17,
 23-25, 27, 28, 38, 41, 43, 44, 68,
 82, 89, 96, 99, 100, 122, 124, 189,
 190, 213, 220, 221 ; Manaji, 38,
 40, 44
 Pilloull, 165
 Pindaris, 132
 Point Palmyras, 185
 Polier, 9
 Pondicherry, 111, 153, 163
 Poona, 1-3, 5, 8-15, 19-21, 23, 27-29,
 33-35, 39, 43, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58-
 60, 62, 76, 79, 81-83, 87-93, 95-98,
 100-102, 104, 109, 110, 119, 120,
 122-124, 125, 129, 131, 134, 138,
 145, 149-151, 164, 165, 170, 171,
 182, 187, 189, 194, 199-205, 208,
 211-213, 216
 Poona Committee, 122, 125-128, 131
 Poona Court, 7, 10, 11, 89, 138, 186,
 220
 Poona Durbar, 2, 6-8, 10, 17-19,
 28, 49, 62, 76-79, 83, 84, 88, 92,
 95, 97-99, 102, 103, 118, 128, 135,
 145, 148, 199-201, 203, 204
 Poona Government, 2, 5, 7, 24, 27,
 34-36, 39, 42, 56, 62, 65, 72, 75,
 78, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 91, 100, 103,
 104, 109, 117, 119, 135, 136, 148,
 150, 151, 157, 158, 160, 161, 168,
 171, 183, 188, 191, 196-198, 201,
 209, 213, 216
 Poona Ministers, 25, 26, 34, 36, 37,
 44, 52, 55, 60, 61, 63-69, 73-76,
 79, 81-85, 120, 134, 147, 149, 151,
 159, 184, 194, 195, 206
 Poonamalee, 181
 Popham, Captain, 115, 123, 172-174,
 176, 177, 180
 Porto Novo, 180

Vijaydurg, 11, 216
 Visaji Keshav, 26, 36, 43
 Visaji Krishna, 9, 10, 20, 26, 35
 Visaji Pant, 6, 96, 186
 Visajipant Lele, 11
 Vithal Narayan, 35
 Vitthal Vishram, 13
 Vizagapattam, 79
 Vyankatrao Kashi, 13, 20

W

Wadgaon, 122, 126, 130 ; Convention
 of, 141, 143, 145, 148, 163
 Wagoneas, 168
 Wandan Fort, 102
 Watherstone, Lieutenant, 133-135,
 151, 199-202, 204

Watson, 226
 Watson, John, 33, 34, 36
 Wedderburn, Colonel, 5
 Welbore Ellis, 48
 Welsh, Lieutenant, 168, 169
 Westphal, Major, 170
 Wheler, 93, 105, 110, 117, 133, 140,
 175, 177, 178, 199, 220
 Wietzman, 48

Y

Yesaji Shivdev, 35

Z

Zabita Khan, 9, 10



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155. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 21 March 1781 ; *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 342.
156. *Ibid.*
157. Bom. Sec. Cons., 28 March 1781 ; *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 343.
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159. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 21 May 1781, No. 2.
160. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 4 April 1781 ; Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 442-444.
161. Goddard to Bom. Govt., 24 April 1781 ; *Sixth Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, App. No. 343.
162. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 24 September 1781, No. 15.
163. Khare, Letter No. 2620.
164. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 451.
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166. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 24, pp. 207-211 ; Coote to Goddard, 1 March 1781.
167. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 445-447.

168. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 24 September 1781, No. 21 ; Goddard to Coote, 15 May 1781.
169. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 455.
170. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 8 February 1781, No. 13.
171. *Ibid.*
172. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 29 March 1781, No. 6.
173. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 29 March 1781, No. 6.
174. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 148 ; Camac to Muir, 5 March 1781.
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175. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 April 1781, No. 4.
176. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 24, pp. 222-229.
177. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 148. For. Dept. Sec. Cons. 14 April 1781, No. 4.
178. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 148 ; Muir to Hastings, 29 April 1781.
179. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 April 1781, No. 7.
180. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 24 September 1781, No. 4 and 31 May 1781, No. 3.
181. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Muir to Hastings, 9 April 1781.
182. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Muir to Camac, 5 April 1781.
183. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Muir to Hastings, 9 April 1781.
184. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 April 1781, No. 2.
185. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Muir to Salween, 21 April 1781.
186. *Glean.* II, p. 379. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119.
187. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119.

16. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119.
17. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 5 November 1781, No. 8.
18. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 5 November 1781, No. 9.
19. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 5 November 1781, No. 9.
20. Dodwell, *Letters of Warren Hastings*, p. 87.
21. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 151.
22. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 119 ; Muir to Hastings, 6 October 1781.
23. Hastings to Scott, 1 January 1782 ; Gleig, II, p. 424.
24. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 461-462.
25. Hastings to Macpherson, 1 November 1781 ; Dodwell, *Letters of Warren Hastings*, pp. 99-103.
26. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, p. 461.
27. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 26, pp. 3-4 ; Nana to Goddard, 25 December 1781.
28. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 February 1782, No. 12.
29. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 March 1782, No. Z.
30. Gleig, II, p. 449.
31. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 December 1781, No. 6.
32. Forrest, *Selections, Foreign Dept.*, Vol. III, p. 821.
33. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 February 1782, No. 13.
34. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 August 1782, No. B.
35. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 August 1782, No. B.
36. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 August 1782, No. C.
37. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 26, p. 76. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 22 April 1782, No. 6.
38. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 March 1781, No. 11A.
39. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 March 1781, No. 11B.
40. Secret and Political Dept. Diary, No. 26 ; Watherstone to Goddard, 31 January 1782.
41. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153.
42. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 March 1782, No. 3.
43. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 January 1782, No. 11.
44. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 January 1782, No. 11.
45. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 2 January 1782, No. 12 ; Hastings to Anderson, 11 December 1781.
46. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 152 ; Anderson to Hastings, 10 January 1782.
47. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 152 ; Anderson to Hastings, 27 December 1781.
48. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 152 ; Anderson to Hastings, 18 January 1782. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 March 1782, No. 4.
49. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153 ; Anderson to Hastings, 2 February 1782.
50. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153 ; Anderson to Hastings, 4 February 1782.

51. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 March 1782, No. 4.
52. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153 ; Anderson to Hastings, 13 February 1782.
53. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 March 1782, No. 4.
54. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153 ; Anderson to Hastings, 21 February 1782.
55. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 March 1782, No. 5.
56. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153 ; Anderson to Hastings, 26 February 1782.
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57. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 18 March 1782, No. 5.
58. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 153.
59. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 15 April 1782, No. 9 ; Anderson to Hastings,
23 March 1782.
60. Gleig, II, pp. 537-538.
61. Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, pp. 478-481.
62. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 June 1782, No. 1.
63. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 June 1782, No. 1.
64. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 149.
65. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 June 1782, No. 1.
66. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 3 June 1782, No. 1.
67. V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 535.
68. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 154.
69. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 155 ; Anderson to Hastings, 1 August 1782.
70. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 155 ; Chapman to Hastings, 29 July 1782.
71. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Chapman to Hastings, 10 November 1782.
72. Gleig, II, pp. 541-542.
73. Gleig, II, p. 544 ; Hastings to Anderson, 25 August 1782.
74. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Anderson to Hastings, 10 September 1782.
75. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Anderson to Hastings, 13 September 1782.
76. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Anderson to Hastings, 26 September 1782.
77. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Anderson to Hastings, 26 September 1782.
78. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Anderson to Hastings, 17 October 1782.
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79. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 156 ; Anderson to Hastings, 25 October 1782.
80. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 November 1782, No. 6.
81. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 11 November 1782, No. 6.
82. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 157.
83. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 129 ; Hastings to Scott, 7 December 1782.
84. Gleig, II, p. 547 ; Hastings to Anderson, 4 December 1782.
85. B. M. Add. Mss. 29, 157 ; Anderson to Bristow, 7 December 1782.
86. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 13 January 1783, No. 11.
87. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 10 January 1783, No. 1. Secret and Political
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